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Preface to the Second Edition
“You can check out, but you can never leave”
—From “Hotel California” by The Eagles (written by Don Henley, Don Felder, and Glenn Frey)
This second edition was prompted by a singular event: shale oil burst 
onto the hydrocarbon scene with even more suddenness than did shale 
gas. The first edition gave it scant attention, and that needed correcting. 
Some may argue that now shale oil is the story. Unlike gas, oil is a world 
commodity. Consequently an unpredictably large new source has the 
potential to affect world prices. During the two-year period 2012 to 2014, 
new US oil production of about 2 million barrels per day (MM bpd) offset a 
commensurate drop in production from the rest of the world, likely helping 
keep prices stable. In late 2014 Libya commenced adding about 700 MM bpd 
to the supply, and at the same time consumption leveled off at 92 MM bpd. 
OPEC refused to decrease production to prop up prices, and the US 
continued to add to the oversupply situation. In early 2015 the price of oil 
dropped to $50 per barrel in a matter of months. It is safe to conclude that 
US shale oil is directly impacting the price of oil.
The fact that this new oil has limited domestic consumptive value because 
it is too good (see chapter 12 for an explanation) has made the allowance 
of export reasonable despite the fact that the country continues to be a 
net importer. Because the pipeline infrastructure was unprepared for the 
increase in production, a million barrels a day (and growing) have had 
to be transported by truck and train. There are limited outlets for the gas 
associated with this light oil, resulting in the flaring (wasting) of $1 billion 
worth of gas annually. The sudden bounty of shale oil is bringing with it 
some baggage.
Over the last two years, many states have moved to strengthen regulations 
to ensure responsible production. As of mid-2015, federal regulations do 
not address flaring of gas associated with oil. However, North Dakota has 
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stairstep state regulations that are designed to minimize flaring. One area 
that has received much scrutiny is that of public disclosure of chemicals used 
for fracturing. I discuss this contentious issue in some detail in chapter 6. 
Chapter revisions include the most recent studies of the possibility of aquifer 
contamination; so far, the news is good. Since oil and gas formation have 
precisely the same mechanism, the early chapters underwent little change, 
but most chapters have been updated for recent information.
This edition has renewed support for using natural gas to displace oil as 
the raw material for fuels and chemicals, although a sustained low oil price 
could affect the degree to which this happens. I report also on some new 
ideas being developed to augment conventional processes (using economies 
of scale) with modular processes relying on economies of mass production 
Singly these modules can also address the monetization economically or 
logistically of stranded gas. In aggregate they would be alternatives to large 
conventional plants. One note of caution on all the economics discussions. 
Commodity prices have been volatile in 2014 and 2015. Where calculations 
are used to support any particular argument, the prices used have been 
spelled out. Readers can recalculate based on then-current pricing if they 
wish. In general, I have attempted to use prices that I consider “normal.” 
Finally, I discuss some concepts for high-efficiency vehicles utilizing 
alternative fuels. In all I added six chapters.
I received a lot of feedback asking for more international emphasis. I 
did point out in the first edition that, based on geology, one would expect 
the potential for shale oil and shale gas in many other countries. But actual 
progress has been slow to date. Also, I expect the considerations to be the 
same as in the US except for the additional issue of property owners not 
owning mineral rights in these countries. This last issue will require the 
respective governments to offer property owners some inducements such as 
revenue sharing. I consider Argentina to be best positioned of all countries 
from the standpoint of prospect quality and size. Accordingly this book has a 
new chapter on the possibilities there. Prospective shale-extracting countries 
would do well to follow the US experience closely and strive to make a virtue 
of being late.
Alkanes. As used in this book these are 
a family of compounds all with the 
formula CnH2n+2. The simplest alkane 
is with n = 1, which is methane. These 
are sometimes referred to as linear 
hydrocarbons.
Aquifers. Underground bodies of water. 
Freshwater aquifers, through drilled 
water wells, are the primary source of 
water for human consumption other 
than surface water.
bbl. Barrel.
bcf. Billion cubic feet.
Brackish. Water with soluble salts such as 
chlorides in greater concentration than 
fresh water (500 parts per million ) but 
less than sea water (35,000 parts per 
million).
Breaker. A chemical used to eliminate the 
effects of the crosslinker, thus allowing 
the viscous fluid to be retrieved from the 
reservoir more easily.
Brent. Brent crude is a major trading 
classification of light sweet crude oil that 
serves as a benchmark in oil pricing. This 
is one of the benchmarks in oil pricing 
and comprises light sweet oil with an API 
gravity of about 38.06. See also WTI.
BTEX. Literally stands for benzene, toluene, 
ethylbenzene, and xylene. These are 
volatile organic compounds that are 
designated as aromatics because of 
their chemical structure. This term 
was originally coined because these 
compounds tend to have an aroma—and 
not a pleasant one.
CERA. Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates. One of the most reputable 
energy consulting houses, best known 
for their annual conference in the spring.
Glossary
CNG. Compressed natural gas. Gas in this 
form is stored at about 3,000 psi to 3,500 
psi and used for a variety of purposes.
Crack spread. The price difference between 
the original fluid and the final cracked 
fluid. After processing costs, this is 
reflective of the profit in the operation.
Cracking. A refining process for converting 
larger molecules to smaller, more useful 
ones. This can be done thermally and/or 
by using specialized catalysts.
Crosslinker. A chemical used in some 
fracturing operations to make the 
fracturing fluid more viscous. Doing 
so increases the efficacy of producing 
fractures in the rock.
Crude oil. A mixture of naturally occurring 
hydrocarbons which can be processed 
in refineries to yield useful fluids such as 
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. The bulk of 
crude oil has the formula CnH2n+2, where 
n is generally over 20.
CTL. Coal-to-liquids. This term describes 
the process for converting coal to liquid 
hydrocarbons. The original application of 
the F-T process was CTL.
Diesel. A crude oil distillate that can be 
compression-ignited, as opposed to 
spark ignition, required for gasoline.
DME. Dimethyl ether. This is a simple 
ether derived from methanol. It can be 
blended with diesel to at least 20 percent 
by volume without engine modifications. 
It has a higher cetane rating than diesel 
and produces zero particulates when 
combusted.
Drop-in fuel. This is a class of fuels which 
may be blended with, or “dropped into,” 
conventional automotive fuels. In the 
pure definition, this ought to be possible 
in any proportion.
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Dry gas. Natural gas that is substantially free 
of NGLs.
EIA. The Energy Information Administration 
is a section of the US Department of 
Energy (DOE) that collects, analyzes, 
and disseminates statistics and data 
on resources, supply, production, and 
consumption for all energy sources.
FFV. Flex-fuel vehicle. This is a vehicle with 
an engine that can operate on any mix of 
gasoline and alcohol.
Fischer-Tropsch. Abbreviated F-T or FT, this 
is one of the most common gas-to-liquid 
processes.
Flocculent. A fluffy material which, in the 
context of water treatment, captures 
undesirable species and is then 
discarded.
Flowback water. Water used in the fracturing 
operation that is circulated back to the 
surface after the operation is complete. It 
often contains some proportion of water 
from the rock formation. In shale oil and 
gas operations, the flowback water is 
decidedly more salty than what went 
in. This is distinct from produced water, 
which is formation water that tends to 
flow after the hydrocarbon is mostly 
extracted. They do overlap, in that the 
flowback water will have a component of 
formation water. 
Formation water. The natural water layer in a 
natural gas or coal reservoir. 
Fossil fuel. Fuel consisting of the remains 
of organisms preserved in rocks in 
the earth’s crust with high carbon and 
hydrogen content.
Fracturing. Defined as an operation in which 
high-pressure fluid, usually water- based, 
is injected into the reservoir rock in 
order to fracture it to induce artificial 
permeability.
F-T. See Fischer-Tropsch.
Fugitive gas emissions. Methane released 
inadvertently into the atmosphere or into 
a body of water. 
Gasoline. A crude oil distillate that powers 
internal combustion engines; can also be 
synthesized from natural gas.
GTL. Gas-to-liquids. This term stands for 
the process of converting natural gas 
to useful liquids and is usually used in 
connection with producing transport 
fuel.
Henry Hub price. This is the price in Erath, 
Louisiana, for natural gas, and is used 
for trading on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. It is strongly correlated with 
the price of gas in all parts of the US.
Interval (well). A well interval is a portion 
along the length of the well. The 
designation is used to identify zones of 
different character, such as productivity.
IHS. A large consulting house of which CERA 
(Cambridge Energy Research Associates) 
is currently a part.
Kerogen. A mixture of long-chain organic 
molecules that is a precursor of oil and 
gas.
LNG. Liquefied natural gas. This is natural 
gas chilled to the fluid state and kept 
chilled at about -260°F. Its volume is 600 
times less than free gas. Transport of 
natural gas across the ocean is done in 
LNG tankers.
LPG. Liquefied petroleum gas. This is a 
mixture of molecules larger than ethane 
and methane. Most LPG is some blend of 
propane and butane.
Marcellus. The name of the formation of 
sedimentary rock in the eastern United 
States containing important deposits of 
shale gas.
mcf. Thousand cubic feet.
Methane. A colorless, odorless, flammable 
gas with the formula CH4 and the 
principal constituent of natural gas.
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MM bpd. Million barrels per day.
MM Btu. Million British thermal units. This 
is the most common energy unit to 
describe the energy content in fossil 
fuels. A thousand cubic feet of natural 
gas nominally contains 1 million Btu.
MM cfd. Million cubic feet per day.
MTG. Methanol to gasoline. This is a specific 
GTL process which converts syngas to 
methanol and then to gasoline. The 
syngas may be from any carbonaceous 
source but usually comes from natural 
gas.
Naphtha. This is product of oil distillation 
during a refining operation. It is defined 
as the fraction of hydrocarbons boiling 
between 30°C and 200°C. It consists 
of a complex mixture of hydrocarbon 
molecules generally having between 
5 and 12 carbon atoms in the formula 
CnH2n+2. It is the starting point for a 
number of useful fuels and chemicals.
Natural gas. Natural gas is a hydrocarbon 
primarily comprising methane but often 
mixed with larger molecules in the 
alkane family. 
NGL. Natural gas liquids. These are 
molecules larger than methane found 
in association with methane in natural 
gas. In ascending order of size they are 
ethane, propane, butane, and larger 
molecules beyond. 
Oil shale. A shale rock infused with 
immature oil and kerogen that can be 
thermally processed to yield useful 
hydrocarbons. This is not to be confused 
with shale oil, which is separately defined 
below.
Pad drilling. This is a relatively new type 
of drilling wherein anywhere from 5 to 
40 wells may be drilled from a single 
location, or “pad.” The advantages include 
less overall road construction and 
traffic. It also facilitates water treatment 
operations due to economies of scale.
Permeability. The property of a rock that 
defines ease of mobility of fluid through it.
Petroleum. The technically exact definition 
is a mixture of naturally occurring 
hydrocarbons that includes oil and gas. 
The petroleum industry encompasses 
both fluids. However, in the parlance 
petroleum is more commonly used 
synonymously with oil, which is liquid at 
room temperature.
Play (gas play). A region being mined for 
petroleum, or the activities associated 
with its development.
Produced water. This is formation water 
that usually flows out after much of 
the hydrocarbon has been produced. 
It is distinct from flowback water, but a 
portion of flowback water is formation 
water. Industry nomenclature is not clear 
on this point, and sometimes flowback 
water is referred to as “produced water.”
Proppant. A hard ceramic material, usually 
sand, which is placed in the fractures 
created in the reservoir rock. The purpose 
is to “prop” the fractures open to allow gas 
or oil to flow. Absent the proppant, the 
weight of the thousands of feet of rock 
above would close the fractures.
Refracturing. The process of fracturing a 
reservoir a second time in an existing 
well bore. This is usually conducted a few 
years after producing gas or oil from the 
original fractures. 
Reserves estimate. This is an estimate of 
the hydrocarbon resource which is 
economically recoverable using current 
technology. In most cases this estimate 
will increase as the resource is developed, 
especially in new plays such as shale gas.
Resource estimate. This is an estimate of the 
hydrocarbon likely to be in place, whether 
economically recoverable or not.
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RPSEA. Research Partnership to Secure 
Energy for America. This organization 
was formed with congressional line-item 
funding and includes most players in the 
oil and gas business. Initial targets were 
ultra-deepwater and unconventional 
resources.
Saline aquifers. Aquifers with water too 
salty for human consumption, generally 
defined as having greater than 500 parts 
per million chlorides. Saline aquifers are 
deeper than freshwater bodies. The water 
from this source is sometimes referred to 
as brackish water.
Scale. This is a crusty deposit formed by 
compounds of calcium, magnesium, 
and barium, to name the principal 
species. Collectively these are classified 
as divalent ions. In common household 
usage their removal is known as water 
softening.
Shale. A rock formed by the deposition of 
sediment, usually transported by water, 
and comprising primarily clay and silt. 
This type of rock is usually deposited in 
characteristic layer patterns.
Shale gas. Natural gas found in shale bodies.
Shale oil. A mature form of oil in shale 
bodies, not to be confused with oil shale, 
which is shale that contains kerogen. 
Slickwater fracturing. This term is used when 
the fracturing fluid used has substantially 
no gelling agent, such as sugars. 
Consequently neither crosslinkers nor 
breakers will be in use. Much of shale gas 
drilling uses this technique.
Source rock. A shale body with oil or gas 
in fully mature form, which usually is 
produced only after it has migrated to 
a porous body such as sandstone or 
carbonate.
Spur line. Short-distance pipeline 
connecting the producing rig site with a 
major gas export line.
Syngas. Short for synthesis gas. This 
is a mixture of carbon monoxide 
and hydrogen produced from any 
carbonaceous source, often natural gas. 
Syngas is the basic building block for a 
host of chemicals including methanol 
and ethers.
Thermal cracking. A refining process 
involving heat to break down molecules 
to smaller sizes.
Thermal maturity. This relates to the process 
of heat and time breaking down organic 
molecules to first form kerogen and 
then oil and gas. The stage at which any 
particular reservoir is in this process is 
described as the thermal maturity of the 
reservoir.
Tight gas. Natural gas found in substantially 
impermeable rock. Shale gas falls in this 
class, as does gas in sandstones and 
in carbonates. The key distinguishing 
feature is the difficulty of movement of 
fluids through the rock. Fracturing the 
rock induces artificial permeability.
Total organic content. Usually abbreviated to 
TOC. This is a measure of the economic 
potential of hydrocarbon-bearing shale 
bodies.
Wet gas. Natural gas with enough 
associated NGLs to materially improve 
the economics of recovery.
WTI. West Texas Intermediate. This is 
one of the benchmarks in oil pricing 
and comprises light sweet oil with an 
API gravity of about 39.6. The other 
important benchmark used is known as 
Brent.
Shale gas is a newly discovered resource that could make the US self-
sufficient in natural gas for over a hundred years. It has already enabled the 
US to overtake Russia as the largest producer in the world. It is uniquely 
enabled by a technology known as hydraulic fracturing, a technique under 
heavy scrutiny for the risk of environmental damage. Some seek to ban the 
method, and entire states and one country have issued moratoria. 
The primary purpose of this book is to shed light on every issue that 
I consider germane to shale gas and the enabling technology, fracturing. 
My intent is for supporters and opponents to learn something they did not 
know about the issues before reading the book. Perhaps it will cause some to 
rethink their positions. I know that in researching the issues I became aware 
of some facets that surprised me. One was the positive impact of shale gas on 
national security. Another was an understanding of why inadvertent releases 
of methane occur during gas production.
Others will find ammunition to support their held beliefs. That is fine 
as well. At least the debate will be joined with factual support. A more 
informed debate is all one could hope for. This is a critically important issue 
for the nation, and the world by extension, and we must get this one right.
Responsible production of shale gas offers the promise of low-cost 
energy for a long time, and not just in the US. At a Department of Energy 
conference in February 2012, Bill Gates emphasized the connection between 
cheap energy and improvement of the human condition: “If you want to 
improve the livelihoods of the world’s poorest 1 billion, their access to cheap 
energy determines if they can afford fertilizer, transport, and lighting—the 
things we take for granted as part of our lives and our dignity. Without 
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“Everybody look what’s goin’ down”
—From “For What It’s Worth” by Buffalo Springfield (written by Steven Stills)
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advances in energy, they will remain stuck where they are” (as cited in 
Johnson, 2012). 
In this context, telling is the fact that India imports natural gas at a 
price that in April 2012 was nearly six times the price in the comparatively 
affluent US. Domestic shale gas would make a dent in costly Indian imports. 
By learning to responsibly produce shale gas, the US is in a position to 
materially improve the human condition. This book takes a modest crack at 
discussing all the elements required to achieve this result.
The book is written for general consumption and so is necessarily short 
on technical depth. But underlying scientific rigor is certainly the intent. 
Calculations and chemistry details are relegated to shaded boxes, which 
can be skipped without losing the main thread. Also, throughout the book 
the term “gas” is used solely to mean natural gas. When gasoline is being 
discussed, the word is spelled out. The common American term gas is not 
used in that context.
The book approaches the topic from the standpoint of the economic 
value, the environmental hazards and potential remedies for them, and the 
political dimension. Balance is sought in the discussions, but ultimately 
balance is in the eye of the reader. If I have a bias it is toward seeing 
problems as opportunities to devise solutions and create economic value. 
Other than that, I have the bias of most people, of ensuring access to 
affordable energy while minimizing environmental risk. 
The discussion is primarily US-centric because the intended audience 
is largely domestic. However, the principles apply elsewhere, and where 
relevant those implications are discussed, such as in chapter 22, “Kicking 
Shale Into the Eyes of the Russian Bear,” which also discusses the use of gas 
supply as a political tool. Much of the world is watching to see whether we 
can exploit this economic windfall with minimal negative impact on our 
environment and way of life.
Much of the book appears to have a focus on the present. In part this is 
deliberate. The realizations regarding the size of the resource, the impact on 
the economy, and the hazards associated with potentially careless production 
are relatively recent. Public anxiety is at a higher level than it was after the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill five years ago. Decisions made today will affect 
our economic and environmental security and well-being for decades. So a 
focus on the present is valid. However, the book also contains discussions 
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about the future—in particular, about the predictions of the price of natural 
gas and oil, which have significant bearing on decisions in the coming 
years. The future is also discussed in the context of alternative fuels, which 
necessarily take multiple years to have material impact.
Environmental activism has been successful in closing coal-based 
electricity-generating plants, particularly older ones. This capacity cannot 
be replaced by renewable sources such as wind and solar in the short term 
because they are still generally too costly. I subscribe to the view that natural 
gas ought to be used as a bridging fuel until renewables are economically 
viable for base load. However, in chapter 21, “Will Cheap Natural Gas 
Hurt Renewables?” I discuss the belief that low gas prices will hurt the 
cause of renewables. This could change with price rises caused by increases 
in demand. The circumstances that could cause increases in demand are 
discussed in several chapters.
The book is laid out in sections, with fairly self-contained short chapters 
on each topic. The intent is to allow the reader to skip to any chapter with 
a reasonable assurance of comprehension of the issues presented. But 
inevitably the understanding of some detail may well require that another 
chapter be read; in these cases references are made to the chapters in 
question. In response to an anonymous reader’s critique on Amazon.com, 
we added a “big picture” introduction at the start of each section.
While there is a solutions-oriented flavor to the environmental issues 
throughout, there is little doubt that this will be a tough row to hoe. It 
will need a combination of legislative oversight, technical innovation, and 
industry doing the right thing, with the last being nudged along by informed 
activism in the communities in which they (will) operate. The triple-bottom-
line tenets of sustainable energy production must be put into real practice. 
In plain words: without profit there is no enterprise, but it must not be at 
the expense of either the obligation to environmental stewardship or the 
interests of the local community.

PART I 
Shale Gas  
Basics
Any book dealing with the comprehensive aspects of oil and gas production needs to start by explaining the basics—how oil and gas are formed and where 
they are found. This is even more important when talking 
about shale oil and gas because this type of resource is not 
well understood even by many in the industry. As a result, 
production methods are not very sophisticated and only 
small fractions of the oil and gas in place are successfully 
produced at this point.
The general public ought to be even more bemused 
by the notion of massive resources when none were 
previously known to exist. When one examines the precise 
mechanism of formation of oil and gas, it soon becomes 
apparent that the resource did not appear out of nowhere. 
It was always there but not deemed accessible. The new 
technologies of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
made it possible to tap into these resources in surprisingly 
prolific ways. However, these technologies also brought 
environmental baggage, the sole subject of Section II.
Shale gas could eventually displace coal for electricity 
generation, and here I demonstrate the relative economics 
using the two different fuels. In my opinion, natural gas 
prices will remain competitive with coal for decades. We 
can look to a future of steady coal replacement. 
The oil price crash of 2014/2015 changed the world order 
in oil and gas. Shale oil has shifted the balance of pricing 
power away from OPEC to the US. I explore oil market 
economics in this section.
I. Shale Gas Basics
CHAPTER 1
So, Where Did All This Gas Come From 
Suddenly?
“Do you believe in magic?”
—From “Do You Believe in Magic” by The Lovin’ Spoonful (written by John Sebastian)
Few will dispute that shale gas has changed the very makeup of the 
petroleum industry. At every twist and turn new resource estimates appear, 
each vastly greater than the previous. The estimate in 2008 exceeded the one 
from 2006 by 38 percent. Each year the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) estimate of the resource is higher than the previous. This is to be 
expected for a new type of resource: commercial activity unveils new deposits. 
The 2013 estimate is 10 percent greater than the one from 2011. As with all 
resource estimates, be they for rare earth metals or gas, disputes abound. But 
through all the murk is the inescapable fact: there certainly is a lot of the stuff. 
How could this suddenly be so? The last such momentous fossil fuel find in 
North America was the discovery of Alaskan oil. But a discovery out in the 
far reaches of the US is understandable. In the case of shale gas, all this is 
happening literally in our backyard.
To appreciate the excitement at the discovery of shale gas we first need 
to understand how oil and gas are formed and recovered. Millions of years 
ago, marine organisms perished in layers of sediment comprising largely silt 
and clay. Over time, additional layers were deposited and the organic matter 
comprising the animals and vegetation was subjected to heat and pressure. This 
converted the matter into immature oil, known as kerogen.
Further burial and temperature rise continued the transformation of 
kerogen to oil. The most thermally mature final form is methane, formed by 
the thermal cracking of oil. By and large the only real difference between oil 
and gas is the size of the molecule. Methane is the smallest gas, with just one 
carbon atom. One of the lightest oil components, gasoline, averages about eight 
carbon atoms. Diesel averages about 12. So, although we refer to them as oil 
and gas, chemically they are part of a continuum, so it is easy to understand 
that they come from a single source.
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Oil Shale
Kerogen left in the original immature form is also found in certain shale 
deposits. These shale deposits are known as oil shale. The nomenclature 
can be confusing because a mere switching of the two words leads to a 
completely different product. (The oil found in shale is known as shale oil and 
is light oil in mature form ready to be distilled into useful products such as 
gasoline.)
Oil shale resources are estimated to be very large, greater than all 
conventional oil combined. The US has the largest deposits, primarily located 
on federal lands in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. However, the difficulty of 
extraction and processing has made these resources largely academic except 
in a few countries. Estonia is by far the most prominent user of oil shale, using 
it for electricity generation.
The immature kerogen requires processing to simulate what millions of 
years of heat and pressure accomplished in nature. Many of the deposits 
are very shallow and so can be mined. The mined material can be thermally 
treated to produce a hydrocarbon vapor, which when condensed yields a 
useful oil. By and large this is considered too expensive today.
Royal Dutch Shell conducted considerable research into heating the 
kerogen in place using a pattern of resistance heating elements. This process 
was piloted in Colorado but eventually mothballed. In principle, this in situ 
conversion is an elegant solution and likely the way forward in the future.
Petroleum
Petroleum principally comprises long-chain molecules with the formula 
CnH2n + 2. In its simplest form n = 1, and this is methane, which is a gas at 
normal temperatures. When n = 2, this is ethane, also a gas, and one which 
features in later chapters. Propane has n = 3 and is a liquid at moderate 
pressure. Propane is most familiar as a cooking and heating fluid. Crude oil 
generally comprises long-chain molecules with n greater than about 20.
The greater the number n, the heavier the oil, because longer chain 
molecules are more dense. Refining is the process of breaking the molecules 
down (cracking) and often adding hydrogen as well, known as hydrothermal 
cracking. When all the oil produced was pretty light, with low n’s, all one had 
to do was to heat it up. The different molecules would be separated based on 
their condensation temperature. This is known as fractional distillation.
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The key word is source. The rock in which the oil or gas (or both) originally 
formed is known as source rock. In Figure 1, the source rock is gas-rich shale. 
The source rock is almost always shale, which is some mixture of silt and clay 
and sometimes some carbonates. Conventionally, the fluid in this rock migrates 
to a more porous body.
Figure 1. Schematic of the geology of natural gas resources
Source: US Energy Information Administration, January 27, 2010 
The porous body to which the fluid migrates is depicted in Figure 1 as 
sandstone, which is predominantly silica, an oxide of silicon. It may also be a 
carbonate, predominantly calcium carbonate. These two minerals are host to 
just about every conventional reservoir fluid in the world. 
The fluid (and by the way, gas is a fluid, although not a liquid) migrates 
“updip” (up the slope of the rock formation), as shown at the upper left and 
right of Figure 1. This is because the hydrocarbon is less dense than the water-
saturated rock and essentially floats up, not unlike the oily sheen on your 
cup of coffee. This migration continues until it is stopped by a layer of rock 
through which fluid does not easily permeate. This is known as a seal, or more 
colloquially, a cap rock. Ironically, this is most usually a shale, not unlike where 
the fluid (gas) originated. The trapped fluid is then tapped for production.
The trap is often in the shape of a dome, as shown in the upper left. It can 
also be a fault. This is when earth movements cause a portion of the formation 
to break away and either rise or fall relative to the mating part from which it 
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just separated. In some instances a porous fluid-filled rock will butt up against 
an impermeable one, and a seal is formed laterally.
In Figure 2, the lightly shaded zone 
represents sandstone, and the fluid 
of interest, shown in the triangular 
hashed area, abuts the cap rock, an 
impermeable zone shown in dark gray. 
This sort of faulting happened a long 
time ago, so the fault has healed. There 
is no fluid escape path along the fault.
In the early days of prospecting, 
explorers looked for surface topography 
indicative of a dome-type trap 
below. Nowadays sound waves are sent down into the formation, using small 
explosions in most cases. The sound waves are reflected back, and an analysis 
of the various reflections produces excellent images of the subsurface. This is 
fairly similar to ultrasound imaging of the internal organs of a human body for 
diagnostic purposes.
Unconventional Gas
I have described how conventional gas—and oil, for that matter—are found 
and produced. The current flurry of activity in shale gas is concerned with 
going directly to the source. This was previously considered impractical, 
primarily because the rock has very poor permeability, which is the ease with 
which fluid will flow in the rock. The permeability of shale is about a million 
times worse than that of conventional gas reservoir rock. In fact, as I observed 
earlier, shale acts as a seal for conventional reservoirs. The breakthrough was 
the use of hydraulic fracturing. In hydraulic fracturing, water is pumped below 
ground at high pressure, causing a system of fractures in the rock into which 
the fluid is injected. These fractures are then propped open with some ceramic 
material, most commonly sand. Without this the sheer weight of the thousands 
of feet of rock above would close the cracks. The propped open fractures now 
constitute a network of artificially induced permeability, allowing the gas to 
flow out of the formation and up the borehole to be collected (in industry 
parlance, to be “produced”). This is akin to the use of pillars and beams in 
underground coal mines, in that case allowing passage of people and bins 
hauling coal.
Figure 2. Schematic of a fault with 
trapped fluid
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The sheer ability to extract gas from source rock is now well understood as 
feasible. But some still doubt the magnitude of the estimated resource. Here is 
the explanation of why one would expect this resource to be plentiful. Consider 
that for a conventional reservoir to be formed, two events had to occur. First, 
there needed to be a proximal porous and permeable rock, and second, a trap 
mechanism had to exist. It would be easy to believe that more source rock did 
not have these conditions than did. In other words, the probability that fluid in 
source rock does not have a way to permeate to more porous rock surrounding 
it is greater than the probability that it does have such a release mechanism. 
This is why it is a reasonable conjecture that the total oil or gas trapped in 
source rock is greater than the amount of it that escaped into permeable 
trapped rock such as sandstone. Further adding to the potential is that this is 
fresh territory, relatively unexploited. Decades of exploitation have denuded 
conventional reserves, while the source rock further below remains relatively 
untapped.
A word on the nomenclature of resource estimation. A resource estimate 
indicates the quantity of estimated hydrocarbon accumulation, whether 
economically recoverable or not. A subset of that is a reserves estimate. 
Reserves are the portion of the resource that one could recover economically 
and bring to market. Typically in a new play (the term oil folks use for an active 
prospect) one would expect reserves to keep getting revised upward. This is 
because every new well put on production increases the certainty of the extent 
and quality of the reservoir, and the reserves can confidently be increased. In 
reading the popular literature it would be well to keep the distinctions in mind; 
they are often confused.
All of the press has been about North American activity. But once the basics 
are understood one can readily believe that source rock is ubiquitous. The EIA 
published a report (EIA, 2011, April 5) in mid-2011 providing its estimates of 
resources worldwide. China was seen with the most, followed by the US and 
then Argentina. The 2013 update (EIA, 2013, June 13) left China in the lead, 
with Argentina number two and Algeria slipping in ahead of the US into third 
position. This report also for the first time estimates shale oil, with Russia in 
front. More to the point, EIA estimates that source rock occurs worldwide, 
as I have conjectured. The greatest impact will be on countries that are net 
importers, such as Poland, South Africa, Turkey, and the Ukraine. Poland 
is already aggressively pursuing development of the resource base, but with 
limited success to date. The have-nots of the hydrocarbon world can kick up 
their heels now.

CHAPTER 2
The Oil Plateau and the Precipice Beyond
“Up, up and away”
—From “Up, Up and Away” by The 5th Dimension (written by Jimmy Webb)
Christophe de Margerie, the CEO of Total, based in France, made a startling 
pronouncement in the fall of 2007. He said that oil production would soon 
plateau, at the level of 100 million barrels per day (MM bpd). Needless to say, 
it made quite a splash. Here was the CEO of one of the top five oil companies 
in the world saying there’s a plateau coming. At that time the world was 
producing about 85 MM bpd and consuming the same amount. In fact, that 
has been the pattern: consumption equals production, and price modulates 
demand.
After that I personally, publicly asked a CEO of a major oil company to 
comment on de Margerie’s prediction. He acknowledged the plateau as being 
real. He said, “I’m not sure I’m going to subscribe to the 100 number, but 
there’s a plateau coming.” Shortly before that I spoke to the head of the French 
Petroleum Institute (IFP), who confirmed that their modeling showed the 
same thing. They pegged it at a somewhat lower number.
So here we have substantial people saying there’s a plateau coming and yet 
nobody acknowledges it publicly. Nobody wants to discuss it. Nobody really 
wants to act on it.
The significance is that if this is supportable, and a case can be made for 
recovery-driven economic growth, a supply/demand imbalance will cause 
havoc. The solution in part is to find substitutes for oil. Cheap natural gas can 
be one avenue, hence the inclusion of the oil plateau discussion in this volume. 
But first the thesis.
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Causes 
Now you’ll ask the reasons for the plateau. First of all there is a technical model 
that predicts a plateau, courtesy PFC Energy in Washington, DC (PFC Energy, 
2009), which I discuss to some degree below. But some qualitative arguments 
can be made in support of a plateau hypothesis. For example, national 
oil companies have realized they have a resource they need to husband. 
International oil companies used to move into resource-rich countries and 
extract oil via production-sharing contracts. Such contracts had built in the 
incentive to get the most oil out as quickly as possible in part because the 
contracts had limited duration.
There’s a truism in oil and gas production: if you draw it out quickly, then 
the net recovery—that is, the fraction of fluid in the reservoir that is ever 
recovered—reduces. The industry currently leaves behind about two-thirds 
of the oil in place. When the international oil companies went into these 
resource-rich nations, they drew oil out as quickly as they could because that 
maximized the value of the contracts. That was not in the best interest of the 
national resource.
Increasingly the nations with oil resources have figured that out. Now 
they are forcing the issue, telling the international oil companies, “We’ll do it 
ourselves. We don’t need you.” The key point is they want to bleed the oil out in 
more measured fashion. Guess what that does to production rates?
Most of the major oil companies are therefore forced to seek unconventional 
sources of oil—for example, Canada’s tar sands—which are largely heavy oil. 
Additionally, Alberta now has a small carbon tax on oil from the tar sands.
The late Matt Simmons, a highly respected figure in oil and gas investment 
circles, wrote that Saudi Arabia would not be able to open the spigots—that 
they didn’t have the oil (Simmons, 2005). 
Predictably, the Saudis have been mum on the point. The fact of the matter 
probably is that the Saudis have the oil, but they’ve got a different view of 
it now and how to release it. The national oil company Aramco has been a 
leader in the application of technologies to maximize recoveries and so can be 
expected to add to the nation’s productive capability. But they’re not going to 
get bullied into releasing it faster just because the world wants a lower price of 
oil. People thought of Saudi Arabia as the buffer, that they’d just open the dams, 
but it just doesn’t seem like they will. Matt Simmons took the position that they 
could not. It’s irrelevant: they won’t. Whether they can’t or won’t, the result is 
the same: they will no longer make up shortfalls elsewhere unless driven by 
political exigency.
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Consumption versus Production 
The estimated production plateau of 95 MM bpd—I think PFC at this point 
is talking about 90–92 MM bpd—comes dangerously close to the 87 MM bpd 
we were consuming prior to the recession. In mid-2015 that consumption 
(demand) is still down around 85 MM bpd. Following economic recovery, 
consumption had risen to 89 MM bpd by the end of 2012, but most of this 
came from non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) countries. US consumption continues to drop year after year, 
as does Europe in aggregate. The big increases are in Asia, and China in 
particular, as would have been predicted by per capita GDP growth. China is in 
the early stages of addressing this through methanol (from coal) substitution of 
gasoline. 
Figure 3 is derived from data from PFC Energy. Their demand curve crosses 
over the supply around 2020. This is a scant five years away. PFC makes the 
point, as do I, that the only real solution is finding alternatives to oil utilization. 
Note that they show the plateau for only few years, and then a decline. All 
of this is subject to speculation. But the key takeaways are as follows: more 
oil has to be found and produced, and alternatives to oil urgently need to be 
developed. The urgency draws from the fact that capacity ramp-up of biofuels 
and the like takes billions of dollars and multiple years.
Figure 3. World oil supply versus demand projection
 Source: Adapted from PFC Energy data (PFC Energy, 2009)
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The key factor is the speed of the recovery with respect to automotive use. 
In the United States, at least, oil is about transportation. Gas is about power 
and petrochemicals. The plateau is real and the recovery is real. It’s very real in 
China and India, which never really saw much of a recession. They each have 
had close to double-digit growth in GDP for the last several years and continue 
apace. In China and India, what do you think newly prosperous people do? 
They buy a vehicle. They go from a bicycle to a motorcycle or scooter to a car. 
Shown in Figure 4 is per capita car ownership on the vertical axis as a 
function of per capita GDP. China is near the bottom, and India is even further 
below, almost off the graph. These are countries with the fastest growth. The US 
is on the upper right, the direction in which these others are headed.
Figure 4. Per capita car ownership as a function of per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) 
Source: Adapted from PFC Energy data (PFC Energy, 2009)
All of this indicates that transport fuel usage is likely to keep increasing, 
and that if it does, the crossover point between consumption and production 
is probably sooner than later (I’m not talking electricity—that’s a completely 
different argument).
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based transport fuels. The rise of wind- and solar-based electricity cannot be 
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juxtaposed with oil usage reduction. This is because very little transport runs 
on electricity. Years from now, when electric vehicles are a significant fraction 
of active automobiles, that could change. 
The plateau is coming, and if consumption continues at the current rate, a 
crossover is coming, too. And at the point of the crossover, we’re not talking a 
spike in prices. We’re talking a sustained price increase. A spike is driven by a 
shortage at some point. This is not a shortage at some point. This is a plateau. 
Clearly demand destruction will occur in response to this. But the initial surge 
in price will be damaging.
Here is the crux, though: Do you really want to test the plateau theory? 
The alternative to testing it is doing something smart, like displacing oil with 
something that is more environmentally responsible. 
The Role of Shale Gas
Prior to the intruding reality of massive amounts of cheap natural gas, the 
options for oil substitution were limited. Electrification of transportation was, 
and remains, the most important avenue. However, by its very nature, the 
carbon footprint burden is merely shifted elsewhere. The electricity generation 
process generates carbon dioxide, even though the vehicle emits none. But 
certainly oil would be saved. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster placed 
a damper on nuclear energy as a source of clean electricity. Germany placed a 
moratorium on new plants, as did Switzerland, and the raising of the risk bar 
has caused funding to dry up in other countries. That pretty much left coal, 
natural gas, and renewables.
Clean coal is simply not going to have legs until we have a price on carbon, 
be it a tax or some other measurable way to pay for cleaning it up. Is it 
technically feasible? Yes. But it will add in the vicinity of 3–5 cents per kWh to 
clean it to natural gas levels. Aging plants will be loath to add new equipment 
no matter what the incentive.
Wind and solar will continue to get increasingly viable. However, they 
simply will not make a major dent for decades. Also, to be viable alternatives, 
they need a price on carbon (in the form of a tax or penalty associated with 
carbon emissions) or policy boosts. The solar subsidy in Germany appeared to 
work, but the post-subsidy world will be rough.
That leaves natural gas. Shale gas is causing the price to remain low in North 
America. There is reason to believe that similar effects will be felt elsewhere. A 
dramatic shift from coal to natural gas for electricity is likely and feasible.
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Shale Oil and Natural Gas Liquids
This is a huge wild card in the oil game. First some definitions are in order. 
Shale oil is oil found in shale, much as the gas is. This is distinct from oil shale, 
which is sedimentary rock containing an immature form of oil that needs 
significant processing. It is generally believed that the oil shale resource, also 
vast, is not feasible for exploitation in the foreseeable future. North America 
is especially blessed in this regard, but technical breakthroughs are needed to 
economically “cook” it in place to make its use viable.
Shale oil is found in two settings. One is in the oil portions of shale 
gas reservoirs, and the other is in completely different areas with varying 
proportions of associated gas. The outstanding example of that is the Bakken 
formation in North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana and extending into 
Canada. As in the case of shale gas, fracturing is necessary to release the liquid. 
The production rates are modest per well. But the production is economical 
and the resource estimates are huge. Unlike that other unconventional oil, 
heavy oil, shale oil is light and sweet, meaning it is low in sulfur, and the size 
of the molecules is on average small. These characteristics by and large ought 
to make it a refinery darling because it is less costly to convert to gasoline. 
However, US refineries do not welcome this liquid. This is discussed in 
chapter 12, but the abbreviated reasoning is that the refineries have expensive 
equipment designed to treat cheap heavy oil. Decreasing utilization of the 
equipment while paying a higher price is not something they want to do. 
Assuming production from shale oil is substantial, how does one rationalize 
the existence of an important resource against the plateau effect? For one 
thing, the plateau is likely driven by lack of access to the resource base. The 
US, as a net importing nation and one not limiting access to at least this 
type of resource, is positioned to become an important new producer. The 
US consumes about a fourth of all oil produced, and significant domestic 
oil production will eventually affect world oil prices. But that is not on the 
medium-term horizon. The very nature of the shale oil resource limits the 
growth ramp. But it could materially affect the supply/demand equation.
Natural gas liquids (NGLs) are liquids found in association with shale gas. 
Because the price of gas is low, and will likely remain low for years, most of 
the activity is likely to be in the portions containing NGLs, known as wet gas. 
These are portions of the reservoir with a higher proportion of the liquids. The 
liquid price is pegged to oil prices, not gas. If oil remains tight in supply, as 
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hypothesized above, the price can be expected to remain high. Today, in early 
2015, oil is roughly three times the price of gas on the basis of energy content. 
One can expect that ratio not to get better and possibly to get much worse in 
the coming years. So wet gas is where the action is and will stay until gas prices 
rise. That could happen with demand improvement. But wet gas will always be 
more profitable.
Wet gas will have liquids associated with natural gas in quantities ranging 
from 4 to 12 gallons per thousand cubic feet (mcf). In the Marcellus Shale, 
it averages 7 gallons per mcf. That is 0.17 barrels, since each barrel is defined 
as 42 US gallons. At today’s price in early 2015 of $65 per barrel, the value of 
the liquids will become commensurately less. For natural gas we will assume 
a price of $3 per mcf, even though it has seen spot price drops during warm 
winters and rises of over a dollar in cold ones. The liquid component is 
worth 0.17 × $65 × a discount factor added for conservatism. Even taking the 
discount parameter to be 0.3, the liquids are worth $3.30, while the associated 
natural gas is worth $3. No matter what reasonable discount you apply, the 
liquids materially add to the profitability of the gas. Small wonder that wet gas 
is the play.
In chapter 14, I discuss the ethane dilemma. One reason the discount factor 
is low is that ethane, which can constitute over half the liquid (actually ethane 
is a gas in that state, but it is lumped in with the NGL by the industry), is priced 
half that of the bigger molecules such as propane and butane at this time. Ways 
to monetize this are discussed in that chapter.

CHAPTER 3
Gas Will Remain Cheap and  
Displace Coal
“She got the goldmine, I got the shaft”
—From “She Got the Goldmine” by Jerry Reed (written by Tim DuBois)
Natural gas will rapidly displace coal for power even without the benefit of a 
price on carbon.
When natural gas is combusted for power production, the carbon dioxide 
produced is about half that produced from coal. Beyond this, the externalities 
associated are small when compared to those attributed to coal consumption, 
notably the environmentally important (and with health implications) 
possibility of emissions of mercury, sulfur, NOx, and particulates, and less 
noticeably fly ash disposal problems. A decided shift toward natural gas in 
the early years of this century stalled when gas prices became unpredictable. 
The shift started when gas was at about $2 per million Btu (MM Btu) and the 
all-in cost of electricity production was less than with coal. A Bernstein report 
(Wynne et al., 2010) details the history of this, including the quandary reached 
in 2007 when gas prices were going up but so were construction costs for coal 
plants. This caused a large number of planned coal plants to be postponed.
Today Congress has reached no consensus on legislation to mitigate 
carbon emissions, and the political makeup of the current Congress makes 
that prospect less likely. So, a price on carbon is unlikely in the near future. 
Mind you, the European version of cap and trade has simply not worked. For 
years the price has fluctuated from about €15 ($19.50) per metric ton (tonne) 
to about €25 ($32.50). In late December 2011 it actually crashed to €6.50. 
Uncertainty in price dampens investment because there is no choice but to 
make the discount rates higher. That raises the overall cost of investment.
However, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is expected to 
levy strong restrictions on mercury, sulfur, and NOx. Their hand has been 
strengthened by the April 2014 decision by the US Supreme Court, which 
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endorsed the EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule that seeks to limit power 
plant emissions in 28 upwind Eastern and Midwestern states to help reduce air 
pollution levels in downwind states. One report (Wynne et al., 2010) states that 
more than 40 percent of coal generation plants that do not meet the latest EPA 
standards are over 50 years old. One can reasonably expect many of these to be 
mothballed, leaving room for new coal plants, gas-fired plants, or alternative 
methods such as nuclear, with the problem exacerbated as the global economy 
continues to expand. With gas plants costing less to build, being cheaper to 
operate (at forecast gas prices), and easier to obtain regulatory approvals for 
new construction, the bias toward gas power generation will be significant. 
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster in Japan has had a chilling effect 
on the nuclear option. Switzerland banned the building of new nuclear plant 
reactors, and Germany went back on its agreement to extend the life of existing 
plants. Some of this action occurred within days of the tsunami and subsequent 
reactor meltdowns and there was no firm finding regarding the true impact. 
Nobody is seriously considering wind or solar for base load any time soon.
The lead time to first electricity production is low for gas, as compared with 
coal or nuclear. Coal and gas are polar opposites on components of cost. For 
coal the capital cost is a high proportion of the all-in cost, around 60 percent, 
whereas the commodity is relatively stable. In the year 2010, coal varied little 
from a cost of about $2.25 per MM Btu. The latest EIA forecasts suggest similar 
stable behavior: averages in the vicinity of the 2013 price of $2.35 per MM Btu 
out until 2016. This is the best way to express the cost of coal because the Btu 
content is highly variable; from brown coal to anthracite, the Btu content 
differs by more than a factor of 2. So in comparing coal with other fuels, the 
price per ton is not a meaningful figure, though oft quoted in reports. Btu 
content is a better measure of comparison.
Gas-based power, on the other hand, has a relatively low capital cost, around 
15 percent of the all-in cost, and in the past a highly variable price, at least 
over the lifetime of the amortization of equipment. Consequently, while coal 
power is highly susceptible to construction costs and inflation in general, gas 
economics depend primarily upon the price of the commodity.
Figure 5 plots the all-in cost for electricity produced from natural gas as a 
function of gas price. The plot uses data from the Bernstein research report 
cited above (Wynne et al., 2010) and reflects 2006 economics. The price in 
October 2010 is shown in the figure. It dropped under $3.50 in 2012 and was 
episodically over $5 per MM Btu during 2013 and also below $4 at times 
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in 2014. The generally accepted cost of production from new coal-based 
construction meeting emission standards is drawn as a horizontal band 
between 6 and 6.5 cents. 
The impact of a price on carbon can be treated in one of two ways. Post-
combustion carbon capture using technology known today, but not yet 
perfected, can be expected to cost about 3 to 5 cents per kWh to bring the 
carbon dioxide emissions down to natural gas carbon emission levels. This is 
plotted as the second horizontal band above the first, plotted using the more 
conservative figure of 3 cents. The second way to treat the impact of a price on 
carbon is to simply pay the carbon penalty. At a price of $25 per tonne this will 
add around 1 cent. This accentuates the point that any price less than about $40 
per tonne is simply not reflective of the cost of taking the carbon out.
Figure 5. Comparison of electricity cost: coal versus natural gas, as a 
function of gas price
Source: Wynne, Broquin, & Singh, 2010
Of immediate note is the fact that in 2013 the gas-based cost was well 
below that from a new coal plant. Of particular note is the observation that 
the breakeven with coal kicks in at a natural gas price between $7 and $8 per 
MM Btu. This is without consideration for any carbon penalty. If that were 
to be included, the breakeven moves to gas prices between about $9.50 and 
$12 per MM Btu, depending on which model of carbon penalty one uses. The 
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gas price spikes of several years ago endure in memory. The fact is that prices 
were over $12 for only about four noncontiguous months. Predictability of 
price and assurance of supply are needed for a major shift from coal to gas.
Assurance of Supply
A scant three years ago this issue would have had a different answer. We would 
have been discussing liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and environmental 
risk posed by that. Shale gas has changed all of that. The US can expect to be 
self-sufficient for a hundred years. In fact, it may well become a net exporter of 
gas or gas derivatives. 
This could also change the entire debate around natural gas in Prudhoe Bay, 
Alaska. Natural gas in copious quantity has been reinjected (about 8 billion 
cubic feet [bcf] per day) because of the high cost of a pipeline to the Lower 
48. Under the circumstances a substantial bullet got dodged by the delay in 
that decision. Had a pipeline been built, the fully loaded cost of the gas would 
have been challenged by that of shale gas production and the utilization could 
have plummeted. As an alternative, the nation should reopen the possibility of 
exporting Alaskan North Slope LNG. Due to the net shortage in the US this 
had been politically impossible until recently except for a single permit for 
LNG export of gas from Cook Inlet. That should no longer be an issue, and 
in fact ConocoPhillips has received an extension to the Cook Inlet permit. 
Shale gas from the Horn River Basin in British Columbia (Canada) is already 
slated for LNG export by Apache. Importantly, three LNG export permits 
were granted by the end of 2013, amounting to 5.5 bcf per day of gas usage. 
Expect this to double in short order. Gas and gas derivative export from North 
America could become a trading force.
Gas Prices in the Future
The floor will be determined by demand. In 2013 it hovered around $4 per 
MM Btu with only modest demand creation. A continuing shift from coal to 
gas will drive demand. So the concern is likely more at the upper end. As I 
have discussed elsewhere, assurance of a moderate price is a huge driver in the 
chemical industry. Is there a mechanism for a ceiling? The answer is affirmative 
and results uniquely from the setting in which shale gas is found.
Most shale gas is either proximal to the intended market, as in the case of 
the Marcellus, or close to major pipelines, as in the case of the Barnett (Texas), 
Haynesville (Louisiana), and Woodford (Oklahoma) shales, to name just three 
big ones.
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Compared to conventional gas, these wells are relatively shallow and on 
land. In a fairly recent study, examination of 100,000 wells showed that the 
average time for the construction of a horizontal producing well from the 
beginning of a well to the start of the next one was 27 days (Nikhanj & Jamal, 
2010). With the steep learning curve to which this industry is accustomed, 
these numbers improved substantially in 2014. In fact, shale gas is particularly 
advantaged in this respect because the sheer number of wells allows for 
innovation to be perfected in what amounts to a factory situation. However, the 
time from the start of drilling to the point of delivery to sales has been much 
greater, averaging closer to 150 days. This does vary by area. The Haynesville 
Shale, with the longest drilling times due to its depth and complexity, curiously 
has the shortest time to market, about 90 days. 
Pad Drilling
The concept of drilling up to 15 or more wells from a single location (pad) was 
a technique pioneered in Colorado as an environmentally friendly technique 
to minimize roads, among other features. However, this may be the culprit for 
the long time to market, because it allows wells to be drilled and completed in 
batches. Batch drilling is a technique wherein the early portions of a number 
of wells are completed at the same time, followed by the later portion of the 
wells all together. This reduces overall cost in many instances. But it necessarily 
greatly increases the time from first well start to first fluid delivery. 
That said, the pad technique is likely here to stay, particularly in the heavily 
populated areas of the Marcellus. It dramatically reduces the traffic associated 
with pump trucks, proppant delivery, water disposal, and the like. The 
aggregation also permits higher levels of sophistication in areas such as water 
handling, remote decision making, and quality control. Ultimately operators 
will balance the economics of batch operations against the opportunity cost of 
later sales.
So, depending upon the area and the business drivers, new production can 
be brought to bear in as little as 90 days and certainly under 180 days. This is 
compared to over four years for a conventional offshore gas field. This short 
time span will basically keep a lid on the high end. Speculators will be aware 
of the quick response ability. This ability to service demand by bringing on 
capacity at short notice will likely keep prices under $8 per MM Btu, possibly 
closer to $6 per MM Btu. This is the crux of the thesis that shale gas will enable 
natural gas to be in a tight band between $4 and $6.50 per MM Btu for a long 
time. 
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At numbers north of $4 per MM Btu most operators will make a very 
good profit, especially if a portion of the gas is laden with natural gas liquids. 
Newer technologies will continue to drive down cost, as has been the case in 
every new resource play since Colonel Edwin L. Drake’s historic oil find in 
Pennsylvania in 1859. So the businesses will be sustainable and continuous 
supply assured. Note: LNG has a built-in cost of nearly $3 to $4 per MM Btu 
just to liquefy, transport, and re-gas, over and above the gas production cost.
In summary, shale gas has changed the game for all industry and power in 
particular. For the first time in memory, a major fuel can be predicted to be 
priced in a tight band at low to moderate levels for many years. This is the type 
of certainty that drives investment. The timing of the realization is propitious 
in dealing with upcoming new EPA regulations on coal emissions and possible 
regulations on CO2. No new coal generation plants are economically justifiable 
provided our predictions on natural gas pricing hold up.
CHAPTER 4
What a Difference  
a Hundred Million Years Makes
“Time is on my side”
—From “Time Is on My Side” by The Rolling Stones (written by Jerry Ragovoy)
Utica, New York, is an unpretentious city of 60,000 people that has an 
interesting geological feature. Here exists a rock outcrop which is named after 
the city: the Utica Shale. This shale body is just beginning to make waves in 
the natural gas industry. This rock is old—100 million years older than the 
Marcellus Shale, the current darling of the shale gas industry. The operative 
word is current. The Utica appears set to upstage the Marcellus.
The Utica Shale is directly below and greater in lateral extent than the 
Marcellus. If all of it proves productive, it will likely be the largest gas field in 
the world. If the initial production numbers prove typical, the Utica may be 
one of the largest in reserves as well. With the Marcellus itself no slouch, the 
two together represent an immense concentration of hydrocarbons. The Utica 
Shale extends into the Great Lakes. This offers the possibility of offshore shale 
gas operations, which would be a first.
The Utica is generally thicker than the Marcellus. In the primary regions 
of interest it appears to vary from 150 to 500 feet. Somewhat complicating the 
issue is that in some areas the fluid had migrated to sandstones and carbonates 
immediately above and adjacent to the shale, so the source rock may not be the 
only producer, unlike the Marcellus. The percent total organic content (TOC) 
is the amount of organic matter present and is a measure of the economic 
potential of the resource. This is somewhat lower in the Utica than in the 
Marcellus.
This difference in TOC is one of the reasons for caution regarding resource 
estimates as compared to reserve numbers. The latter value is always smaller 
for any prospect because to be qualified for a reserve designation, the fluid has 
to be economically recoverable and deliverable. In general, a TOC less than 
2 percent is probably below the threshold of interest. 
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Productivity Considerations
Once the TOC threshold is crossed, the next consideration is the estimate of 
the gas in place. In conventional reservoirs, the gas is all free gas in the pore 
spaces. It is then driven out by a variety of drive mechanisms. Shale layers have 
two types of gas. The first is free gas in the pores. The other is gas adsorbed 
onto the organic matter. Adsorption is a surface phenomenon, as opposed to 
absorption, which is a bulk effect. An everyday example of adsorption is the 
activated carbon filter used in water filter systems to remove select harmful 
species such as bacteria. Activation is a process that dramatically increases the 
surface area of the carbon and increases its adsorptive ability. In the case of 
a water filter, the harmful species stay adsorbed on the carbon and the filter 
element is replaced from time to time.
In the case of shale gas, the adsorbed gas is released simply by reducing 
the pressure by opening up the well to the surface, and further reducing it 
through removal of the free gas. In principle one could improve desorption 
(the release of adsorbed gas) through injection of carbon dioxide. This 
molecule preferentially adsorbs on shale organic matter by about a factor of 
5. Thus all the adsorbed methane would get released; this would be a CO2 
sequestration mechanism. The practicality of conducting this operation needs 
to be researched.
Shale usually comprises a combination of silica and clay, often with another 
mineral such as calcite or calcium carbonate. The relative quantities determine 
the ability to produce and propagate fractures. The best rock for successful 
fracturing is slightly brittle. Too much clay makes it too ductile. Think peanut 
butter as opposed to peanut brittle. See chapter 28 for another discussion on 
this topic with respect to Argentina’s Vaca Muerta prospect.
What Makes Utica Different 
The source rock belongs to the Ordovician Period, which extends to 500 
million years ago and which is about as old as rocks derived from sediments 
can be. As a frame of reference, dinosaurs started 250 million years ago and got 
erased 65 million years ago. The black shale of the Utica is about 460 million 
years old, as compared to the Marcellus, which is around 370 million years old. 
This extra age manifests in two ways. One is that it is deeper wherever they 
overlay each other. This difference is up to 7,000 feet. The extra depth brings 
with it higher natural pressures for fluid production, which would be more 
similar to the prolific Haynesville Shale in western Louisiana and eastern Texas. 
Of course the deeper wells will be more expensive.
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The extra age also brings with it a greater thermal maturity. This means a 
greater conversion of kerogen to oil and gas. All of this is good for productivity. 
In addition, the close proximity to sandstone and carbonate layers causes 
some carbonate content in the shale, making it more porous. This offsets the 
lesser TOCs compared to the Marcellus. But the carbonate content makes 
the formation more like the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas than the Marcellus in 
its fracturing character. So, despite the fact that Marcellus property leasers 
have the Utica below them, the techniques used would need Eagle Ford–type 
experience.
Producing the Utica
A point being debated is whether an operator could exploit both reservoirs at 
the same time. On the plus side, the drilling and fluid export infrastructure 
certainly could be used for both. On the other hand, with the Utica being at 
much higher pressures, it would be impractical to mingle Marcellus and Utica 
fluid. Expensive techniques known as smart wells could be employed, but the 
more likely option would be to produce them sequentially. Utica would go first 
and later the vertical portion of the same well bore could possibly be used for 
the Marcellus.
Another distinguishing feature of the Utica is the presence of a significant 
oil portion on the western side. Much of this will be in Ohio, a relative 
newcomer to the shale bonanza and one in dire need of job creation. In fact 
the field it is most similar to is the Eagle Ford Shale. It has the same pattern 
of hydrocarbon distribution: oil, wet gas, and dry gas. The Eagle Ford has 
been the fastest growing shale area by far as measured by the rate of increase 
of production (see Figure 7 in chapter 12); one could likely expect the same 
with the Utica. Chesapeake Energy reported huge results from wells in Ohio. 
They reported gas production to be between 3 and 9 million cubic feet per day 
(MM cfd) and with associated natural gas liquids (NGL) of 800 to 1,500 barrels 
per day (“Chesapeake’s New Utica Shale Wells,” 2011). The ratio of liquids to 
gas is similar to the numbers in the Marcellus, but the raw numbers are much 
greater, as would be expected from the greater depths. But those reports are 
from 2011. More recently the news is more tempered, although many players 
have now entered. Shell reported recently (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014) that two 
dry gas wells in the Utica were highly productive, with peak production in one 
of them in the vicinity of 26 MM cfd, which is huge (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014).
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The Oil/Gas Price Spread and the Effect
In the early part of the last decade, oil and gas prices were in substantial parity. 
A barrel of oil has about six times the energy content as a thousand cubic feet 
of natural gas. So, if the prices are in parity, the ratio of price of oil in dollars 
per barrel to natural gas in dollars per thousand cubic feet should be around 
6 to 1. The last sustained period for that price ratio was back before 2007. The 
trend since then has been for the ratio to be in the mid-20s to 1, and 2013 
estimates from the EIA (US EIA, 2012, January 23) forecast this ratio to stay in 
that range for two decades.
This is entirely due to shale gas. The supply has kept the cost down. At the 
same time, oil has continued to become scarcer and its prices have stayed up. 
Because of this spread between oil and gas prices, the oil and wet gas are the 
most desirable. One would expect these to get developed first. This means the 
western side of the Utica will be advantaged economically, at least at first.
The Marcellus is similarly wet on its western portion. Taken together, one 
would expect the greatest activity to be in western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and eastern Ohio, and in 2014 that is in fact the trend. The last two are the 
current have-nots of the shale gas boom. West Virginia will likely be somewhat 
ambivalent about this because of the prominence of the coal industry 
there. But Ohio has welcomed it. The recession has hit that portion of Ohio 
particularly hard. Of course, other considerations will be in play, including 
whether the liquids processing is done in state or elsewhere.
The propane and larger molecules will have an instant local market. 
Half of the liquids comprise ethane (ethane is a gas at normal pressure and 
temperature but falls in the classification of NGL). The dominant use for 
ethane is in converting to ethylene, which in turn is used to make a host of 
products such as polyethylene. No capacity for this process exists near the areas 
of production mentioned. A possible solution to that problem is discussed in 
chapter 14.
PART II 
Environmental  
Issues
To many readers this section will define the “peril” in the title, although pitfalls other than directly environmental are peppered throughout the book. In 
my view, the most substantive environmental risk rests in 
the improper surface handling of components of fracturing 
fluid and subsequent disposal of the fluid returning to the 
surface (flowback water) following the fracturing operation. 
Baseline testing prior to any commercial activity is 
paramount in determining causality. 
The issue of full disclosure of chemicals has been highly 
visible with the public. Virtually every state regulation 
includes a controversial provision to permit non-disclosure 
of this information if deemed a trade secret. Freshwater 
usage is a flash point as well, especially in drought 
conditions, as each well uses up to 6 million gallons of 
water. 
Earthquakes related to shale gas production activity 
have also caught the attention of the public. In early 2015 
the US Department of Energy issued a report confirming 
that earthquakes can be generated during deep disposal 
of waste water. The problem lies in the deep disposal. The 
mechanisms are understood, and I discuss measures that 
could be taken to avoid these occurrences. 
II. Environmental Issues
CHAPTER 5
Beyond Gasland
“We can work it out”
—From “We Can Work It Out” by The Beatles (written by John Lennon and Paul McCartney)
No shale gas production issue may be more fraught with partisan rhetoric than 
the possibility of methane in drinking water. Flaming faucets make for great 
imagery no matter the true frequency of occurrence.
Well water contamination is very personal and frightening. Think Erin 
Brockovich. Airborne species don’t appear to get the same reaction. Certainly, 
carbon dioxide in the air barely registers on the average personal anxiety scale. 
Consequently, assaults on the quality of well water make for avid reading and 
activism. In the case of shale gas, industry response to well contamination 
has been sweeping in denial. Both sides play fast and loose with the English 
language, as will be shown.
There are two potential ways in which shale gas operations could 
contaminate aquifers. One is through leakage of the chemicals used in 
fracturing. These would then be liquid contaminants. The second is the 
infiltration of aquifers by produced methane. This is a gaseous contaminant, 
albeit in the main dissolved in the water. If present, a portion may be released 
as a gas, as spectacularly depicted in the documentary Gasland. Natural 
occurrences such as the Eternal Flame Falls in the Shale Creek Preserve in 
New York demonstrate methane intrusion into a freshwater source. The name 
follows from the fact that the gas remains lit with a visible flame under the 
rock overhang of the waterfall.
Incidentally, methane is odorless and colorless, so it is hard to identify. It 
leaves no taste in the water, but can be hazardous if it collects in an enclosed 
space. When used in commerce, industry deliberately adds mercaptans, a 
smelly substance (travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike proximal to refineries 
in years past know the smell well) for added safety. Gas leaks in a commercially 
supplied setting such as a kitchen or furnace are therefore detectable simply by 
smell. Leaks from a well would not be detectable by smell.
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Natural contamination is either from relatively shallow biogenic methane or 
from thermogenic gas from deep deposits escaping up along faults and fissures. 
These last are generally due to tectonic activity at some time. The two types of 
methane gas have fairly different fingerprints and can often be distinguished 
on that basis. Good oil and gas exploitation practitioners will avoid producing 
in areas with significant vertical leak paths because they vitiate normal sealing 
mechanisms.
Distinguishing Between Methane Sources
Thermogenic methane is formed when heat and pressure act upon organic 
matter present in the sediment. The stress of this “thermal maturation” causes 
the longer molecules to be chopped up to form smaller molecules. The 
smallest is methane and usually dominates the mix. Also present will be the 
somewhat larger molecules such as ethane and propane, collectively known 
as natural gas liquids (NGLs). Thermogenic methane will almost always have 
some of the larger species present.
By contrast, biogenic methane will almost never have these other gases. 
This is because the method of formation is bacterial action upon carbon-
bearing molecules such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen, yielding methane 
molecules, water, and energy. This mechanism is unlikely to form bigger 
molecules.
The absence of larger molecules is generally a clear indicator of biogenic 
origin. The reverse is not necessarily as clean an argument in part because 
mixtures of gases from different origins are possible.
Another distinguishing feature is the isotope signature. The scientifically 
faint of heart can skip this paragraph without loss of the thread. Carbon 
has a heavy isotope 13C, with an extra neutron compared to the normal 
species. When methane is formed by either mechanism above, the carbon 
atoms in the methane preferentially have a higher proportion of light atoms 
compared to the source material. This is known as fractionation in that the 
heavy atoms are preferentially left behind. But bacteria tend to want to feed 
on lighter carbon and so the fractionation is more pronounced than it is for 
thermogenic reactions. Also, the stuff they feed on is often of bacterial origin 
so is already concentrated with the light version. So, the fractionation is an 
indication of origin.
The isotope signature, taken together with the level of presence of larger 
molecules, is the generally accepted means for distinguishing between gas 
origins.
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Despite the seemingly sound scientific fingerprinting techniques available, 
identifying the source of gas is subject to interpretation. This is particularly the 
case when, within the class of thermogenic origin, efforts are made to identify 
the age of the rock from which the leakage took place. In principle, both the 
isotope signature and the NGL content have relationships with rock age. These 
relationships are not always well behaved enough to be unequivocal.
Water Well Contamination Studies
The first comprehensive study (Osborn et al., 2011) of possible contamination 
of water wells from shale gas production activity was by Osborn and colleagues 
from Duke University. They studied 60 wells in Pennsylvania and found no 
fracturing chemicals in the water wells. They did report finding a strong 
correlation between proximity of shale gas wells and methane in the well 
water. The data have been interpreted by the authors as proving the origin 
of the methane to be from the Marcellus formation from which the gas was 
being produced. The method used was as described in the box at left. Since no 
baseline testing of the water wells was done, the entire conclusion rests upon 
the method of analysis. Any retrospective study faces this shortcoming.
More recently, industry proponents took the same data and published an 
analysis to the effect that 
the isotopic signatures of the Duke study’s thermogenic methane 
samples were more consistent with those of shallower Upper and 
Middle Devonian deposits overlying the Marcellus Shale. This 
finding indicates that the methane samples analyzed in the Duke 
study could have originated entirely from shallower sources above 
the Marcellus that are not related to hydraulic fracturing activities 
(Molofsky et al., 2011). 
They based this in part upon other studies they conducted in which they tested 
1,700 wells. As a clarification of terminology, the geologic periods named 
above span about 30 million years—not huge in geologic age terms. That is why 
they were careful to use the conservative phrasing “could have” in relation to 
their assertion. They, too, did no baseline testing and note that the area is well 
known for methane intrusions in freshwater aquifers.
They provide a detailed description of the geology of the area and identify 
many small gas bearing formations. In my recommendations below I suggest 
regulations requiring the identification and sealing of these gas-prone intervals 
in the shale gas wells.
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Such dueling interpretations are inevitable when dealing with data with 
no baseline studies. The only rational way to determine the propensity for 
methane contamination attributable to gas production is to conduct baseline 
analyses of water wells prior to any activity. Sound inquiry in any field of 
science has always had this feature. A paper on biology experiments would 
be rejected in a peer-reviewed journal if these “controls” were not present. 
Both sides agree with this, and in fact the EPA is conducting such studies as 
part of the congressionally mandated investigation of fracturing operations. 
The most thorough type of study would be one that did all of the above and 
also considered the geology and the integrity of gas well execution. The US 
Geological Survey (USGS) conducted a study in the Fayetteville formation in 
Arkansas (Kresse et al., 2012). They used baseline testing and concluded that 
neither methane nor chemical contamination occurred. Incidentally, three of 
the authors in the Osborn study (Osborn et al., 2011) co-authored the USGS 
report.
The distinction between potential liquid and gaseous contamination 
is important because the hazards are different, as are the remedies and 
safeguards. Also, because well water could not naturally have the liquid 
contaminants from fracturing fluid, any presence at all is evidence of a 
manmade source. Therefore, simple testing of wells proximal to drilling 
operations is sufficient, with the only possible complication being some source 
other than drilling, such as agricultural runoff. This is easily resolved because 
of the specificity in the chemicals used for fracturing. The fact that Osborn et 
al. (2011) found no such chemicals in any wells is hardly ever reported in the 
press, indicative again of the polarization caused by the issues.
Unfortunately, liquid and gaseous contaminations get lumped together in 
the statements by shale gas opponents and the genuinely concerned public. 
Some see methane intrusion as proof of well leakage as a whole and therefore 
equate it to chemical contamination as well. Gasland reports “thousands 
of toxic chemicals” as the hazard, which is hyperbole. In actuality, the 
mechanisms for possible leakage of gas and liquid are quite different. Methane 
as gas is much more likely to leak out of a badly constructed well than is a 
liquid. 
So, do producing gas wells sometimes leak into freshwater aquifers? The 
answer is yes. In all cases this is because of some combination of not locating 
cement in the right places and of a poor cement job. Many wells will have 
intervals above the producing zone that are charged with gas, such as the 
formations identified in the Oil and Gas Journal paper cited earlier (Molofsky 
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et al., 2011). If these are not sealed off with cement (many wells are not 
cemented top to bottom by design) some gas will intrude into the well bore. 
This will still be contained unless the cement up near the freshwater aquifers 
has poor integrity. In that case the gas will leak. You will notice nothing 
in the prior discussion says anything about fracturing. In other words, a 
badly constructed well is just that, no matter how the gas was released from 
the formation. This distinction is lost on many. The paper by Osborn et al. 
(2011) unequivocally shows no fracture chemical intrusion into water wells. 
It also shows gas intrusion in disturbingly many cases, although no baseline 
measurements were made to normalize for possible natural seeps and prior 
drilling activity. Yet the title of the paper is “Methane Contamination of 
Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing” 
(emphasis added). The last three words infer a causality that is not proven and 
in fact is contraindicated by the absence of fracturing chemicals in the water 
wells.
Industry proponents on the other hand make statements such as “hydraulic 
fracturing has never contaminated groundwater.” In precise terms this may 
be right in that fractures have not propagated into groundwater. Take the 
hypothetical case of a well associated with fracturing operations that leaks gas 
but not liquid. One could argue that the poor construction would simply not 
have occurred but for the desire to fracture the shale reservoir to produce the 
desired fluid. So an opponent would take those very data and say “hydraulically 
fractured wells contaminate groundwater,” while the proponent could say 
“hydraulic fracturing did not contaminate groundwater.” Neither would be 
wrong. It is the public that will be confused with this license taken with the 
language.
Suggested Remedies
Rhetoric aside, we can take proper stewardship of our resources and the 
environment. Some possible measures are listed here and policy suggestions 
are made in chapter 30, “Policy Directions.” Permits must be given only to oil 
companies with good track records, thus maximizing the chances of diligence 
in well construction. Water wells proximal to intended operations (the 
Pennsylvania governor’s Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission recommends 
2,500 feet) should be tested prior to drilling, at the cost of the operator. The 
state Department of Environmental Protection should maintain a list of 
certified testing laboratories and only these ought to be used. North Carolina 
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rules awaiting ratification by the NC legislature in 2015 have all the above 
provisions and additionally require periodic testing of the same wells. 
Logging ought to be required to identify zones of possible minor gas 
production. Logging is a routine technique in which specialized sensors are 
lowered into the well to identify formations of interest. The state Department of 
Environmental Protection must require that these zones of gas be sealed with 
cement. Consideration may be given to requiring cementing top to bottom in 
areas whose geology dictates that. At a minimum, the cement bond log ought 
to be required. This examines the integrity of the cement job and famously was 
not run on the Deepwater Horizon well that blew up in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Routine testing of the water wells ought to be de rigueur, with a prompt 
attempt to seal the well if leaking. This occurrence should also result in a severe 
penalty. Regulations requiring all of the above will not be considered punitive 
by the industry. This is because normal sound practice includes all of these, 
with the exception of the stipulations with regard to water well testing. That 
is not done routinely, although there are several instances of this happening 
voluntarily. All of this and adherence to sound drilling and completion 
practices are necessary to ensure the sustainable production of a valuable 
resource.
CHAPTER 6
The Chemicals Disclosure Conundrum
“Because you’re mine, I walk the line”
—From “I Walk the Line” by Johnny Cash
This earth is ours. We have an obligation to it and the people who inhabit it. 
The shale oil and gas industry can do right by it and still conduct commerce. 
This is especially so in the matters pertaining to using chemicals wisely. Most 
states in the US require the disclosure of chemicals used in fracturing fluids 
by posting on the public website FracFocus.org. However, the majority of 
instances include the so-called trade secret exclusion. In essence this permits 
the operating company or its subcontractor to withhold information if it deems 
the chemicals in the fracturing fluid to be a trade secret. This is one of the most 
contentious issues surrounding shale oil and gas regulation. The public appears 
concerned that under the veil of trade secrecy, industry could use chemicals 
harmful to human health. Some of the concern is as simple as the need of the 
public to know what goes in the ground. 
Trade Secret Exclusion
Why should there be trade secret exclusion? Regulators often are asked this 
question. One reason is that legitimate trade secrets are protectable under 
many state laws, as for example the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection 
Act, embodied in Article 24, Section 66-152 of the North Carolina General 
Statutes. The other reason concerns the public desire for the industry to 
create means to use greener chemicals. If a company succeeds, it ought to be 
afforded intellectual property protection rights, the sort available to all citizens. 
One means for such rights is patents. The neat feature about patents (from a 
public disclosure standpoint) is that 18 months after filing, all the contents 
are published whether or not the patent is eventually granted. Rarely does an 
invention make it to commercialization within that period. So the public will 
in effect be informed in good time.
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Intellectual Property
Intellectual property in commerce falls into four principal categories: patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The first three are covered by 
federal law in most countries. Trade secret law in the US is at the state level, 
although most states follow the same strictures by using the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.
Patents are granted to a person or entity if certain standards of novelty and 
non-obviousness are met. This entitles the holder to exclusivity for 21 years 
following the filing. In return for this right, the public is allowed access to 
the invention after the 21 years. The framers believed that this compact was 
best for the world at large because a closely held secret inhibits commerce 
due to the fact that only one entity can supply it and innovate to improve it. 
A common example of this value to the public is the plummeting cost of a 
drug when it goes “off patent.” Generic drugs constitute a huge and thriving 
business affording the public low-cost access. 
As mentioned in the main text, all patents are published 18 months after 
filing. This was not always the case in the US. Inventors had been allowed to 
file and had no requirement to publicly disclose the contents were the patent 
not granted. But the comfort granted the public by this disclosure is tempered 
by an interesting aspect of clever patenting. The best patents, from the point 
of view of the inventor, are those in which enough information is provided 
to the examiners to get allowance, and yet critical elements are withheld 
to prevent competitors from knowing what exact combination was used or 
in what precise proportion. In the context of public disclosure of fracturing 
chemicals, a point of note is that these stratagems are devised to thwart 
competitors, not to deny the public information. But they could nevertheless 
have that effect, and state regulations ought to take these nuances into 
account. However, as noted later, from a public safety standpoint, not 
knowing proportions may not matter much.
Trademarks and copyrights are types of property that have no bearing 
on the main debate in this chapter. But trade secrets certainly do and are, in 
fact, the main issue. Inventions are often kept as trade secrets if they could 
easily be worked around. This is often the case for apparatus as opposed to 
methods. Also, patents are not useful unless the infringer can be detected 
as doing so. So, inventions that do not meet these two standards will be 
considered for relegation to the trade secret pile. The point here is that there 
are good and valid reasons for holding innovations as trade secrets, and doing 
so does not necessarily make them any less innovative. Regulators ought 
to treat trade secrets with as much respect as any other form of intellectual 
property. Accordingly, the trade secret exclusion to the chemical disclosure 
laws has a legitimate place.
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Sometimes a company may choose not to patent and to merely hold the 
innovation as a trade secret. An example is the formula for Coca-Cola syrup. 
The formula constitutes intellectual property and it would not be fair to require 
disclosure, which would enable their competitors to copy them. This appears 
to be the basis for the trade secret provisions in state laws. In these cases, 
companies have stringent procedures to prevent inadvertent public disclosure. 
Any company claiming the trade secret exclusion ought to be required to 
submit an affidavit asserting that the claimed item received such care and 
that the details had not already been made public. This requirement could be 
expected to limit the exclusion claims to genuine trade secrets. The foregoing 
forms the basis for the rule set by the North Carolina Mining and Energy 
Commission, of which I am the chairman. It was passed by the North Carolina 
legislature and is now the law.  
Some in industry are pushing back on the idea that trade secret claims face 
verification by a state body. One reasonable basis for concern on their part 
would be undue legal burden, with attendant costs and delays. This concern 
would be taken care of by and large if the state body merely required the filing 
of a short brief stipulating that the claimed trade secret had received the same 
care as their other trade secrets. In unusual cases the state body may seek a 
short interview to clarify some aspect. The second area of concern could be 
the inadvertent disclosure of the trade secret by the review body. This concern 
can be addressed in a couple of ways: The review body could have very few 
people, as few as three. The secret information, and all documents pertaining 
to it, could be returned to the company promptly after the review. This sort 
of thing is commonplace in commercial transactions such as the sale of one 
company to another. The business confidential information in these cases 
may have much greater value than those in the matters discussed above, and 
yet the secrecy aspect of the transaction is rarely a consideration impeding 
the deal. Furthermore, most state agencies routinely receive business-
sensitive information in the process of permitting or the granting of special 
considerations such as tax forgiveness. 
So, What Are These Trade Secrets Anyway? 
Without exception, the trade secret exclusions are sought by the service 
company or a supplier to them, not the oil and gas company that will use the 
products in the well completion process. In many cases the oil company is 
in the dark regarding the precise formulation. But increasingly the medium 
to larger oil companies are asserting their purchase power rights to demand 
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fuller disclosure. For example, according to a 2014 declaration on its website, 
Apache Corporation now requires the “elimination of diesel, BTX, endocrine 
disruptors, and carcinogens” as constituents in fracturing fluid. BTX stands 
for benzene, toluene, and xylene, all of which are known as aromatic organic 
molecules, originally so-named because they had an aroma. Aroma in common 
parlance tends to be associated with pleasant smells such as from perfume. The 
“aroma” from BTX compounds is more like a bad smell; take a cautious sniff 
sometime when you are filling gasoline and you get the idea.
Volatile Organic Compounds, or VOCs
Volatile organic compounds are broadly classified. Basically, any organic 
compound that has noticeable vapor pressure at ambient temperature falls 
into this category. Some are benign, such as those generated by plants, and 
some are toxic. The rest fall somewhere in between. The organic solvent 
in paint is one such. In fact, many household materials, including cleaning 
liquids, emit VOCs. Some of the compounds are toxic, and their impact on 
human health depends upon the level of exposure. Common compounds 
found in the home are benzene, toluene, xylene, formaldehyde, and acetone. 
All are harmful at some level and some are carcinogens.
The debate on VOC levels associated with shale gas centers firmly on the 
toxic and potentially carcinogenic species. Much of the public angst from the 
standpoint of disclosure comes from a concern that such compounds could 
be used in secrecy, shielded by trade secret exclusions.
Oil company declarations regarding what they want and don’t want as 
fracturing fluid ingredients are important because service companies know 
that the customer has a choice. This is especially so in shale gas operations, 
which use “slickwater” formulations containing fewer chemicals than in 
more conventional fracturing operations. Everybody pretty much uses the 
same chemicals. They may use somewhat different formulations to assert 
differentiation.
So, the recipe may be the secret. If that is the case, it is not a public health 
issue because the ingredients themselves are fully disclosed. Why is the 
nondisclosure of the recipe not a public health problem? It is not an issue 
because the proportions of what went into the ground are not terribly relevant. 
What goes in is not what comes out. Some constituents are consumed, such as 
biocides, some are partly reacted, such as acids, and some return in the form 
introduced. So, more important is to analyze the water that flows back and not 
worry too much about the proportions of what goes in. The ingredients that 
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are going in inform us of the reaction products that may emerge, and we can 
analyze for those in the return fluid (flowback water).
The Way Forward
The use of standard chemicals allows for high-quality shale gas wells. 
Companies are becoming increasingly open on this point because of public 
concern with nondisclosure. Halliburton has posted the precise ingredients 
it uses on its website (Halliburton, 2015). I examined the Marcellus list, and 
each chemical has a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) number. This number 
uniquely identifies the chemical, and the properties are easily discerned. 
Virtually all service companies use some variant of these very chemicals. 
There is no pressing need for substitution of these with others except to make 
them greener—more on that below. The trade secret exclusion would apply 
only to substitutes with use advantages. Such a claim would be very hard to 
substantiate in shale gas wells; the standard chemicals work just fine. However, 
I recognize that this fast-moving sector will be in continuous improvement, 
especially in recovering a higher fraction of the hydrocarbon in place. This is 
particularly the case in liquids-rich plays and also shale oil wells in the Bakken 
and elsewhere where only about 5 percent of the oil in place is currently being 
recovered. But the improvements must not compromise the environment or 
public health. Certainly compounds such as those in the BTX family ought 
to be disallowed by law. The North Carolina rule set forbids any aromatic 
compound as a constituent. This is a good rule and does not constitute an 
imposition on industry because relatively benign alternatives are available. Full 
disclosure of the CAS numbers for substitutes ought to be the goal. Oil and gas 
companies have a lot of choice when it comes to service providers and ought to 
be discerning on this point.
The goal is for functionally equivalent chemicals with minimal 
environmental impact. Norway has been using this approach for at least a 
decade—requiring green, yellow, and red labeling for oil field products, and 
requiring a game plan (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2010) to reach full 
green slates, meaning all constituents in the operations are green. One oil 
service provider has come up with a methodology for this for fracturing fluids. 
Another such provider has a fracturing fluid composition fully comprising 
additives from the food industry. Their CEO famously drank some quantity of 
the fracturing fluid (we assume the sand was absent) on a public occasion. He 
has since been seen in public. Incidentally, if my recommendations in chapter 7 
of using saline water are followed, he should take a smaller sip. Then again, 
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who among us has not taken that inadvertent mouthful of sea water while body 
surfing? The astute majority who don’t body surf, that’s who. 
Clearly this sort of innovation ought to be granted trade secret status, if 
sought, so long as the requirements of the relevant state statutes are met. But 
since by their very nature these ingredients will be environmentally benign, 
the secrecy will almost certainly be in the production processes to make them 
cheaper or in the recipe. As discussed above, the recipe ought not to be of 
concern to the public, especially when benign ingredients are involved. To the 
extent the secret is in the green chemical ingredient, it ought to receive trade 
secret status after some verification.
In conclusion, oil and gas companies ought to strive to employ only those 
service companies prepared to fully disclose the chemicals used, including the 
CAS numbers of each. In every case the state ought to accord the recipe trade 
secret status if claimed, without subjecting it to any process for verification of 
claim.
CHAPTER 7
The safe handling of water associated with shale gas operations is the most 
significant environmental hurdle faced by the industry. This can and must be 
surmounted. This is not to downplay fugitive methane emissions or any other 
concern, but this one is up close and personal to the community surrounding 
gas production. The global warming propensity of methane, and arguments 
regarding the different models to assess the impact—these simply do not have 
the resonance of potential short- and medium-term health effects of polluting 
surface or groundwater. These last are what one could call front-of-the-box 
items.
The potential for pollution of surface water and groundwater comes from 
two sources. One is the improper handling of the return water from fracturing 
operations, known as flowback water. The other is from accidental spills of all 
sorts, including fracturing fluids and water laden with these chemicals. The 
very nature of shale gas formations is such that even if fresh water is injected 
as the fracturing fluid, the returning water is much more salty. The salt content 
could be as much as 350,000 parts per million (ppm). Sea water is about a 
tenth as salty, and fresh water is defined as less than 500 ppm. The saltiness 
is due to the fact that the returning water includes water resident in the 
formation, which happens to be heavy brine.
Radioactive Elements
Naturally occurring radioactive elements can be found in the flowback 
water. These can be isotopes of uranium, thorium, potassium, or radium. 
All shale strata have some amounts of radioactive species naturally. In fact, 
in the prospecting for hydrocarbons, shale is distinguished from sand and 
Preventing Contamination of Surface 
and Groundwater
“A bridge over troubled water”
—From “Bridge Over Troubled Water” by Simon & Garfunkel (written by Paul Simon)
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The Front of the Box
A 2011 New York Times story (Kaufman, 2011) has a very interesting take on 
the environmental movement and changes therein. These organizations in 
the past have taken national or even global approaches to the issues. The 
rise of global ambient temperatures caused by greenhouse gases is a case in 
point.
The general public can be left cold at two levels. One is that global issues 
do not resonate with a lot of folks, while local ones do. The other is the 
discounting of future privation. This is not unlike discounting future earnings 
in finance; a discount rate is applied which gives a lower present value. 
Similarly, future suffering is discounted, especially when it is 40 years out, as 
are most global warming warnings. Rising water levels on a Florida beach 40 
years hence (and only a maybe at that) have little resonance with the public in 
Wyoming. One could call it two degrees of separation.
The Times story draws a clever analogy. If a consumer is walking down a 
grocery store aisle and sees a box with a delectable brownie on the face, she 
may be attracted to it. Some might look at the back of the box, which details 
the information indicative of a potentially obese future for the consumer of 
the goods. Even though the future in this case is more in the short term than 
the aforementioned global warming one, the choice of looking at the back 
of the box—at the potential hazards—is personal and will not happen all the 
time.
The Times story concludes that environmental activism is best served by 
presenting front-of-the-box issues at a local level, and leave the back-of-the-
box issues to the national or global level.
carbonate by the presence or absence of these elements, using Geiger counters 
in some cases. As discussed in an earlier chapter, hydrocarbons are most 
usually found in these other two mineral strata, not shale, and so identifying 
them is a key. Yet these concentrations are usually too small to be a health 
concern, and usually are below EPA threshold levels (King, 2012). The greater 
incidences, particularly of radium, appear to be in the Marcellus Shale of New 
York. Although usually low in concentration, if a crusty layer known as scale 
is formed anywhere in the system, these elements will have a tendency to 
concentrate in the scale. Consequently, scale formation must be inhibited. This 
is why in the chapter encouraging the use of saline water in place of fresh water 
I suggest the removal of the ions of calcium, magnesium, and barium because 
these form adherent scale, especially barium.
If scale formation is inhibited, radioactive elements are not likely to be 
an issue (King, 2012). This is particularly the case if one reuses the flowback 
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water, as I propose later in this chapter as a preferred option. Then any of these 
elements that come up go right back down where they came from.
Fracturing Chemicals
Rock is fractured by injecting a fluid, usually water, at very high pressures. This 
operation is made more efficient if the water contains a thickening agent to 
make it more viscous. This is usually a sugar derived from the guar gum seed, 
a crop that is largely sourced from India and Pakistan. To further improve 
the viscosity the molecules are bound together with a chemical known as a 
crosslinker.
The viscous liquid under high pressure creates fractures in the rock. Then, 
in order to remove the liquid, another chemical is introduced known as a 
breaker. It breaks the cross-linking bonds. Now the liquid is no longer viscous 
and can be pulled out. A final step before the viscosity is dropped is to inject 
something known as proppant into the cracks. Proppant is usually sand 
particles but can also be synthetic ceramic materials. Its purpose is to hold 
the cracks open after the high-pressure fluid is removed. Proppant functions 
in a manner similar to the pillars and beams in coal mines, which enable the 
transport of coal-laden bins. As in the case of the mines, if the rock is not 
propped up in some way, the weight of the sediment above the zone will close 
the cracks.
Finally, after the fluid is removed, the gas will flow through the propped- 
open pathways into the main well bore and then up to the surface. Some gas 
will start flowing, mixed with the fracturing fluid as it is removed and the 
pressure drops. This mixture will need to be separated at the surface. This early 
gas, if not piped somewhere, is the primary source of fugitive methane into the 
atmosphere, as discussed in chapter 9.
Slickwater Operations
The vast majorities of shale gas operations do not use the thickening agents and 
associated chemicals. This is because the early production in the Barnett Shale, 
in Texas, had dramatic falloff in production over time that was attributed to the 
plugging of the cracks by residues from the sugars used for thickening.
This use of essentially fresh water is known as slickwater production. Despite 
the imagery of slipperiness from the name, the fact is that plain water is not 
very slick at all and the friction in the pipes can be high. So, a friction reducer 
is added, which is usually a polyacrylamide, the same material that is used in 
baby diapers, wound dressings, and the like as an absorbing material. Also, 
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simply greater volumes are needed in this case. On average about 4 million 
gallons of fresh water are used per well, but the use of 6 million gallons is not 
unusual.
Other minor constituents of the fluid include scale inhibitors, for the 
reasons mentioned above, and biocides. This last is to address the fact that 
bacteria of certain types are harmful to the operation. Some species cause the 
formation of sulfur-bearing gases. In fact virtually all hydrogen sulfide found 
in reservoirs was formed by bacterial action. Also, certain other bacteria cause 
the formation of salts, which plug the pores and impede production. For all 
these reasons operators will not permit any bacteria in the fluid injected and 
additionally inject biocides, the principal one in use being glutaraldehyde. 
Other methods in some use include the use of ultraviolet radiation to kill the 
bacteria in the fluid prior to injection.
Use of Diesel and BTEX
One of the most vigorous arguments against shale gas production has been 
about the use of diesel in fracturing fluid. There is no technical reason to use 
diesel in the fracturing fluid in shale oil or gas operations. When diesel was used 
in the past it was as a lubricant. Now polymers do the job well and are safer 
to handle. The use of diesel for this purpose should not be permitted, and such a 
rule will not impose any material hardship on operators. The class of organic 
compounds known by the acronym BTEX has also been cited as in use.
These compounds may well be present in diesel, but if that is outlawed, 
BTEX constituents from that source should cease to be an issue and BTEX 
ought to go away as well, given there is no technical need for them to be used 
Chemicals in Slickwater Fracturing Fluid
• Friction reducer: Always used. Usually polyacrylamide. Other common 
uses: baby diapers, flocculent to remove fine particles in drinking water 
preparation.
• Scale inhibitor: Used about a quarter of the time depending upon solutes 
present. Usually phosphonate. Other common use: detergents.
• Biocide: Used in almost every instance. Glutaraldehyde, chlorine dioxide, 
mostly the former. Other uses: glutaraldehyde as medical disinfectant and 
chlorine in municipal water supplies. Will be replaced in part with surface 
treatment designed to kill the bacteria using ultraviolet radiation.
• Surfactant: Sometimes used. Many formulations. Other common uses: 
soaps, cleaners.
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in isolation. The Nother Carolina regulations forbid any aromatic compounds 
to be used in fracturing fluid. BTEX compounds all fall into the aromatic 
classification.
Some reservoirs are water sensitive. In one type of sensitivity, the formation 
swells with water and impedes the flow of hydrocarbons. In this case, which is 
rare, propane or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG; a mix of propane and butane) 
may be used. While diesel use is a possibility as the carrier fluid, there is 
no need for it since these other two work better at about the same cost. At 
a lecture I was asked by an environmental group official why industry did 
not use propane in place of water. My response was that to use an expensive 
hydrocarbon to produce another was something most would prefer to avoid. 
Keep in mind that propane pricing is pegged to oil, which is about four times 
the price of natural gas. Transporting and handling propane for this use would 
open new concerns. There are some technical advantages to using liquid 
propane but they do not balance the cost and risk. An added element of cost is 
that the propane will blend with the produced natural gas and will need to be 
separated out. This requires cryogenic apparatus at the rig site. Because of these 
and other issues with alternates, water can be used safely as a fracturing fluid, 
and ought to be.
Diesel is also predominantly used as the fuel for the pressure pumps on 
the rig. The issues with this would involve leakage, spills, and emissions. 
Pennsylvania has expressed concern because much of this activity is in 
populated areas. The emissions of concern in diesel usage, whether on a rig 
or on a city bus, are particulates. Metropolitan areas that switched public 
transport from diesel to compressed natural gas (CNG) have seen dramatically 
positive health effects. These are reported in chapter 17. In addition to the use 
of CNG, or liquefied natural gas (LNG) for that matter, another possibility is to 
substitute diesel in part or whole with dimethyl ether (DME). Diesel engines 
today can substitute DME to 20 percent or more with no modifications. 
Engines can run on pure DME if modified. Isolated instances of substitution 
of diesel are occurring. The leader on this has been Apache Corporation, with 
the service assistance of Halliburton and the equipment support of Caterpillar. 
The ultimate goal would be to use field gas directly or with some processing. 
States should take a good look at DME and CNG (or LNG) substitution and 
take steps to encourage and enable these changes. In the grand scheme of 
environmental hazard, these are small potatoes. But you want to take the wins 
where you can get them. This one really has no technical hurdle, just the will to 
do it.
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Disclosure of Chemicals Used
In one sentence, full disclosure must be made of all chemicals in fracturing fluid. 
The only exception ought to be the use of a proprietary product, and for that 
exception to be given the bar must be set very high. This entire issue is covered 
in greater detail in chapter 6, “The Chemicals Disclosure Conundrum.” But 
here are just a few points for context with this chapter.
Even in such a case the properties of the material relative to environmental 
issues must be fully documented. There are legal methods for confidential 
disclosure to federal and state authorities that protect all parties. If a patent is 
applied for, 18 months following the application the US Patent and Trademark 
Office will publish all the secret details anyway. The oil field is famously slow to 
commercialize new products. An 18-month stay of disclosure is virtually in the 
noise. The proprietary product exception must not be a shield or an artifice.
The mandatory disclosure that is noted above is for the gross chemical, say 
polyacrylamide. No chemical is 100 percent pure. To identify each possible 
impurity would be onerous and may in fact not be easily performed. As long as 
the impurities have no material bearing on public health, their disclosure ought 
not to be mandatory.
In the run-of-the-mill shale gas operation, the chemicals used are well 
known, as described in the box on page 44. Note, however, that in some wet 
gas operations, and almost all shale oil operations, additional chemicals are 
added, as described above. Primarily, these are a thickener, such as a derivative 
of the guar seed, a crosslinker, and a breaker to remove the crosslinking action. 
Non-disclosure by companies is likely on the advice of attorneys who fear the 
famous “slippery slope” concept. The way that goes is roughly analogous to 
that other well-known adage “give an inch and they will take a mile.” Advisors 
feel if you disclose something now, even more will be asked for later and so on. 
Memo to attorneys who feel that way (and by the way not all do; this is not a 
diatribe on attorney conduct. Some of my best friends . . .): without risk there 
is no profit. Second memo: when non-disclosure of something benign causes 
folks to get riled up, that is bad business.
One may well ask why allow such an exception at all. The answer is that 
we want innovation to design the most benign additives at the lowest cost. 
The reason diesel was used as a lubricant early on was that designers were not 
attuned to environmental concerns. The same goes for why fresh water is used 
as the base fluid rather than low-value saline water. We need to challenge the 
entire industry, and this goes beyond the oil field, to design with an eye to 
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sustainability: environmentally benign and using the least energy, while still 
being profitable.
If the industry is really clever about all this, it needs to be afforded the 
protection offered by law in the patenting process and to some degree in the 
trade secret maintenance process. Premature public disclosure kills patent 
validity. Patents will simply not be granted, especially abroad. We want the 
innovation and the associated profit to happen. In context we want it in the 
area of green chemicals and processes (Heintz & Pollin, 2011). 
Handling Flowback Water
Some of the water and chemicals injected into the reservoir return as flowback 
water. Less than 10 percent of the chemicals injected return to the surface 
(King, 2012). The polymers degrade at reservoir temperatures, the biocides do 
their job and get consumed by bacteria, and other chemicals are partly trapped 
in the rock. Much of the water also stays behind. Recent theories suggest that 
water actually acts as a proppant in some fractures. In any case only between 
16 percent and 35 percent of the water comes back to the surface. Although 
very little of the injected chemicals return, the flowback water now also carries 
with it some of the mineral content from the reservoir. The chief of these are 
chlorides of sodium, magnesium, and calcium, which account for the dramatic 
increase in salinity over what was injected. There may even be some aromatic 
compounds that are naturally found in association with some hydrocarbon 
deposits.
Flowback water is absolutely not suitable for surface discharge. It is also not 
suitable for being sent to municipal water treatment facilities, as is believed to 
have happened in Pennsylvania. These facilities are not equipped to handle the 
high salinity or the chemical content. Some have suggested the construction of 
special facilities to treat the water for discharge. However, the cost of doing that 
could be higher than that of two measures proposed below.
Deep Disposal
The least costly method of disposal of flowback water or any other wastewater 
is the deep injection well. This is an EPA-approved method known as a UIC 
(Underground Injection Control) Class II injection well. The key criteria are 
the porosity (it should be high) and permeability of the host rock, the need 
for competent cap rock above it, and firm guidelines on casing and cementing 
of the well to protect freshwater aquifers. In most states these are monitored 
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by the state environmental protection agency. The host rock is either a porous 
rock with no fluids or sometimes a rock depleted of fluid by prior production.
This type of disposal is very inexpensive in comparison to the value of the 
produced fluids. The fully loaded cost including amortization of the well is 
between $0.25 and $1.00 per barrel of wastewater disposed, with the former 
figure applying when the well is proximal and owned by the operator, and the 
latter including hauling some distance, and profit for the injection company. 
The water hauling is subject to spills since this is done primarily by trucks. 
Proceedings from a workshop held by the EPA in 2011 (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, May 2011) has detail on this and other aspects of disposal.
Since the last part of 2011 there was a lot of press about earthquakes in 
Oklahoma and Ohio presumed to be related to deep disposal wells. I cover 
those issues in greater detail in chapter 10. But there is no doubt that disposal 
wells should be planned and executed with care. Seismic studies must establish 
the absence of significant faults in proximity. There is evidence that some 
care is already being exercised; the suspect wells in Ohio were shut down 
promptly. Also, the EPA reports that there currently are more than 145,000 
disposal wells in the US today, going back decades. So the occasional problem 
could have been expected, especially because the earthquake propensity was 
not recognized, and avoidance was not part of the design. Still, given that it 
is a regulated and monitored event, any such problem is correctible primarily 
through requiring that disposal wells not be in close proximity to active faults 
over a certain size. The specifications guiding this still need to be worked out, 
and the EPA then ought to add these to their current specifications.
Reuse of Flowback Water
This is the most elegant solution. But in order not to be cost prohibitive, the 
industry had to tolerate greater salinity. This is discussed in chapter 8. Were 
we to require fresh water in the fracturing fluid formulation, the desalination 
alone would send the costs higher. Flowback water salinities in the Marcellus 
range from 16,000 ppm to over 250,000 ppm. Halliburton disclosed at a CERA 
conference in 2013 that salinities in excess of 250,000 ppm could be tolerated 
in specially formulated fracturing fluids. This means no desalination would 
be needed, except possibly for the removal of the minor constituent divalent 
ions, for reasons mentioned in chapter 8. Even solids removal may not be 
necessary. Surface discharge would require a good deal more treatment. So 
reuse in the fracturing operation would be cheaper than treating for surface 
discharge. Also, any minor impurities, such as radioactive species, which could 
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be a problem for surface discharge, would present no hazard to the fracturing 
application. Bacteria would have to be removed because most operators 
are reluctant to inject these. But this too is being researched and ultraviolet 
radiation for killing bacteria is already in practice (Rodvelt, 2011). Alternative 
techniques such as the use of molecular iodine as the kill agent are also feasible 
Desalination Methods
The workhorse desalination method is reverse osmosis (RO). This uses a 
filter known as a semipermeable membrane: it allows only water molecules 
through and rejects others such as salt. Ordinarily the process of osmosis 
causes water to flow from the fresh to the salty side, essentially to equilibrate 
the concentrations. In reverse osmosis hydraulic pressure is applied on the 
salty side to force water to flow to the fresh side. Depending on the pressure 
applied, this will cease at some concentration of the brine, usually at about 
75,000 ppm salt. At the end one is left with fresh water on one side and very 
heavy brine on the other. This is commercially used to produce fresh water 
from sea water in the Middle East, Australia, and other arid places. But the 
process leaves a brine to dispose of.
In coastal areas desalination operations put the resulting brine back in 
the ocean, although this practice is in review in some instances due to risk of 
damage to coral and other species. Certainly, in inland applications disposal 
will be a concern. Furthermore, this technique is fairly useless when the 
starting liquid is a heavy brine, as is often the case in shale gas operations.
Forward osmosis (FO) is a relatively new technique and has greater 
potential because it ought to use less energy. In this case a “draw” solution is 
designed with constituents that cause water molecules to be drawn to it from 
the flowback water side. Eventually the constituents causing this action are 
removed, sometimes by volatilizing them, leaving behind clean water. The 
flowback water side concentrates into heavy brine, which needs disposal.
A relatively new technique is membrane distillation. This involves a 
membrane that transmits vapor only. Water vapor can be moved across the 
membrane, leaving behind the salts. In this case volatile organics, if any, 
would likely have to be removed first, else they too would go across. The 
allure of this technique is that low-grade heat can be used for the vapor 
production. One innovative method combines this with FO.
A popular method is to simply evaporate the water from the flowback 
water and condense it for use. This is energy-intensive because the latent heat 
of evaporation has to be provided. The resultant product is very pure. Some 
outfits are claiming techniques that minimize energy use. Something like this 
may be needed for the very heavy brines that are too salty for direct reuse and 
too salty for RO. But evaporation does get more energy-intensive as the salt 
content goes up.
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(Chelme-Ayala et al., 2011). Iodine is at least 20 times as effective as chlorine 
and is more benign, being classified by the EPA as generally recognized as safe 
(GRAS).
In the Marcellus and Utica areas, very few strata have been qualified 
for deep injection. Consequently, this option is largely unavailable. Not 
surprisingly, this is the area, particularly in Pennsylvania, where the greatest 
incidents of irresponsible discharge or disposition have been reported. In 
recognition of this many operators are reusing the flowback water, proving 
that this is feasible. In many instances the cost will be very low, likely below the 
upper end of deep disposal cost. In any case, environmentally secure disposal is 
not optional.
If the costs are prohibitively high, this country will innovate to get the cost 
down. Or only the more profitable reservoirs will be accessed until such a time 
as natural gas costs rise to profitable levels for dry gas production. As discussed 
in chapter 11, wet gas is extremely profitable and will easily sustain these costs 
of proper water handling. And there is plenty of that in the Marcellus and 
Utica, the areas challenged by few deep disposal well options, and by far the 
largest and most prolific plays in North America.
Responsible disposition of flowback water should be mandatory. Until 
better alternatives are found and fully tested, the only disposal methods must be 
UIC Class II deep injection or direct reuse.
CHAPTER 8
Zero Fresh Water Usage
“Drove my Chevy to the levee, but the levee was dry”
—From “American Pie” by Don McLean
Use of fresh water as the base fluid for fracturing operations is no longer 
necessary. Salty water with little or no value for human consumption or 
agriculture can be used. Salt water of convenience ought to be the default 
option in every case.
Shale gas wells use up to 6 million gallons of fresh water per well in 
fracturing operations. Only up to about a third of the injected water returns 
to the surface, so more fresh water needs to be added to make up the needed 
volume, even if the flowback water is reused.
A Wall Street Journal article (Gold & Campoy, 2011) tells a tale of water 
deprivation in south Texas. The town of Carrizo Springs, the imagery of 
plentiful water notwithstanding, is dealing with the conflicting demands of 
agriculture and gas development. Oil and gas leases often do not have water 
rights attached, although in Texas they do. Farmers without oil and gas leases 
have the option to sell their water to whomever they please. The value of the 
water is much greater to the oil companies, so they generally get the water they 
need. In the Journal report, data are presented for the number of water wells 
drilled for this purpose as opposed to all other uses. In some areas of Texas, 
80 percent of new water wells drilled are in support of oil and gas operations. 
In total the number of wells in 2010 is about five times those drilled in 2005. 
The rate of this activity can only be expected to increase.
Heavy water withdrawals can strain aquifers, especially in drought years. 
The major gas production areas of Barnett, Woodford, and Eagle Ford in 
Texas and Haynesville in Louisiana were in exceptional to severe drought in 
2011 and continued to flirt with extreme privation through 2013. The prolific 
Marcellus in the Northeast is spared this particular problem. Nevertheless, 
water usage has been an issue in some communities, probably because water- 
related issues tend to have an emotional component. But in the other areas 
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mentioned the issue is quite real. Curiously, the Texas Water Development 
Board estimates that mining and oil and gas account for less than 2 percent of 
all water used. The majority is used for crops (56 percent) and municipalities 
(27 percent). But again, as the new game in town, shale gas drilling will 
inevitably be a focus of attention because the other uses already exist and are 
essentially unassailable. 
The above numbers notwithstanding, the report of new water wells being 
dominantly devoted to oil and gas certainly indicates a growing trend. Fresh 
water drawdown can lead to the need to go ever deeper. At some point the 
water will get brackish, having salinities in excess of drinking water standards. 
This is because all groundwater tends to get saltier as wells get deeper. This is 
why it is rare to find freshwater wells deeper than 500 feet.
While severe droughts are not common in Texas, in the early part of this 
decade they have been experiencing the worst drought in decades. In general 
a vertical swath through the country going north from west Texas through 
Arizona and Colorado and up to Wyoming is a perpetually water-deprived 
area. Important gas production areas other than those for shale gas are in 
Colorado and Wyoming. These are also in tight rock, albeit most commonly 
sandstone. Fracturing is required to economically release the fluids. This co-
location of tight reservoirs with drought-prone environments is nature’s little 
joke, as it were. 
Salt Tolerance of Fracturing Fluids
The industry has been pursuing the objective of salt tolerance for a number 
of years. The initial driver was to improve the feasibility of reusing the water 
returning from the well after fracturing the rock. On the entire Eastern 
Seaboard of the US, deep disposal wells are not feasible due to the geology. 
Pennsylvania operations are rife with alleged instances of improper disposal 
leading to groundwater contamination. Absent a solution, production could 
well be halted. One solution is direct reuse at the site. 
If fresh water was required, the desalination cost would be prohibitive in 
many instances. This is because the returning water could have salt content 
in excess of 200,000 ppm. The conventional desalination workhorse, reverse 
osmosis, is essentially useless because it needs to treat salinities in the vicinity 
of sea water (roughly 35,000 ppm) or lower, and reverse osmosis rejects water 
at 80,000 ppm. Evaporative recovery, no matter how clever the design, faces the 
hurdle of supplying energy to overcome the latent heat of evaporation. So, the 
objective is to maximize tolerance to the salinity of fracturing fluids.
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How Fresh Does Water Have to Be?
Freshness is generally defined by the water’s saltiness. The measure commonly 
used is total dissolved solids, or TDS. In the main these are chlorides of 
sodium, potassium, magnesium, and calcium. Drinking water is required to 
be under 500 parts per million (ppm). As a frame of reference, 10,000 ppm is 
1 percent and sea water runs around 35,000 ppm, although that can vary from 
sea to sea. 
Agricultural uses generally dictate salinity under 1,000 ppm. Curiously, 
though, the tolerance for chlorides is variable between plant species. At 
one extreme are date palms, which can handle up to 20,000 ppm, probably 
because of adaptive mutation to an environment wherein evaporation 
tends to render much surface water brackish. Sweet sorghum, a potentially 
important source of biofuel, is said to tolerate 3,000 ppm. Livestock, too, have 
variable tolerances. Sheep are the most tolerant, coming in at about 6,000 
ppm for healthy growth. They can tolerate double that for a maintenance 
situation.
 
Salinity tolerances of livestock and poultry
In parts per million of total soluble salts
Animal
Maximum tolerance  
for healthy growth
Sheep 6,000
Beef cattle 4,000
Dairy cattle 3,000
Horses 4,000
Poultry 2,000
All of the foregoing underlines 
the fact that potable water is not 
needed for every application. In 
fact, the salinity should simply 
be fit for the intended purpose. 
This could be important in 
selecting the most suitable 
desalination technology.
Also, some saline aquifers 
could be moderately useful. 
In fact, one could seriously 
consider selecting farm products to suit the available water, rather than the 
conventional approach of treating water to be fresh. Edible plants can be 
genetically engineered to be more salt tolerant. One extreme is the class 
of plants known as halophytes, which actually preferentially consume salty 
water.
Similarly, commercial processes could be modified to accept higher TDS. 
One such is the fluid used for fracturing operations. More on that on page 46.
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Fracturing fluids were originally designed to work with fresh water because 
such water was plentiful and it was easier to do that. Today salinities of 
over 250,000 ppm are tolerable for fracturing fluid formulations, with some 
adjustments to the other chemicals used. Some of the chloride ions impair the 
effectiveness of the crosslinkers and friction reducers. Of course crosslinkers 
are used only when sugars are used as thickeners, and this is largely not 
the case in shale gas production. Nevertheless, alternative chemicals can be 
employed in the presence of salinity, whenever crosslinkers are required. As 
mentioned in chapter 7, in the majority of instances the fracturing fluid is 
water with very few chemicals and no sugars. This is known as “slickwater” 
fracturing. The slipperiness evoked by the name notwithstanding, such fluids 
have high frictional losses. So, friction reducers are added. Some of these 
chemicals are less effective at higher salinities. However, replacement chemicals 
have been found.
Chlorides of sodium and potassium are particularly tractable. Those of 
magnesium, calcium, and barium are less desirable. Mostly this is because 
they will form an adherent scale in the flow system. Scale tends to concentrate 
radioactive elements if they are present. In some shale gas drilling areas, 
radioactive radium, thorium, and potassium are found in the formation and 
may be present in very low concentrations in the returning fluid. While these 
quantities are generally benign, if concentrated in scale they can present health 
hazards, especially during scale cleanup. 
One solution is to simply remove these elements, known as divalent 
ions, from the fluid prior to use. The process for accomplishing this is very 
straightforward and is commonly known as water softening. Most municipal 
water systems and some homes with their own wells employ this process 
when the water is known to be “hard.” In a domestic situation this is done 
largely because the divalent ions interfere with detergent action, so soap does 
not lather up effectively. At any rate, this is a known process and the only 
consideration is the cost of doing it.
Sources of Non-Fresh Water
To this point I’ve discussed the use of saline water in place of fresh. In point 
of fact a number of other sources of water are feasible for use. These include 
wastewater from industrial processes such as mining, cooling towers, and 
effluents in general. Samples of these would have to be evaluated and treated 
for use. A much more practical solution is the use of water from saline aquifers. 
As discussed earlier, all groundwater gets salty at increasing depths. So, one 
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could expect saline bodies of water to be fairly ubiquitous. This is in fact the 
case, as exemplified by the map shown in Figure 6, which was plotted by the US 
Geological Survey about 60 years ago. The white spaces simply represent areas 
not investigated by them, and not necessarily lacking in such deposits. This is 
an important point because a lot of the white space is in areas covered by the 
Marcellus and Utica, both very prolific shale gas regions.
Figure 6. Depth to saline groundwater in the United States
Depth to saline 
groundwater, in feet
Less than 500
500 to 1,000
More than 1,000
Inadequate information
Source: US Geological Survey, 2003, generalized from Feth and others, 1965; Department of the Interior/USGS
Note that in many instances the water is shallower than 1,000 feet, making 
it very accessible. In general, shallower deposits are less salty. However, in 
these instances care has to be taken to understand the hydrology relative to 
adjacent freshwater deposits. In many cases, these are in communication, and 
withdrawals from one can affect the other. 
Saline aquifers can be expected to be in reasonable proximity to 
producing areas. Consequently they represent reliable sources of water. The 
other alternatives, such as wastewater, mentioned earlier, while chemically 
acceptable, could vary in supply. Also, a given saline aquifer can be expected to 
deliver uniform quality over a long period of time, thus allowing the treatment 
processes to be standardized.
Assuming widespread acceptance of these ideas, the work needing to be 
done includes characterization of saline aquifers in producing zones and 
filling in the white spaces on the map. The principal points of interest are 
concentrations of divalent ions and bacteria. 
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Bacteria will need to be eradicated before the water can be used as 
fracturing fluid. Bacterial species present in the shallow aquifers are likely to be 
different from those in the gas reservoir. Injection of unfamiliar species could 
have unintended consequences. We do know that certain bacteria are harmful 
to the reservoir from the standpoint of causing the formation of chemicals 
that plug the pores and impede fluid movement, and hence production. Other 
bacteria can cause the synthesis of hydrogen sulfide. Removal of bacterial 
species is straightforward. Reuse of flowback water will need some such 
process anyway. In general, one would expect those process steps to work hand 
in hand with the preparation of saline water for use.
Horn River Experience
Lest the foregoing appear to be a theoretical exercise, at least one outfit is using 
these methods routinely. This is Apache Corporation in their Horn River field 
in British Columbia, Canada. Incidentally, Horn River and Montney in British 
Columbia are on par with five of the largest fields in the US.
The driver for Apache was at least in part the difficulty of access to fresh 
water in winter. The water has to travel a considerable distance, and keeping it 
from freezing is a challenge. They access the Debolt saline aquifer, with salinity 
running in the vicinity of 35,000 ppm. The bacterial content is low and the 
mineralogy is acceptable. After minimal treatment, they are able to use it as the 
fracturing fluid. They sometimes blend it with produced water or even fresh 
water. They report that water from the saline aquifer provides a cost savings of 
over 50 percent over the use of fresh water (King, 2011).
The Apache experience is a concrete example of the use of brines of 
convenience. It would be reasonable to expect that a majority of shale gas 
operations could virtually eliminate the use of fresh water. From the standpoint 
of energy policy, this should be the new norm. Departures from this practice 
ought to require defensible arguments.
CHAPTER 9
Is Natural Gas Indeed Worse for the 
Environment Than Coal?
“You may be wrong but you may be right”
—From “You May Be Right” by Billy Joel
Until recently, natural gas was seen as an indisputably cleaner alternative 
to coal. Robert Howarth and colleagues at Cornell changed all that, at first 
abortively when their study was demonstrably flawed. Their revised report, 
which now includes the contribution of fugitive methane in coal mining, was 
published in the peer-reviewed journal Climatic Change (Howarth et al., 2011). 
Their thesis is that about 2 percent of the ultimate recovery of natural gas is 
released to the atmosphere. Since methane is many times more potent than 
carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas, they compute that the net effect is worse 
than from the use of coal.
Hailstorms of criticism notwithstanding, some of the issues beg debate. 
A more recent study (“Switching from Coal,” 2011) appears to be in support 
of Howarth and colleagues’ contention as well. In contrast is the report by 
the Worldwatch Institute (“Despite Methane Emissions,” 2012), conducted 
in collaboration with Deutsche Bank, which unequivocally concludes the 
superiority of natural gas but nevertheless recommends attention to fugitive 
emissions. Howarth’s own colleagues at Cornell University conducted a peer 
review and pronounced the 2011 publication flawed (Cathles et al., 2012). At 
last count only one supporting study, cited above, is counterbalanced by at least 
five in serious opposition. 
A blog by Michael Levi (Levi, 2011) of the Council on Foreign Relations 
is worth reading mostly because Howarth chose to respond to his critiques, 
and the back and forth is instructive. The most critical report is one by Mary 
Barcella and colleagues from CERA, entitled “Mismeasuring Methane: 
Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Upstream Natural Gas 
Development” (Barcella et al., 2011). This report alleges that key IHS data were 
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“misused and severely distorted”—strong words. On balance all of the criticism 
centers on overcounting fugitive methane emissions from shale gas production 
operations.
So what is the public to make of all of this? They are right to assume 
that science is deterministic, at least in the broad swaths of the argument in 
question. When combusted, natural gas produces about 45 percent less carbon 
dioxide than does coal in producing the same amount of electricity. The 
Howarth study does not take the analysis to post combustion, thus intrinsically 
favoring coal because coal has lower combustion efficiency. The salience of 
such a comparison lies in the fact that cheap shale gas is being considered 
to replace coal in aging plants. A fair comparison would be the best new gas 
plant to the most advanced coal plant because when the old coal plants are 
retired, the choice will be the best of the alternatives. A combined cycle natural 
gas plant has about 60 percent efficiency compared to about 43 percent for 
combined cycle supercritical combustion coal plants. This simply cannot be 
ignored and would skew the Howarth analysis toward gas even if their data 
were not suspect. 
Howarth et al. defend their choice on the grounds that natural gas is used 
for purposes other than electricity generation (see commentary in the Michael 
Levi blog cited above). While this is true, coal is used predominantly for power, 
so in choosing to compare natural gas with coal, post-combustion analysis is 
appropriate. 
Where the dueling reports diverge is in the area of fugitive emissions— 
releases of methane during the operations involved in producing and 
transporting the fuels. The quantities are in dispute, not the origins of the 
emissions. The Howarth data are from a variety of sources of variable quality. 
The most recent EPA estimates are much lower, as are those, predictably, from 
the gas industry. 
Methane is about 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide in its global 
warming proclivity if the period under study is 100 years. The bulk of the 
debate surrounding the Howarth et al. work has been around the  
unconventional time scale of 20 years for the analysis, which most 
disadvantages methane. When carbon sequestration in deep saline aquifers 
is considered, the yardstick the practitioners are held to is well in excess of 
100 years. In other words, the sequestered gas has to be guaranteed to not leak 
over that period.
In the case of coal, the emissions comprise methane found in association 
with the coal. For centuries this has been a known hazard of coal mining, 
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both from the standpoint of a poisonous atmosphere for miners and from the 
possibility of explosions in confined areas of the mines. In the past, canaries 
were famously used as indicators of methane. If they died, you got out in a 
hurry—a sort of go/no-go device. As previously mentioned, methane has no 
odor; commercial producers deliberately introduce an odor into methane for 
public use precisely for the detection of leaks.
Methane emissions from coal mining vary depending upon the nature 
of the mine. Deeper coal mines need to be purged for safety reasons, and 
therefore more methane is produced from them. The gas is purged with air, 
and then transported to the surface in vents. Consequently the methane is very 
dilute, usually less than 1 percent. This is the dominant source of methane from 
coal mines and is currently released to the atmosphere. Recently attention has 
been paid to capturing and utilizing the methane (Somers & Schultz, 2010). By 
many accounts much can be accomplished here economically. The next biggest 
source is when holes are drilled to purge the mines prior to actual operations 
with personnel. Mountaintop and other open pit mines likely have fewer 
emissions, but these are also harder to assess.
The Howarth study, flawed or not, has on balance been very good for all 
concerned. This is because it drew attention to the issue and drove a number 
of other studies that might not otherwise have been conducted. Such attention 
would likely not have been given were it not for the controversial comparisons 
with coal. With a large number of coal plants scheduled to be mothballed over 
Global Warming Potential of Methane
Methane in the atmosphere will absorb infrared radiation attempting to 
escape to space. In so doing it causes atmospheric warming, much as does 
carbon dioxide, albeit at a lower level. Consequently it is classified as a 
greenhouse gas.
Over a 20-year timeframe, the global warming potential of methane is 
72 times that of carbon dioxide. This means that if equal weights of the two 
gases are released into the atmosphere, methane will be 72 times as effective 
in warming. After about a 10- to 12-year period, the methane reacts with 
hydroxyl radicals in the atmosphere to produce carbon dioxide and water. 
This reaction product continues to warm the earth long after the methane 
has been consumed. Over a 100-year timeframe, methane has a net effect 25 
times that of carbon dioxide, as compared to the factor of 72 in 20 years. The 
time period of comparison is therefore critical. Experts debate the appropriate 
timeframe, although current consensus leans to the higher number and is the 
number used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
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the next few years, natural gas as a transitional fuel to more sustainable sources 
has great currency. Since that is the primary issue, Howarth’s not taking into 
account the combustion step is a significant error. A direct consequence was 
the strident response, in the form of studies, from the likes of Worldwatch and 
the National Resources Defense Council. 
The brouhaha certainly has focused attention on the fact that something 
concrete ought to be done about fugitive methane emissions. This ought to go 
beyond coal mining and oil and gas production. It should include the following 
two sources:
• According to the latest available EPA estimates, the third-largest US 
source of fugitive methane is livestock; in Europe and Canada it is 
the principal source. The rumen, or forestomach of animals classified 
as ruminants, converts feed by bacterial action known as enteric 
fermentation. One byproduct of this action is methane, which is expelled 
by the animal. The methane formation represents about a 7 percent 
loss of efficiency in food conversion. It seems the only truly viable 
approach to mitigating this is not capture, but amelioration. Modeling 
has demonstrated that up to 40 percent reduction may be possible by 
various interventions (Benchaar et al., 2001). A 2007 European study on 
dairy cows claims 27 percent to 37 percent reduction in methane through 
addition of just 6 percent lipids in the feed (Martin et al., 2007). For this 
study they used linseed lipids at a dairy farm. Since methane production 
represents inefficiency, cost-effective reduction is in the economic 
interests of the farmer.
• Methane from landfills is the second-largest source in the US, and some 
estimate it to be the largest. In the absence of sufficient oxygen, organic 
matter decomposes to a mix of gases, about half of which will be methane. 
Intervention can be in two forms. One would be to divert organic matters 
such as household food scraps and yard waste to a specialized facility.
Until such measures can be instituted, the alternative, capturing the 
methane from landfills, is feasible. This can be flared, which is burning at the 
end of a pipe (the resulting carbon dioxide being less harmful than methane), 
or it can be combusted for a purpose. This purpose could conceivably be 
generation of electricity, hot water, and the like. The business model of landfill 
operation does not necessarily fit this type of process.
Natural gas production and distribution can cause the leakage of methane 
in two principal areas. One is in transportation. In some cases the high-bleed 
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design of pneumatic systems in the pipeline infrastructure is the culprit. 
Replacement with low-bleed designs is feasible, and substantial gains can 
be achieved by doing this. A higher-cost solution is replacing the gas with 
compressed air in the systems.
Also, the system of pipelines and associated valve assemblies can leak at 
various points after aging-induced malfunctions. But this can be addressed 
through maintenance mechanisms. One reason for the global drop in this sort 
of release is believed to be a Russian effort to replace old equipment.
The second and main source of fugitive emissions is the natural gas 
produced before a pipeline is in place to move it. This occurs in the early days 
of the prospect. Even in areas riddled with pipelines, a spur line to the new 
rig in question does not exist at the outset. Some operators may choose to not 
invest in a spur line until the reservoir is proven commercially viable. In that 
case, the initial gas produced during the discovery process has nowhere to go. 
It is often released. 
A simple solution would be to flare it. This would dramatically reduce the 
problem since the released pollutant would be carbon dioxide, not methane. 
Howarth et al. assume that every bit of this gas on every well is vented. A 
2012 study by Matthew Harrison of 1,578 shale gas wells across the country 
reports that in 93.5 percent of the cases, the spur line to the main gathering 
line is laid in time and the gas is recovered for sale. Thus only 6.5 percent of 
the gas in question is either vented or flared. This is a far cry from the 100 
percent venting assumption of Howarth et al., so the situation is far less dire 
than they make out. The Harrison study was industry-sponsored, which could 
carry taint with some. But it is unlikely that the numbers are off by much. The 
larger operators such as Shell have publicly stated that they utilize all the gas. 
The most authoritative study to date, sponsored by EDF and conducted at the 
University of Texas at Austin, is ongoing, and the first report was published 
in late 2013 (Allen et al., 2013) in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences. Their conclusions, if representative of the industry at large (theirs 
was necessarily a smaller sampling), are encouraging. They estimate that 
only 0.42 percent of gross gas production is released in some form. Some 
have challenged these numbers, but further reporting will hopefully allow a 
consensus on this issue.
The public may well ask why something useful is not done with the gas in 
every case other than simply putting it on the spur line, which, as we discussed 
is sometimes not present. The answer lies in part in the short duration of 
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the production of natural gas wells. It cannot economically warrant any sort 
of capture and use. If such an economically enabling technology were to be 
developed, the potential to reduce methane emissions would be significant. The 
actual act of capture is straightforward and requires no particular innovation. 
The only issue is the economic utility of capturing gas as opposed to flaring. In 
some ways it is the same issue faced by landfill operators.
A little-known fact is that LNG is kept cold during the long voyage from 
Qatar or elsewhere by periodically releasing small quantities. This release 
causes chilling primarily through evaporative cooling. But in recognition of the 
economic value of the gas, it is collected and used in engines on the ship.
Natural gas associated with oil production when not in economically 
useful quantities is another potential source of emissions. Here, too, flaring is 
an option, as is any new technology to utilize the gas. Oil storage is another 
source, in that oil storage tanks are vented to release methane; in principle 
this methane could be recovered. In all recovery schemes, a yardstick for cost 
breakeven could well be the price set on carbon. Today there is no such thing 
in the US, but in Europe that price ranges from about $15 to $35 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide. One could use $30 per tonne as a target figure that one could 
reasonably project as an effective US-based “tax,” no matter what the manner 
of implementation. 
The US EPA issued the so-called green completions regulations (EPA, 2012) 
covering this issue. In summary, operators will be required to use measures to 
drastically reduce methane emissions during the early stages of production (the 
flowback period). They will have until 2015 to achieve this.
In my opinion, this is a reasonable policy. To expedite execution, the 
industry would be well served by sharing best practices with the smaller 
operators. This technology is unlikely to have a proprietary component, so 
sharing ought to be straightforward. Although research is not involved, RPSEA 
(the Research Partnership to Secure Energy for America) could be instructed 
to execute this aspect. This would be a fit with the small producer assistance 
stricture under which RPSEA operates.
The new rules also govern some of the other areas we have discussed in this 
chapter, including oil storage tanks and valve systems. There are also specific 
reporting requirements, which ought not to be onerous and are needed to 
assure a concerned public
A final note: Given that belching bovines are such a major part of the 
methane emissions equation, an outbreak of vegetarianism would help the 
environment!
CHAPTER 10
Earthquakes:  
Should We Be Concerned?
“Shake, shake, shake”
—From “(Shake, Shake, Shake) Shake Your Booty” by KC and the Sunshine Band 
(written by H.W. Casey and R. Finch)
Fracturing operations produce seismic energy. This can cause moderate 
earthquakes if the operations are proximal to active faults. Conventional 
techniques can identify such faults and interaction with them can be avoided. 
With diligent pursuit there ought to be no concern.
In Lancashire, United Kingdom, an earthquake of magnitude 2.5 on the 
Richter scale was recorded on April 1, 2011. Despite the date being subject to 
some tomfoolery, this actually did happen. It was followed by a 1.5-magnitude 
tremor on May 27 of the same year. A study by European scientists concluded 
that it very likely was tied to fracturing operations. It also mentioned that this 
was due to a combination of circumstances unlikely to be repeated and that the 
maximum such that could be expected was a magnitude-3.0 tremor.
In 2008 and 2009 the town of Cleburne, Texas, experienced a series of 
tremors up to 3.3 on the Richter scale. This town had no recorded history of 
earthquakes, so the residents speculated that fracturing operations, which were 
a relatively recent activity, were the cause. A team of scientists from two major 
Texas universities concluded that fracturing was not the likely cause but that 
waste fluid disposal wells could be implicated, and the two were related in that 
the waste fluid was mostly from fracturing operations.
In late 2010 and early 2011 a series of earthquakes were recorded in the 
Guy-Greenbrier area of central Arkansas. The US Geological Survey studied the 
phenomenon and dubbed it the “Guy earthquake swarm.” Initial reports were 
not conclusive except to suggest that fracturing per se is an unlikely cause, but 
deep disposal wells could be the culprits. Of note, though, was the report that 
in Enola, southeast of Guy, swarms of about 3,000 quakes occurred in the early 
1980s, and about 2,500 again in 2001, predating fracturing and deep disposal in 
both cases.
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The Tohoku-oki earthquake off the eastern coast of Japan in 2011 was 
the fifth earthquake globally since 2004 of magnitude 8.5 or greater, an 
extraordinary recurrence rate considering that the last preceding earthquake 
of that magnitude was in 1965. The Tohoku-oki earthquake certainly cannot 
be compared with the others, in part because it could not possibly be human- 
induced except in a James Bond fantasy. But is the earth entering a period of 
increased seismicity? 
The December 2011 issue of Science reports (Mueller & Yeston, 2011) on a 
paper by Andrew Michael in Geophysical Research Letters: “Recent seismicity 
can be described by random and high variability of low-rate events within 
a Poisson process rather than a cluster of related events.” The main purpose 
of Michael’s paper was modeling to show that the recent spate of large 
earthquakes, most lately the one mentioned above, was not an indication of 
an era of increased global seismicity. His point being taken, one could still 
conclude that higher incidences of small temblors were natural events and not 
anthropogenic.
But whether fracturing could develop enough energy to cause geological 
platelets to move deserves study. The same goes for stresses caused by deep 
disposal wells. But first some basics. Earthquakes are measured on the Richter 
scale, named after a Caltech professor who devised it. The information in 
the box at right comes from the USGS Earthquake Hazards Program website 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov) and presents intensity in common terms. The 
Richter scale is logarithmic. This means that each increasing whole number 
indicates a 10× increase in displacement (ground motion) and about a 32× 
increase in energy. More recently, as shown in the box, the USGS has moved 
toward using the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale. Unlike the Richter scale, it 
has no mathematical basis. It simply is a ranking based upon the actual effects 
felt by the populace. USGS feels the public can better relate to such a scale. 
However, the popular press did not get the memo and still report these events 
on the old Richter scale. Some habits are hard to break. In an effort to be even-
handed, I have provided both in the box.
The USGS table raises several points related to earthquakes observed in 
the vicinity of fracturing activities. The ones in the UK really ought not to 
even have been noticed. Perhaps an observatory recorded and reported it. The 
ones in Cleburne as well were barely in the noticeable range. But once noted, 
the recurrence would have raised concerns simply because they were not the 
norm. Not mentioned in the chronology above were some larger ones in Ohio, 
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around 4.9, and an even larger one in Oklahoma, around 5.6, in late 2011. 
These appear definitely to be implicated with injection wells.
The other takeaway from the table is the sheer number of smaller events. 
The normal number worldwide in the intensity range of the suspect ones 
noted above is a reason to believe that many of those observed may be 
naturally occurring. Also, aside from a fear of the unknown, the moratorium 
on shale gas development called for in the UK based on those tiny quakes, the 
sort of which naturally occur a million times annually in the world, smacks 
of overreaction. This is especially so in a country reliant on imported gas. 
Single-issue activism without consideration of the other implications is always 
disappointing.
Seismic Activity Related to Fracturing
Many fracturing operations are closely monitored for seismic activity. This has 
been done for a number of years in order to map the pattern of fractures in an 
effort to improve drainage of the reservoir by making sure they knew where 
the fractures went. As a consequence, very detailed information is available. 
The magnitudes have always been known to be small, so the technique is 
designated “microseismic.” In principle, monitoring wells could be placed in 
Earthquake Intensities and Frequencies
Magnitude
Typical Maximum Modified  
Mercalli Intensity
Annual  
Average Number
1.0–2.9  I 1,300,000*
3.0–3.9  II–III 130,000*
4.0–4.9  IV–V 13,000*
5.0–5.9  VI–VII 1,319**
6.0–6.9  VII–IX 134**
7.0 and higher  VII or higher 15**
*  estimated
**  based on observations
Abbreviated Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale: 
I  Not felt except under very favorable conditions
II  Felt on upper floor of buildings
III  Vibrations similar to passing truck
IV  Felt indoors noticeably, outdoors sometimes; like heavy truck striking wall
V  Felt by nearly all, unstable objects topple
VI  Felt by all, some frightened, damage slight
VII  Poorly built buildings damaged, slight to moderate damage in well-designed normal buildings
Source: USGS, n.d.a and USGS, n.d.b 
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every new prospect to estimate the actual energy produced from fracturing in 
that rock. The most detailed studies to date are in the Barnett Shale. The levels 
observed are mostly under 3.0 in intensity.
The more important point is probably not the energy from the fracturing 
itself but rather the proximity to faults of reasonable size. According to the 
USGS, the magnitude of an earthquake is directly proportional to the length of 
the fault. 3-D seismic is a technique routinely used by the industry to delineate 
the subsurface. Essentially a three-dimensional picture of the reservoir and 
the rock surrounding it can be produced. This is routinely performed in 
offshore tracts but not so commonly on land, where a more cost-effective 
two-dimensional picture could do the trick. In prospective areas known to 
be significantly faulted, the prudent approach would be to run a 3-D survey 
to assist in placing the wells in the most productive areas while also avoiding 
faults of significant size. In areas with some risk, at least the initial fracturing 
operations may need to be accompanied by microseismic monitoring in real 
time. If a fault is intersected, the entry will be detected and the operation can 
be shut down.
Seismic Activity Related to Disposal Wells
Disposal wells have been more directly implicated in tremors. In Guy, 
Arkansas, four disposal wells were judged to be close to previously unknown 
faults. After two of these wells were closed, the incidence of earthquakes 
greater than 2.5 dropped significantly, and a moratorium was placed on wells 
in a 1,100-square-mile area over the fault system. Similar measures were taken 
in Ohio after additional quakes were linked to disposal wells.
There is a general belief that disposal wells, and these could include wells 
for carbon dioxide sequestration, have the potential to create seismic activity. 
While even this may not be of a damaging scale, it is disturbing for the public 
unused to such activity. Since disposal wells are regulated by the EPA, planning 
and monitoring ought to be straightforward. This in fact is likely why swift 
action to shut down was taken in Ohio: the wells were being monitored by the 
state Environmental Protection Agency. Careful planning and execution are 
critical for disposal wells.
These wells are used to dispose of all manner of liquid waste, not just that 
from drilling operations. Considering just the latter, one ought to give serious 
consideration to reuse of produced water being the primary option rather than 
the secondary.
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Should We Be Worried? 
In short, no. The seismic activity from the act of fracturing is small in intensity. 
It will by and large be below the threshold of human detection except in 
unusual situations. But care should be taken to not operate proximal to 
faults over a certain size. There ought to be rulemaking on this point. The 
technology of subsurface mapping to identify the location and size of faults is 
well known and currently used for practical reasons: operators do not want to 
lose valuable fluid down these faults. The technology of real-time monitoring 
of fracturing is well developed as well. Best practices ought to be developed 
with respect to the minimum number of wells in each prospect that ought to 
have such monitoring implemented. Good subsurface mapping combined 
with procedures to ensure no intersection of fractures with faults ought to be 
mandated.
Disposal wells do present a larger risk of detectable tremors, but again not 
likely large enough to cause damage. But the intersection of active faults by any 
such disposal wells ought to be avoided using very similar techniques to those 
mentioned above. This being an EPA-regulated activity, the execution of new 
measures ought to be straightforward. Strong consideration should be given to 
incentivize reuse of flowback water rather than deep disposal of it. Aside from 
avoiding the problem of possible tremors altogether, this would put less of a 
burden on fresh water withdrawals because at least a portion would be reused. 
In many, but not all, instances the cost may not even be greater.

PART III 
Economics  
of 
Production  
and Use
The bulk of the “promise” element of the book is in this section. Reporters in reputable newspapers had questioned the very profitability of shale gas 
production. Growth in the industry bolsters the fact that the 
profits were there. 
In the span of 2012 to 2015, shale oil has taken center 
stage away from shale gas. I had missed that trend in the 
first writing in part because shale oil burst into prominence 
in the very year of that writing (2011). It seems I was not 
the only one caught unawares. Pipeline infrastructure did 
not keep up with production, and in early 2015, a million 
barrels a day are being transported by under-regulated rail, 
with attendant issues such as explosive derailments. So, 
here we have an environmental impact issue not captured 
in Section II.
On the economic plus side, shale oil has caused a 
sustained drop in the world price of oil, a boon for net 
importing nations such as the US, China, and India. Over 
time this increase in domestic production of oil will affect 
politics as well. 
Sustained low domestic prices have brought chemical 
processing companies, such as makers of ammonia 
fertilizer and methanol, to the US. The US will likely be 
a net exporter of these in the future. In addition, cheap 
natural gas is enabling the substitution of gasoline and 
diesel in transportation. Innovations in technology such 
as conversion of gas to liquids on a small distributed basis 
are discussed in this section. I construct a thesis whereby 
gas could be converted to liquids and sent down the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline, providing a lifeline to a system in danger of 
extinction due to low oil volumes.
III. Economics of Production and Use
CHAPTER 11
Is Shale Gas Production Indeed  
a Giant Ponzi Scheme?
“You’re just too good to be true”
—From “Can’t Take My Eyes Off You” by Frankie Valli (written by Bob Crewe and Bob Gaudio)
A New York Times top-of-the-fold front page piece, “Insiders Sound an Alarm 
Amid Natural Gas Rush” (Urbina, 2011), discussed the profitability of shale gas 
wells and is very bearish on the prospects. The author is careful to use the term 
“Ponzi scheme” in a statement attributed to someone else. But as anybody with 
modest discernment knows, such a reference made in the early stages of a piece 
is at the very least a tacit endorsement.
I acknowledge the principal points: some in the industry worry about 
profitability, especially given the low gas prices in the last year or two. I present 
here a case for rejecting the pessimistic premise. These are early days in the 
exploitation of a completely new type of reservoir. Continuous improvement, as 
in any industrial endeavor, can be expected. In the case of shale gas, the learning 
curve is likely to be steep. In part this is because of the sheer volume of activity. 
Each well can be drilled and produced in as few as 21 days, so the financial 
risk is low and the number of wells will be large. The setting is almost akin to a 
factory, the type of enterprise amenable to rapid learning curves. 
Production From Shale Gas Wells Declines Rapidly
True. The decline is steep, with a drop of 60 percent to 80 percent in the first 
year. (Conventional reservoirs decline 25 percent to 40 percent in the first year.) 
After year two, there is a gradual asymptotic decline. The mechanism is still 
being debated, but premature closure of the fractures is a likely explanation. This 
could be due to insufficient penetration of proppant into the formation. Industry 
is working on materials and techniques to cause improved and more sustained 
flow. A Rice University–originated product sourced from nanomaterial is in 
early stages of commercialization. This and other such products are being 
designed to be lighter than conventional proppants, while still being strong 
enough. Being lighter they can be expected to float out further into the cracks.
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Refracturing
In this technique, new fractures are initiated in existing well bores, often 
directly on top of the old ones. In the few cases where it has been attempted in 
the Barnett, the results have been dramatic. Production rates after refracturing 
have reached and exceeded the original starting production. And sometimes 
they decline at the same rate as before. This is indicative of the possibility that 
new rock pores are being accessed.
Current research at the University of Texas indicates that the optimal time 
to refracture is two to three years after initial production (Sharma, 2010). 
The University of Texas study will also examine other factors such as precise 
location relative to the old fractures. One hypothesis is that closure of the 
fractures in the zone produced induces a stressed region, which discourages 
new fractures from going to that area. In some observations, the new fractures 
are seen to bend away from the depleted zones.
Somewhat ironically, a shortcoming of the resource, poor permeability (a 
measure of the ability of fluids to flow in the rock), may be why refracturing 
works. Ordinarily, poor permeability means less flow, and hence less 
production. Fracturing improves that. But if the fracture paths are impaired, 
as explained above, the gas does not get fully drained from adjacent rock. 
However, it remains available for new fractures, and is for all practical purposes 
from new rock despite being proximal. From the standpoint of economics of 
the prospect, all that matters is that each operation cause enough production 
to ensure a rate of return. The fast declines are not highly material if this 
economic threshold is met. One final point: refracturing comes at a fraction of 
the cost of the original well because no new well bore is drilled. So the newer 
gas has a cost basis that could be a third or less of the initial gas. This does 
wonders for prospect economics.
Wet Gas
There is a passing allusion to wet gas in the New York Times piece, but it 
deserves serious attention because of its dramatic effect on profitability. Wet gas 
is defined as natural gas with a significant component of hydrocarbon species 
other than methane, known collectively as natural gas liquids (NGLs). The 
principal constituents are ethane, propane, butane, and even larger molecules 
broadly named condensate. As a detail, although ethane is lumped in with 
NGLs, it is actually a gas at ambient temperature and importantly also a gas 
at temperatures that condense out the bigger molecules propane and butane. 
This distinction is important in the method of separation from methane and is 
discussed in a separate chapter.
 Chapter 11. Is Shale Gas Production Indeed a Giant Ponzi Scheme? 73
The economic significance of NGLs lies in the spread between natural gas 
and oil prices. Natural gas, on the basis of energy content, is currently priced 
at about a fourth of oil. Decades ago their prices were in parity. Natural gas 
liquids, the “wet” part of wet gas, are priced in relationship to the price of 
oil. Condensate is at or somewhat higher than the price of oil, and butane is 
definitely higher than oil because it is essentially a drop-in replacement for 
gasoline. Propane is at a discount to oil, as is ethane. Ethane is the least costly, 
at about half the price of oil. The actual price varies depending on location 
and availability. But all these are vast improvements over the price of methane 
which is typically one-third to one-fourth the price of oil.
A typical Marcellus wet gas is reported by one oil company as pricing out 
about 70 percent over dry gas. Range Resources reports that at a flat $4 per 
MM Btu gas price (incidentally, the average for 2010 was around this figure, 
and in 2013 that was close to the average as well), its internal rate of return 
would be 60 percent. That is way more profitable than many conventional gas 
prospects. But you and I can do our own calculations (see box below)—or you 
can skip that and go to the punch line on returns.
Wet Gas Economics
The wet portions of North American shale gas deposits average between 4 and 
12 gallons of NGL per thousand cubic feet (mcf) of natural gas. Typical Marcellus wells 
run about 1,500 mcf per day, and an average cluster of wells (pad) may have 15 wells, 
giving daily production of 22,500 mcf per day. Using a figure of 7 gallons NGL per mcf, 
that yields 157.5 gallons, or 3.75 barrels of NGL per day.
Ethane tends to average 60 percent of the NGL. (The full implications of the lowest 
value NGL being so preponderant are discussed in chapter 14, “The Ethane Dilemma.”) 
For simplicity I will count all the other liquids priced at a discount to $100 per barrel of 
oil, at $70 a barrel. Support for this is the EIA-sourced pricing figure in chapter 14. That 
figure demonstrates the recent history of NGLs at roughly 80 percent of crude price 
and, separately, ethane at about 50 percent of crude price. In both the NGL and the 
ethane, I have been more conservative than that. Ethane I will price at half of that, at 
$35 a barrel. Ethane prices out at 0.6 x 3.75 x $35 = $78.75. The other NGLs collectively 
are worth: 0.4 x 3.75 x $70 = $105. Total value of the NGLs is the sum of those two: 
$183.75. (Note that I call ethane an NGL, following industry practice, but in the 
calculation I make a distinction because the EIA figure splits out ethane.)
To estimate the effect of NGLs, it is simpler to reduce the above figure to that 
associated with 1 mcf gas. That would be $183.75/22.5 = $8.17. This calculation states 
that the NGL associated with natural gas could add $8 to the typical price of natural gas 
these days, which was $4 per mcf in 2011.  To be immensely conservative, let’s halve the 
NGL value by discounting severely. That still indicates double the profits over dry gas. 
The actual market value of such liquids can vary by area, which is why I have chosen to 
be so conservative. But the moral is that the wet component dominates profitability.
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Wet gas profitability is shown to be more than double that of dry gas. A 
downside would be drops in the price of oil, thus reducing the NGL value. 
In chapter 2, “The Oil Plateau and the Precipice Beyond,” I describe models 
in support of the belief that oil prices will remain high except for the usual 
perturbations driven by external factors. Another downside is wetness at the 
lower end of the scale mentioned, below the average figure of 7 gallons of 
NGL per thousand cubic feet (mcf) of gas. Keep in mind, though, the heavy 
discounting we did in our calculations relative to oil. Even accounting for the 
costs to clean up the liquids and transport them, the value of NGLs should be 
closer to the price of oil than our conservative assumptions.
The Marcellus Shale, the largest and most prolific of the North American 
deposits, has a wet character on its western side. The as-yet not important 
producing states of West Virginia and Ohio are advantaged in this regard, as is 
western Pennsylvania. The Utica Shale is described in chapter 4. It is a newly 
discovered province that promises to be bigger and more productive than 
the Marcellus, but these are early days yet to put any certainty on the size. Its 
productivity, on the other hand, is more of a sure thing because the Utica is 
set deeper and so can be expected to have higher natural pressure to drive the 
fluids up. On average it has wetter character than the Marcellus, again on the 
western side. The same three states are advantaged by this.
How Things Will Play Out
Given the facts above, expect the wet gas prospects to be produced first. Over 
the next few years, the price of dry natural gas will rise because of demand. 
Massive switching from coal-fired electricity to gas will occur. This is because 
even without a price on carbon, the all-in cost of electricity from gas is less 
than that from coal at gas prices below $8 per MM Btu. In a 2011 article (Rao, 
2011), I presented a model predicting gas prices to have a lid at about $8. This 
stability will contribute to switching from oil to gas. The switches will include 
methane propulsion of vehicles and gas-to-liquids-derived diesel and gasoline. 
Chemicals traditionally derived from oil will switch to being produced from 
natural gas or the associated NGLs. These chemicals include ethylene and all its 
derivatives and propylene. Many of these products are imported today.
Over time, all this oil replacement, plus electric vehicles, will make a 
significant dent in our $300 billion plus annual imported oil bill, and hence 
our balance of payments. Importantly, gas prices will be less subject to the 
whims of the weather because heating and cooling will be an ever-decreasing 
component of gas usage. Also, with shale gas production heavily distributed 
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and deep inland, hurricane-related disruptions to gas supply, and associate 
price spikes, will be a minor factor. But 33 of the 42 US/Canadian ethylene 
crackers are on the Gulf Coast. So hurricane-related reduction in the supply of 
chemicals that are based on natural gas is still not out of the question.
Demand creation will enable a gradual return to dry gas production. Some 
of the earlier plays are profitable at $4 already. But a rise in the floor price will 
ensure the supply that will be available when the consumption trends described 
above mature. 
And one day The New York Times will have a page 1 above-the-fold piece on 
how shale gas transformed the US economy. Then I will wake up.

CHAPTER 12
The Supporting Actress Is Now the Star?
“Lightning is striking again”
—Lou Christie in “Lightnin’ Strikes,” written by Lou Christie and Twyla Herbert
Just as we were absorbing the enormity of the economic impact of shale gas, 
along came shale oil and in many ways trumped it. Oil used to be in the 
supporting cast for shale gas. Not oil per se, but natural gas liquids (NGLs) 
found in association with the gas, had value. Economists tend to lump 
NGLs with oil in their statistics. I discussed in chapter 11 the fact that the 
NGL component was the difference maker in the economics of the shale gas 
production as long as natural gas prices stayed low. This is driven by the fact 
that most NGLs are pegged to the price of oil rather than gas and oil continues 
to be four to five times as costly as natural gas. 
Supporting Actors Stealing the Show
It does not happen often, but when it does, a star is usually born. Abigail 
Breslin saved the otherwise inconsequential movie Little Miss Sunshine; it’s too 
early to see what the more grown up Breslin will do. Austrian actor Christoph 
Waltz stole the show from Brad Pitt in Inglourious Basterds and got an Oscar 
and out-of-nowhere recognition for his work. These performances basically 
demonstrate the actors’ credo: there are no small parts. In opera that is often 
literally the case. When the novice Frederica von Stade came out of obscurity 
in 1973 in the role of the page boy Cherubino in The Marriage of Figaro first 
in Santa Fe and then at the Met in New York (I was privileged to be there), 
she did steal the show. But was it in fact a small part? Cherubino it could be 
argued has two full arias, same as the Countess. But when was the last time 
you saw the person playing Cherubino advertised on the poster? Von Stade, 
known as Flicka to her adoring legion of fans, went on to be a star.
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The pricing disparity has caused a radical shift toward shale oil away from gas, 
especially “dry gas,” which is natural gas with little or no NGL content. There 
are no hard numbers for this but if the NGLs are less than about 2 gallons per 
mcf gas, then the gas could be considered dry. Typical producing wet gas wells 
run between 4 and 12 gallons per mcf.
The logical extension to wet gas is oil itself. In chapter 1, I explained 
that from the standpoint of chemistry and geology, oil and gas are one vast 
continuum. Consequently, where you found one, the other was also likely to 
be found. Probably the fastest growing shale hydrocarbon area in the US has 
been the Eagle Ford play in Texas. This was driven in no mean part by the fact 
that the single area contained fluids ranging from dry gas to oil. Consequently, 
property owners became very conversant with the special operational 
requirements of producing oil, some of which are described later in this 
chapter.
The big story in shale oil is the Bakken formation. It lies mostly in North 
Dakota but also is found in Montana, South Dakota, and Saskatchewan. The 
existence of recoverable oil was known for a couple of decades, but serious 
exploitation did not happen until about 2008. As one can see from Figure 7, the 
explosive growth took a couple more years, and I missed noting it in the first 
edition of this book, which I wrote in 2011. The pace is keeping up, and shale 
oil produced from the Bakken is right around 1.3 MM bpd in early 2015.
Figure 7. Bakken and Eagle Ford oil production history
Source: US Energy Information Administration: Drilling Productivity Report
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The Eagle Ford, as I mentioned, has both gas and oil. In 2011, attention 
shifted to oil production, and the growth rate (shown in Figure 7) is even more 
remarkable than that of the Bakken. In part this high rate is because being in 
Texas, the Eagle Ford formation is close to petroleum industry infrastructure 
and potential markets for its product. Even so, marketability of this light oil has 
been challenging, as I discuss below. Not surprisingly, the pace of development 
pickup is similar for the Bakken and Eagle Ford plays.
As of early 2015, together these two sources of oil are producing over 
3 MM bpd and increasing. Other plays such as the Niobrara (300,000 bpd) 
and the western Marcellus are also adding material quantities. This is against a 
backdrop of oil imports that were over 8 MM bpd a scant few years ago.
All of this is causing bold, possibly rash, predictions of oil independence. 
This domestic source arrived contemporaneously with reduced utilization, 
especially of gasoline, through higher CAFE standards and the unconnected 
recession we experienced. In chapter 26, I discuss the further reduction in 
domestic oil demand through the use of natural gas as a raw material for a 
number of fuels and chemicals ordinarily produced from oil. In fact, I believe 
the world will see a progressively reduced dependence on oil. This will begin 
with gas substitution mentioned above and then later be joined by biomass-
sourced liquids and chemicals. This will happen neither quickly nor completely. 
In other words, oil is here to stay for a long time. But it will lose its status as an 
essential or strategic commodity and simply become a useful option. When 
that happens the price will moderate. Nevertheless, energy independence is not 
a particularly viable concept in this connected world. But energy security is a 
worthy objective.
The Nature of Shale Oil and the Economic Consequences
Shale oil is a throwback. This is the way oil used to be back in the day, way 
back. We are talking over half a century ago. Industry explores for oil and 
gas and tends to produce the easy stuff first because that delivers the most 
profit. The result is that conventional oil is now by and large either not easy 
to produce or not as desirable when produced. In the first category is oil from 
ultra-deep water (over 5,000 feet water depth) and demanding environments 
such as the Arctic. In the second category, the less desirable oil, in conventional 
settings, is defined by its properties. Typically it is heavier or sourer or both. 
Heavy means a high proportion of large molecules, making transportation 
and refining more difficult and expensive. Sour means more sulfur in the oil 
or gas. In the case of gas, the less desirable category includes a high proportion 
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of carbon dioxide. Very few prospects are being exploited with more than 
10 percent. The bypassed gas can have as much as 60 percent carbon dioxide. 
Might as well call it a CO2 well, not a natural gas well!
In some ways the shale oil and gas revolution has turned the industry 
on its head. Sweet gas (defined as not sour) is now available from shale and 
other tight rock. A defining feature of shale gas is that it is almost exclusively 
sweet. Similarly, shale oil is almost universally sweet, and it is light to boot. 
Consequently refiners should welcome it with open arms, right? Wrong. But 
before we get to that particular travesty, consider that shale oil and gas are 
throwbacks to the good old days because they are a brand new resource. When 
conventional resources were new, there was a lot of the light sweet fluid. The 
other reason is geology: shale oil and shale gas are in the source rock, the place 
they originally formed. When either formed it was light and sweet. Virtually 
all the oil that became heavy or sour got to that state due to bacterial action, 
usually at shallower depths (all the important heavy oil deposits are relatively 
shallow).
Domestic Market Is Weak for Shale Oil
The vast majority of US refineries are of the complex variety. Many have 
invested heavily in the specialized equipment to handle heavy crude from 
Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico. Some estimates have that investment at 
$20 billion (Phillips, 2013). Canadian crude imports in particular are on the 
rise. This extra-heavy crude is heavily discounted with respect to the West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) price on light sweet crude oil in recognition of the 
refining costs and also because a portion of it, after the best refining efforts, has 
essentially no value. This final residue is known as petroleum coke and does 
have fuel value comparable to the better grades of coal, but it has limited use in 
this regard.
Light sweet shale oil ought to sell for WTI price. But US refiners essentially 
cannot afford to pay that price because it would underutilize their special 
equipment. Furthermore, US laws do not allow export of the light oil except to 
NAFTA countries. The net result is that this valuable oil has been selling at a 
discount compared with WTI. While the prices of the two benchmark crudes, 
WTI and Brent, tend to vary, Bakken crude at the wellhead in January 2014 
was selling for $18 less than WTI and $27 less than Brent. That $18 spread 
with respect to WTI is not that far off the Canadian heavy (known as Western 
Canada Select, or WCS) spread, which in recent years has ranged from $15 to 
$25, with minor excursions higher. 
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This is why the producers are lobbying for permission to export crude—
because they are likely to get a world price for light sweet crude, at least WTI 
and possibly close to Brent. Pushback is coming from many fronts but in 
particular from the independent refiners (refiners not tied to an oil producing 
company). Given that refined products can be exported at will, the refiners are 
in a bit of a bind philosophically. They are currently enjoying the free market–
enabled margins while arguing against the same for producers. In fact, the 
US currently exports over 3.5 MM bpd of refined products, as compared with 
an expected crude oil import level of 6 MM bpd in 2016. In general it is good 
for the nation to be exporting refined products because the margin stays in-
country as a profit. Also, the creation of these products results in jobs.
Refineries and Refining Margins 
Refineries fall into two categories: simple and complex. Simple refineries heat 
up the crude oil and separate the vapors into condensates of value, primarily 
gasoline, kerosene/jet fuel, and diesel. What is left over is known as fuel oil, 
which has uses such as for heating homes. The lighter the oil, the lower the 
fuel oil fraction. Simple refineries may also do some hydro-skimming, which 
is using hydrogen to remove sulfur. But they make no effort to upgrade the 
heavier molecules.
Complex refineries use a process known as cracking, which reduces the 
size of the molecules in fuel oil to create gasoline or diesel. This is done if the 
market for the transport fuels is good and better than that for fuel oil. The 
most common process used is known as fluidized catalytic cracking (FCC). 
The heavier the oil, the greater the need for cracking. Extra-heavy oil is often 
vacuum distilled, after which it is left as a residuum that has no use except as a 
partial blend with fuel oil. The residuum is usually processed in cokers, where 
intense heat breaks down the molecules. The end result is a solid known as 
petroleum coke, which cannot be further refined into gasoline or other fuels. 
The heavier the oil, the greater the fraction of this substance with limited 
utility. For this reason, extra-heavy oil is almost always priced lower than 
lighter oil.
Refining margins are calculated as the difference between the total 
selling price of the output minus the cost of the crude. What makes refining 
a less-than-predictable business is that both ends of that chain can have 
volatility. Simple refineries generally have lower margins unless there is an 
unusual depression in price of light oil. This is in fact happening with shale 
oil—more on that elsewhere in this chapter. Complex refineries have more 
costly equipment, but the feed cost is generally lower and more of the feed is 
converted to valuable fuel.
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The other interesting twist is that the artificially low price for light sweet 
crude has emboldened the resurrection of old simple refineries and even 
the building of new ones. Most of these are small—under 20,000 bpd and as 
small as 10,000 bpd. By comparison, conventional refineries are mostly larger 
than 100,000 bpd, and newer world-class ones such as the one in Jamnagar, 
India, are over 1 MM bpd. The new one is a 20,000-bpd plant near Dickinson, 
North Dakota, the first new refinery permitted and built in the US since 2008. 
No new refinery larger than 50,000 bpd has been built since 1977. Given the 
uncertainties with regard to permission to export crude, these simple refineries 
would do well to be small, thus reducing supply risk.
The Midstream Was Unprepared
The midstream is defined as the capability that transports produced fluids 
from the “upstream” well locations to the “downstream” refineries. Shale gas, 
and particularly shale oil, suffers from inadequate capacity to take it to market. 
A glance at Figures 7 earlier in this chapter provides a clue as to the reason. 
The rapidity of the buildup would have tested any midstream capability. The 
hardest hit area was the Bakken, where no prior capability existed. The result is 
that the oil is being transported in trains (and trucks to get it to the train). 
A scant five years ago such a proposal would have been met with derision, 
yet these days trains are carrying nearly 1 MM bpd of North Dakota oil. 
The same is happening with Canadian heavy crude, especially in the face of 
seemingly interminable delays in the sanctioning of the Keystone XL pipeline. 
Incidentally, this pipeline was designed to carry a portion of Bakken oil as well, 
in addition to the Canadian crude. A major oil train derailment in Quebec 
in 2013, resulting in 47 deaths and significant environmental damage, gives 
one pause regarding this mode of transportation. At least two derailments of 
Bakken oil trains occurred in 2013 as well. Saying no to a pipeline, whether 
it is the Keystone XL or any other, is now an implicit acceptance of transport 
in trucks and trains. Opposition to pipelines in the past did not present that 
alternative. Consequently, activism in this regard must recognize the change in 
the landscape and decide which alternative is worse.
The absence of natural gas pipelines is leading to massive flaring of 
associated gas. This is natural gas that is found incidental to the oil production. 
In some ways this is an analog to NGLs found in association with natural gas. 
In this case, however, the gas has little value unless it can be taken to market. 
Release to the atmosphere being especially harmful, as discussed in chapter 9, 
this gas is flared. By some estimates North Dakota is flaring about $100 million 
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worth of gas each month, and this tally will continue to rise with more oil 
production. Many remedies are being sought, including building ammonia 
fertilizer plants in close proximity and making plans for pipelines. Some of the 
ideas in chapter 18, “Horses for Courses: Challenging the Orthodoxy in Fuels 
and Chemicals,” could be employed here. But as it stands, the suddenness of 
the gas production has caught the industry unprepared and much profit is 
literally going up in smoke. Royalty owners are unhappy, and lawsuits could be 
forthcoming.
Implications to Energy Security
US oil production has exceeded imports for the first time since 1995 (US EIA, 
January 23, 2012). This is largely attributed to the surge in shale oil production. 
The EIA expects a continual rise in this production out to at least 2020. But 
this increasing self-sufficiency will not insulate the country from price shocks 
from world events. This is because oil is a world commodity, and a world 
market price exists. However, by importing less oil, more is available for other 
markets, thus damping volatility induced by singular events. Because shale oil 
is light and sweet, the US will soon not be importing similar oils from Nigeria 
and Angola. That oil will now be welcome elsewhere, especially in countries 
with predominantly simple refineries, which are especially suited to refining 
light oil.
Eventually the combination of higher domestic oil production and the 
conversion of abundant and low-cost natural gas to transport liquids will 
severely limit oil imports. By 2025 the new CAFE standards will also serve 
to reduce consumption of transport fuel. Not out of the question is the 
scenario that by 2025 the US will source all its oil from North America. While 
something short of oil independence, this would constitute a high measure of 
security of supply.

CHAPTER 13
Chemical Industry Prodigals Can Return
“Get back to where you once belonged”
—From “Get Back” by The Beatles (written by John Lennon and Paul McCartney)
Consistently cheap shale gas and associated liquids will transform the US 
chemical industry. Production that fled these shores in the face of high and 
uncertain natural gas prices will return.
Unrest in the Middle East causes spikes in the price of oil, with immediate 
impact on gasoline price. Rather uncharacteristically, the Islamic State violence 
in Syria and Iraq have not had the usual upward impact on oil prices. This is 
likely due to the balance brought by new US production. But even when oil 
spikes, the price of natural gas tends to remain stable over the same period. 
This story line has repeated often and underlines the principal difference in 
these two essential fuels. Oil is a world commodity, while gas is regional. Also 
they serve largely different segments of end use. Consequently, the fact that gas 
is one-half to one-fourth the price of oil (in energy content) has little relevance 
in the main.
However, if industry believes that this differential will hold for a long time, 
technology-enabled switching will occur. In this chapter I predict a shale gas– 
enabled future of gas at low to moderate price for a long time. At the same 
time I subscribe to the view of an upcoming plateau in oil production, which 
will drive oil prices higher. These two trends taken together assure a high oil-
to-gas price ratio. The EIA 2013 forecast is in complete consonance with this 
view. This will cause systematic switching where possible. Industries that went 
abroad due to pricing uncertainty will gradually return. This will be good news 
for US balance of payments and job creation.
Predictably cheap natural gas stimulates a number of different avenues of 
endeavor. To begin with, a number of chemical and metallurgical industries 
have a high component of their cost tied up in fuel. The ones most affected 
are those with natural gas as feedstock. Also impacted are those in which oil 
can be switched to gas. One such industry, the production of ethylene from 
ethane rather than from oil-derived naphtha, is discussed in chapter 14. That 
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particular compelling value move had an unintended consequence. Propylene 
production was impacted.
The Propylene Story
One of the derivatives of propylene, polypropylene, is ubiquitous in our lives: 
roofing, carpets, bottles, and bendable plastics, to name a few. For years, 
when oil and gas pricing was in greater parity, propylene was a byproduct 
of ethylene production in oil refineries. It is also produced by tweaking the 
catalytic cracking process, at the cost of a smaller gasoline fraction. A refinery 
can change the mix essentially at will, presumably based on the relative profit 
potential.
But with a worsening oil:gas price ratio, ethylene production increasingly 
switched to an ethane feedstock. Unfortunately this process produces very 
little propylene as a byproduct. So, as reported in The Economist (“Plastics 
Prices,” 2011), in the two years preceding 2011 the price of propylene went 
up 150 percent and continued to stay at those high levels through 2013. 
Propane associated with shale gas production is easily converted to propylene 
by dehydrogenation, much as ethane is cracked to ethylene. But propane is 
a high-value commodity and is priced near oil, so this is a costly approach. 
A predictably low price for gas will allow for plants dedicated to producing 
propylene from gas. At least three companies, Lurgi, Total, and UOP, have the 
technology at an advanced state. Just as in the case of ethylene production, 
domestic locations for these plants are very likely.
Ethylene
This is the dominant feedstock for the plastics and fiber market. When natural 
gas prices started fluctuating in the early part of the last decade, much of the 
cracking capacity was shut down and the likes of Dow invested in plants in the 
Middle East and Asia, proximal to low-cost feedstock. The US became a net 
importer of ethylene derivatives. Now the US and Canada have predictably low 
prices compared to most of the consuming nations. All the major players have 
announced reopening of old plants and the construction of new ones. This 
is driven by two factors. One is the virtual certainty of high-volume ethane 
availability at low prices, and the other is the predicted demand in the coming 
years.
In a few years, the ethane supply from the shale gas–related NGLs will 
exceed the cracker capacity. As discussed in chapter 14, the newly built 
crackers could be in the Marcellus area, either as massive plants or as 
distributed small-footprint reactors. To get a feeling for how many crackers 
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would be supported, I’ve done a calculation (see box below) using typical 
figures for NGL content of Marcellus gas. The size of crackers being discussed 
today by companies seriously considering building these is 1 million metric 
tons (tonnes) per year.
I conclude that such a unit would be served by about 420 wells. Pads with 
multiple wells will be increasingly common. So the number of pad locations 
serving each cracker will be somewhere around 20 to 30.
Crackers will take a few years to get into production. Assuming an 
immediate desire, we need to look at 2014 to 2015 targets. Some estimates put 
Marcellus production in 2014 to be between 5 and 10 billion barrels per day 
(bbd), of which a quarter may be wet. So, assuming a figure of 7.6 bbd, the wet 
gas will be 1.9 bbd, yielding 317,000 bpd of NGL, of which about 190,000 bpd 
will be ethane. That will cover three 1-million-tonne-per-year ethylene 
crackers.
Marcellus Assumptions
Typical values are presented below for the liquid-rich segments of the Marcellus 
Shale.
• One thousand cubic feet (1 mcf ) of Marcellus shale gas would produce 
approximately 7 gallons of NGLs (the range is 4 to 12 in wet deposits across 
the country), ~60 percent of which would be ethane.
• Each Marcellus well produces approximately 1.5 million cubic feet (1,500 mcf) 
per day of wet gas. (Utica shale would be higher, maybe double, in part due to 
the higher pressure at greater depth.)
• Each well pad would contain around 15 individual wells on average. Pad 
drilling occurs only after full development is planned. Initially individual wells 
may be drilled. The economic, environmental, and societal benefits of pad 
operations will make them routine in most instances.
• Each well pad could thus produce around 94,500 gallons per day, or 
2,250 barrels per day (bpd), of ethane (7 gallons х 0.6 х 1,500 х 15 wells 
= 94,500 gallons).
• A new 1-million-tonne-per-year ethylene cracker would need 63,000 bpd, 
or 1.3 million tonnes per year of ethane feed (Seddon, 2010). Thus, a single 
conventional cracker could require the ethane output of 28 well pads, or 
420 individual wells.
• A 63,000 bpd natural gas processing plant would be expected to have a 
capital cost of ~$700 million, or ~$11,100 per bpd ethane, or ~$540 per 
annual tonne of ethane.
• Annual operating costs of such a facility would be on the order of $35 million 
(Seddon, 2010), or ~$1.50 per barrel, or ~$27 per tonne of ethane.
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Financing for crackers always requires guarantees on long-term supply. 
If dry gas prices remain low, the proportion of shale gas exploited that is wet 
will remain high simply to assure more profitability. So, there would be a 
logical basis for security of supply. Furthermore there is an expectation that 
the low-cost driver will provide good margins for export of the ethylene or its 
downstream derivatives such as polyethylene, PVC, and polystyrene.
Nitrogen-Based Fertilizers
Modern agriculture relies dominantly on synthetic fertilizers. The most 
important one is ammonium nitrate, which also has an unfortunate use in 
explosives as well (think Oklahoma City bombing). Another is urea, much of 
which is used in the production of rice. As a major producer of crops, the US 
is a significant user of synthetic fertilizer. Much as in the case of oil, we use a 
quantity disproportionate to our population: 12 percent of the world’s usage as 
against 5 percent of the world’s population. The primary feed for this fertilizer 
is ammonia, which in turn is completely dependent on natural gas, which 
accounts for 90 percent of the cost. The high and erratic price of natural gas 
caused over half of the industry to flee to other parts of the world with low-cost 
gas. Trinidad and Tobago is the largest supplier by far, followed by Canada and 
Russia. 
Cheap shale gas is luring this industry back. Given the importance of food 
to the nation, it would not be much of a stretch to suggest that fertilizer is a 
strategic commodity and that domestic production is a welcome change. A 
number of ammonia fertilizer plants have been announced for build by 2016. 
Prior to the flight abroad, the US was a net exporter of fertilizer. This could 
happen again. It might also not be off base to suggest the possibility of reduced 
food prices due to a consistently low fertilizer price. Were this to happen, the 
irony would not be lost that the last time the nation discussed the food/fuel 
nexus, it was the anxiety occasioned by beef prices rising due to the diversion 
of corn to ethanol.
Who Will Do It and Where Will the Jobs Be?
The chemical industry is vertically integrated by and large, in one direction 
or the other. Vertical integration involves being the producer of the feedstock 
as well. So, the major oil and gas refiners are also producers of the oil and gas. 
There are exceptions, such as Marathon, which is not a major producer of the 
fluids but is a huge refiner. Since production, known as the upstream, and 
refining, referred to as the downstream, are such distinct competencies, the 
decision to vertically integrate is a business one. 
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Oil field service companies perform the bulk of the work in the extraction 
of the fluids from the earth. With one singular exception, no oil field service 
companies participate in the processing. Even that exception went away 
with the divestiture of KBR by Halliburton a few years ago. A separate set of 
companies designs and builds refineries, crackers, LNG plants, and all other 
manner of chemical processing plants. In other words, vertical integration is 
uncommon in all aspects of the oil and gas service sector.
Oil companies have tended to vertically integrate from the very beginning. 
The big ones take it all the way from upstream to downstream to products and 
retailing. This is why you see consumer automotive products such as lubricants 
made by the likes of Shell. They are also into retailing, although many gas 
stations are franchised and not owned by the major oil company. As a curious 
point, although seemingly integrated vertically, the gasoline at an Exxon station 
may not have come from an Exxon refinery and almost certainly not from an 
Exxon-owned upstream facility. This is for two reasons. One is that refineries, 
no matter who owns them, will take feed from wherever they can get it. 
Refineries are finely tuned to accept certain input compositions, so the precise 
nature of the feedstock is more important than the source. The second is that 
gasoline distribution is most effectively accomplished using blending sites that 
are agnostic regarding the source, as explained in the box below.
BP Gasoline May Not Be From a BP Refinery
Gasoline blenders and distributors are located strategically to serve 
various filling stations. The fuel may come from any sort of refinery, and 
standardization has rendered this possible. The tanker trucks from the name 
brand stations drive up to the distributor and accept a product with a known 
octane rating. Blenders also put in the needed ethanol. Incidentally, the 
infamous 50-cent-per-gallon ethanol subsidy was being awarded to the 
blender, not the farmer making the corn. At this point the truck will blend 
in the special chemicals that each company believes impart all the qualities 
advertised at the filling stations: better engine cleaning properties and so 
forth. 
In one sense, therefore, the boycotting of BP stations was misdirected, 
although the message value might have been present. The station being 
boycotted was most likely privately owned by a guy who was about as far 
from the Macondo oil spill as was a shoe salesman from the potentially 
questionable labor practices of a shoe manufacturer. The gasoline in question 
may not have any BP provenance other than the blending additives.
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Another type of vertical integration is backward from the consumer 
product. In this case, the giants who make containers, fabrics, and all manner 
of plastic goods integrate back to make the key ingredient.
In all the discussion regarding the return of the chemical industry, the 
question arises as to where these jobs will end up. Certainly some of the jobs 
will be in the same locations as plants mothballed by the shift abroad. In this 
category falls the announced reopening of ethylene crackers in the Gulf Coast 
by Dow Chemical. But the new plants could well go closer to the source of 
ethane, as discussed in chapter 14. Bayer, Shell, and Total have expressed 
interest in crackers in the Marcellus area.
The domestic fertilizer growth will follow similar lines. Much of the current 
capacity is in the Midwest and the Gulf, and one could expect expansions to 
current plants. New plants, especially if dedicated to export, could go near the 
East Coast. For a bulk commodity such as ammonium nitrate, which also has 
transportation safety issues, proximity to end-use states could drive new plants 
to be in the breadbasket.
When a single commodity is a dominant portion of the cost of a product, 
comings and goings of plant locations are more to be expected than would be 
for processes with multiple commodities contributing to cost. Predictably low 
natural gas prices ought to persuade prospective owners of plants of a highly 
predictable long-term future. Such predictability keeps discount rates down 
and is a magnet for investor dollars.
CHAPTER 14
The Ethane Dilemma
“Why don’t you stay?”
—From “Stay” by Sugarland (written by Jennifer Nettles)
The abundance of shale gas and the as yet limited demand have kept the price 
of natural gas low in North America. The price per million Btu (MM Btu) 
hovered at or under $4 for most of 2011 and hit decadal lows in early 2012. 
As conjectured in chapter 11, this is driving the activity toward wet gas 
production. In the principal producing areas more than half of the NGLs in 
wet gas comprise ethane. This abundance of ethane is posing the industry with 
a dilemma with respect to the most appropriate manner of exploitation. A 
good problem to have, but it is a dilemma nevertheless.
Ethane is a molecule with one more carbon atom than methane has. This 
crucial additional carbon allows for easy conversion to ethylene, which is 
ethane with two hydrogen atoms removed. Ethylene in turn is the basic 
building block of a host of useful products (see box on the following page). But 
ethane really has no other use except for increasing the value of natural gas. 
Natural gas nominally has 1 MM Btu per thousand cubic feet (mcf). But some 
sources, especially coal bed methane, can be as lean as 800,000 Btu per mcf. In 
these cases, ethane, with higher energy content, can be used to raise the value 
to a million or a bit more. 
The processing of ethane to ethylene is done in plants known as crackers. 
The ethane dilemma centers on the fact that the crackers are located on the 
Gulf Coast, over a thousand miles from the workhorse gas production areas of 
Marcellus and Utica. To compound the problem, the majority of the ethylene-
consuming factories making consumer and industrial products are located, 
you guessed it, right near the Marcellus and Utica fields. So one scenario would 
have the industry transport the ethane down to the Gulf Coast, convert it to 
ethylene, and ship ethylene derivatives all the way back again. This chapter is 
devoted to discussion of this proposition and alternatives, together with the 
technical and economic hurdles of each option.
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Prior to this windfall of ethane availability, ethylene was largely produced by 
cracking naphtha, a byproduct of oil refining. These crackers have the ability 
to make gasoline or ethylene, with the proportions driven by relative pricing. 
When ethylene is made from naphtha, a significant fraction of the output is 
propylene, another important building block for the chemical industry. When 
ethylene is made from ethane, this fraction is not available. So, abundant 
ethane and subsequent cracking to ethylene will create a shortfall in propylene. 
The consequences of this are discussed in chapter 13.
Ethane Pricing
Ethane pricing has demonstrated an unusual pattern since 2009, entirely 
mediated by the shale gas boom. Prior to that year ethane tracked with oil 
price. This can be seen in Figure 8. The NGL composite includes ethane, 
propane, butane, and natural gasoline. It, too, tracked oil and generally stuck 
close to the WTI price. But from 2009 onward, much wet gas was produced, 
and ethane made up nearly half of the NGL produced from wet gas. This 
sudden increase in supply without a concomitant increase in demand caused 
the ethane price to drop while the larger molecules such as propane and butane 
stayed high.
As is evident in Figure 8, this separation became marked from the start 
of 2010. This trend continued in 2011, and then in 2012 ethane took a major 
dive, as shown in Figure 9. Early in 2013 ethane was priced about the same as 
natural gas, which is completely unprecedented. 
Making and Using Ethylene 
Ethylene has the formula C2H4. It is synthesized by stripping two hydrogen 
atoms off ethane, which is C2H6. This process is known as cracking. 
Straightforward polymerization yields polyethylene, which is produced in 
two forms—low density, for food wrapping and the like, and high density, 
for bottles and other more robust applications. Perhaps less obvious is the 
product vinyl chloride, from which PVC is made. Other common materials 
sourced from ethylene include ethylene glycol, an antifreeze, and polyester 
resins for carpets and clothing. Styrene is a derivative, from which polystyrene 
resins are made for containers, and also butadiene elastomer for tires. Readily 
apparent is the fact that ethylene is the starting point for a number of 
commonplace products. Consequently, increased domestic production of this 
chemical can have a major impact on much of the chemical industry. High-
value exports could be the result.
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Figure 8. Comparative spot price movements in natural gas, crude oil, and 
natural gas liquids, 2008 to 2011 
NGL composite includes ethane, propane, butane, and natural gasoline. 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, April 29, 2011
Figure 9. Ethane price trend compared to oil price (WTI), 2008 to 2013
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WTI refers to West Texas Intermediate, a benchmark for crude oil pricing. 
Source: Figure courtesy of Dow Chemical Company, 2015. 
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Industry has responded to this trend by expanding cracker capacity and 
constructing new crackers. Range Resources in Pennsylvania is reported to 
have signed a contract to export ethane to Europe. This is very unusual because 
this gas is not very easily transported. This and all other demand creation 
will need a few years to take hold. Consequently, there is a school of thought, 
shared by me, that ethane prices will stay unusually low for four to five years 
and then drift upward, back to the pattern seen in the later years of Figure 8. 
A return to the prices of 2009 is very unlikely if natural gas prices stay under 
$5.50 per MM Btu for the next decade, as currently predicted by the EIA. With 
low prices, wet gas will continue to be the primary target of production, thus 
keeping ethane in abundance. 
Impact of Low Ethane Price
Given a choice between naphtha and ethane as starting feedstock, the latter 
will be picked every time in North America because of the cost differential. The 
profit margin from producing ethylene from low-cost ethane is hundreds of 
dollars per tonne higher than from the use of naphtha as feed. As a percentage 
of ethylene prices in 2014 in the vicinity of $1,320 per tonne, a typical $600 
differential with naphtha-sourced ethylene is highly material. Since cheap 
ethane is purely a North American phenomenon for now, the US is the low-
cost ethylene producer in the world today.
Consistently low pricing combined with strong availability is changing the 
landscape of the North American chemical industry. In a 2011 report entitled 
“Shale Gas and New Petrochemicals Investment: Benefits for the Economy, 
Jobs, and US Manufacturing,” the American Chemistry Council, a trade-
supported organization, made some bold predictions. They predicted that 
ethane production would increase by 25 percent. They estimated a $32.8 billion 
increase in chemical production as a result, and an associated $132.4 billion 
increase in US economic output. Total estimated jobs created would be 
395,000. In 2014 the same organization released more general statistics: 
As of [February 2014], 148 projects valued at $100.2 billion have 
been announced. These projects—new factories, expansions, and 
process changes to increase capacity—could lead to $81 billion per 
year in new chemical industry output and 637,000 permanent new 
jobs by 2023. More than half of the investment is by firms based 
outside the United States (American Chemistry Council, 2014).
 Chapter 14. The Ethane Dilemma 95
The US now is extremely well positioned competitively with the rest of the 
world. Some evidence for this comes in the form of the statistic mentioned by 
the American Chemistry Council above: over half of the capital investment 
is from abroad. The unit cost of production of plastic resins in the US is 
now on par with Canada and only slightly higher than in the Middle East. 
It is well below all the other consuming nations, including China, Western 
Europe, and Japan, in ascending order of cost. In 2005 the US was on par with 
Western Europe. Significant investment that had fled to what had been low-
cost countries is returning, contributing to the economic figures estimated by 
the American Chemistry Council. Imports will increasingly be replaced by 
exports.
Since all of this is so new, policymakers must feel they are in something of 
a fog. LNG producers such as Cheniere have obtained permission for exports, 
when not so long ago they were building import terminals. In early January 
2012, Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts expressed concern to Energy 
Secretary Steven Chu that approval of the Cheniere request would result in 
increased domestic gas prices. That particular concern may not have had a 
lot of merit because of the sheer abundance and accessibility of the resource. 
But this does raise the question as to what is the most advantageous export: 
a commodity such as natural gas or a processed product? There can be little 
doubt that it ought to be the latter, if feasible. In chapters 16 and 19, I discuss 
the technical and economic viability of methane conversion to transport fuel. 
Ethane-derived resinous material, methane-originated fertilizer, and methane-
sourced liquid fuel are the type of high-value products most suited to export. 
The bulk of the economic value stays in this country.
The Ethane Cracking Options
North America, excluding Mexico, has 42 ethane crackers. Of these, 33 are on 
the Gulf Coast, 4 in Alberta, 2 in Ontario, 2 in the Midwest, and 1 small one 
in Kentucky. So, the Bakken Shale oil field could supply Alberta, while Eagle 
Ford in south Texas, a rich source of ethane, is proximal to Gulf Coast capacity. 
But the Marcellus and Utica are essentially stranded. These are also generally 
acknowledged as the largest of the deposits. This analysis concentrates on these 
two sources.
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The various options are presented in Figure 10. I will key in on only the 
first, third, and fourth rows from the top. The most conventional option is 
to transport the wet gas to a central facility and chill it to the point where all 
the NGLs drop out sequentially. The ethane is the last to liquefy and can be 
separated and then transported via pipeline to a cracker. As mentioned earlier, 
the only viable capacity is on the Gulf of Mexico coast. Much of this capacity 
was idled in the early part of this century following the gas price shocks and 
fled, primarily to the Middle East.
Figure 10. Processing technology options for shale gas ethane
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Another option is to separate the ethane at or near the production location 
and then pipe it to a central cracker in the region. So, for example, a dedicated 
cracker in eastern Ohio or West Virginia or western Pennsylvania could serve 
all of those areas.
The final option is the most innovative and also provides the highest 
returns. I refer to it as the pad-level (local) reactive separation option. This 
option involves reacting all the gases at the wellhead and tailoring the reaction 
to crack or convert the ethane (ethylene/fuels/hydrocarbons in Figure 10) 
while allowing recovery and sale of the other liquids. The methane passes 
through to the export pipeline.
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The Gulf Coast Cracking Option
In late 2011, El Paso Energy dropped plans for an accelerated-schedule pipeline 
that included using an existing portion. This was because the company was 
unable to get guaranteed contracts for gas. All major capital undertakings 
such as pipelines and LNG plants suffer from the need for these assurances 
of volume usage. But at about the same time, Chesapeake Energy, a major 
producer of gas, announced its decision to ship 75,000 barrels per day (ultimate 
capacity of 120,000) of ethane to Mont Belvieu, Texas, a distance of about 
1,230 miles. West Virginia authorities responded with dismay.
“Every barrel of ethane that is shipped to the Gulf Coast means jobs and 
investment there and not here,” West Virginia Department of Commerce 
Secretary Keith Burdette said. “We want to see those investments in this part 
of the country.” But he acknowledged that absent an in-state option, producers 
have no option but to build a pipeline to a known market. The downstream 
oil and gas establishments clearly wish for a Gulf Coast cracker option. State 
governments will equally vehemently opt for the local option. In the end, the 
timeliest solution may be the winner. This may be the opportunity for the pad-
level (local) reactive separation option, provided it can be developed in timely 
fashion.
More recently, MarkWest and Kinder Morgan announced plans in early 
2013 to open an 1,100-mile NGL pipeline from the Utica shale well fields to 
the Gulf Coast. They also plan smaller lines to bring the NGLs to a location 
to process the mixture to strip the ethane and place it in the line to the Gulf. 
Recently completed in Ohio is the Appalachia-to-Texas (ATEX) Express 
Pipeline built by Houston-based Enterprise Products Partners L.P. to transport 
liquids from the Utica south. When others come on stream in addition to 
this one, the ethane pricing ought to normalize closer to the numbers in the 
vicinity of 2010 in Figure 9.
Overall capital costs for such conventional ethane recovery, transportation, 
and conversion would be on the order of $2,700 per annual tonne of ethane 
(assuming construction of a new 1 million-tonne-per-year ethylene cracker 
on the US Gulf Coast). Overall annual operating costs for such conventional 
ethane recovery, transportation, and conversion would be on the order of $190 
per tonne of ethane. Total annual costs of conventional ethylene production 
via shale gas extraction, ethane recovery, ethane pipelining to the US Gulf 
Coast, and ethane cracking would be expected to be on the order of $1,100 per 
tonne of ethylene (including capital recovery and shale gas extraction costs). 
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This is in the right ballpark for current ethylene pricing, indicating such a 
conventional approach based on shale gas could be competitive with oil-based 
ethylene.
The New Proximal Cracker Option
This option is seriously being considered by Shell, among others. However, 
in late 2013 Shell announced a seemingly indefinite postponement. West 
Virginia authorities are keen to realize this option, and Pennsylvania and 
Ohio would like this as well, in their states of course. This option could reduce 
overall pipeline capital and operating costs by as much as 90 percent versus 
transporting ethane to the US Gulf Coast. Overall capital costs for this option 
would be on the order of $1,600 per annual tonne of ethane. Overall annual 
operating costs for this option would be on the order of $130 per tonne of 
ethane. This is decidedly cheaper than the Gulf Coast option, although the 
figure for the latter could be shaved with use of some existing facilities. More 
to the point, this option would require less pipeline cost and associated 
community pushbacks similar to the issues with the Keystone XL heavy oil 
pipeline, which is still not resolved in 2014.
But the most important reason for this option is job creation in general 
proximity to the production. Not to be ignored also is the fact that the highest 
density of polyethylene converters to useful products is in the Midwest. The 
Gulf Coast option would entail shipping the polyethylene back to near where 
the ethane came from. Most modern crackers are fully integrated to produce all 
the necessary downstream plastics. One could reasonably expect the proximal 
cracker to serve the polyethylene and other plastic needs of the East and 
Midwest. This option allows all the job and value creation to be proximal to gas 
production.
The Pad-Level Reactive Separation Conversion Option
A proposal under consideration is reactive separation conversion of ethane 
at the well pad level. It would need to have the following features. Based 
upon the assumptions shown in chapter 13 for Marcellus prospects, such a 
converter would need to be economic for throughputs of between 2,000 and 
3,000 barrels of ethane processed per day. The output at a minimum must be 
ethylene, but more preferably a drop-in fuel for gasoline. That is a tall order 
for any conventional cracking process, but new technology appears available 
to achieve this, and RTI International believes it is feasible (R. Gupta, personal 
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communication, March 13, 2012). Such a small-footprint convertor could be 
expected to be easier to finance and commission than a full-blown cracker.
The full size would be on par with the pilot plant for a regular cracker, so 
time to market can be expected to be shorter than for most chemical processes. 
Timeliness with regard to jobs and the thwarting of raw ethane export ought to 
make it a favorite of state authorities.
The prominent producers in the Marcellus and Utica are not players in 
the downstream refining and processing area, so their imperative ought to be 
prompt monetization of the ethane. Currently, producing states are unhappy 
about plans to ship ethane to the Gulf but reluctant to antagonize a major 
employer. But given a viable local option, they may exert pressure and possibly 
provide investment incentives. To date the only local option available to them 
is a new dedicated cracker, and that may be in a neighboring state; also, the size 
and capital cost inevitably delay things.
The biggest hurdle, assuming techno-economic viability, is the business 
model. A large integrated cracker producing polyethylene is the current model. 
The independent polyethylene manufacturer is an endangered species. The 
reactive separation approach will require polyethylene to be manufactured in 
reasonable proximity. This is because the polymer is much cheaper to transport 
than is ethylene. The combined economics of all processes culminating in 
polyethylene will be the key, in comparison with the local cracker option. Of 
course, if the technical hurdle of the economic production of a drop-in fuel 
locally is crossed, that could trump all other options.
The solution to the ethane dilemma will most likely hinge on a combination 
of innovation and state activism.

CHAPTER 15
The Alaska Pipeline Is Dead;  
Long Live the Alaska Pipeline
“The leader of the band is tired / And his eyes are growing old”
—From “Leader of the Band” by Dan Fogelberg
Alaskan oil represented 11 percent of US consumption in 2012 and is a bit less 
today due to shale oil, but it remains a vital component considering that the US 
imported over 50 percent of its need in 2011, even though that proportion is 
dropping. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), a marvel of engineering 
built in 1977, is now in trouble. Another proposed pipeline, one to transport 
natural gas to the Lower 48, is on life support. This is the story of one that 
needs resuscitation and one that needs to be allowed to die. Curiously, these 
two outcomes are related.
A giant oil field was discovered in 1968 in Alaska. But it was located up 
on the frozen North Slope. The sheer size and national priority dictated the 
construction of a pipeline (Figure 11). This was no mean task. The 800-mile 
traverse included three mountain ranges and hundreds of rivers and streams. 
Over half the length needed to be well above ground in order to not melt the 
permafrost, ground that is permanently frozen. The melting would occur 
because the oil flowing is relatively hot and needs to remain so in order to 
flow at a good rate. The above-ground pipe also needed to be built taking into 
consideration caribou migration and the like.
TAPS is in trouble. At its peak it carried 2 million barrels of oil a day 
(MM bpd), and the oil made the trip in three days, arriving at a temperature 
of about 100°F. Now, the falloff in production has reduced the flow to a third 
of that and it takes up to 15 days of travel. Figure 12 shows historical flows of 
crude oil in TAPS plus two projections: a continuous decline and a case where 
measures such as pipeline heating improve the flow.
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Figure 12. Average daily volume of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, in 
thousands of barrels per day 
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The heat loss with the extended travel time causes the oil to be much cooler 
upon arrival. This increases the possibility of clogging and other problems. The 
practical limit at which it becomes economically prohibitive is debated but is 
somewhere in the range of 0.35 to 0.5 MM bpd, although the lower end of that 
range would need heat management solutions. That day is a scant few years 
away, 10 at most.
More oil is needed. The three candidates are heavy oil, oil from the source 
rock, and liquids converted from natural gas (called gas-to-liquid, GTL). 
Offshore oil from the Chukchi Sea and oil from ANWR (the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge) will not be considered here because politics, environmental 
hurdles, and location will render the output not timely for resolution of this 
problem.
Heavy Oil
The Ugnu formation is estimated to hold about 20 billion barrels. The 
reservoirs are very close to the permafrost layer, so the oil is cold and hard to 
move. BP’s Milne Point development has already demonstrated the ability to 
produce economically viable quantities using cold production methods. Such 
methods rarely yield more than 8 to 10 percent of the fluid in place. But even 
with this low recovery, the production will at least serve the purpose discussed 
above. Eventually BP will try some heating method because the layers adjacent 
the permafrost will be prohibitively cold. These methods necessarily will need 
to avoid damaging the permafrost. This is likely feasible.
The stuff is the consistency of molasses and not easy to transport. It 
would need blending with a lighter oil of some sort to be suitable for TAPS. 
The current oil from the Slope would do, as would condensate from the gas 
production. Another heavy oil source is the West Sak in the Kuparuk River 
field, also on the Slope. This has like quantities and is a bit lighter, more the 
consistency of honey. It too is close to existing infrastructure. 
Heavy oil has a higher carbon-to-hydrogen ratio than does light oil. When 
refined, a significant portion of heavy oil drops out as a carbon residue known 
as petroleum coke, which has low value. Consequently, heavy oil sells at a 
discount. Heavy oils from Canada and Venezuela, major import sources to the 
US, also suffer from high sulfur and heavy metals. Alaska oil is much better in 
this regard. Nevertheless, only specialized refineries can take heavy oil. This 
will eventually prove to be a hurdle when the volumes down the TAPS are 
high. The good news is that California refineries, the closest to the Alaska port 
of Valdez, are generally well positioned to handle heavy oil refining.
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Oil From Source Rock
The concept here is similar to our discussion with respect to shale gas. 
Proponents suggest that only about 20 percent of the oil “at source” found a 
suitable rock into which to migrate. They maintain that the remainder can be 
tapped much as is shale gas today, by fracturing the rock. In my discussion of 
the origins of shale gas, I, too, conjectured that more would stay behind than 
would find a porous and permeable home. Now a little outfit out of nowhere, 
Great Bear Petroleum, has spent $8 million on substantial acreage. They will 
first target the Shublik formation, rock that is about 250 million years old and 
is the deepest of the three source rocks in the area. In part this target must 
be chosen because the deeper rock is more naturally pressured. Great Bear 
expects to access the shallower deposits in a later phase. This is not unlike my 
discussion with regard to developing the Utica first and then the overlying 
Marcellus.
The president of Great Bear has a BP (actually Sohio, back when he was 
there) Alaska pedigree as a geologist. So, this lends him some credibility. Great 
Bear had expected to start production in 2013 and ramp up to 250,000 bpd by 
2020. That would be ample to save TAPS. However, as of mid-2014 they had 
just two exploratory wells and hadn’t yet taken either horizontal. They have 
spent $40 million on seismic exploration and appear encouraged by the results. 
Two other companies have purchased leases close by, but all eyes are on Great 
Bear.
There is every reason to believe that the source has the same mix as Eagle 
Ford and Utica: zones of oil, wet gas, and dry gas. One assumes Great Bear is 
chasing the oil leg first. But either their acreage or those adjacent must have the 
other two, which will have bearing on the following discussion. It is interesting 
that none of the current North Slope producers bid for the leases (except for 
a solitary lease by ConocoPhillips). The post–shale gas world knows all about 
source rock recovery. So, one school of thought would be that they will wait for 
success before bidding on adjacent leases yet to come up for sale. Or they plan 
to simply buy Great Bear, following a Lower 48 pattern in shale gas.
Finally, there is the ghost of Mukluk, which was predicted to be a giant 
reservoir. The company: Sohio. When the drillers got there, a billion (1983) 
dollars later, the oil appeared to have been spirited away. Dry as a fossilized 
bone. There is no geological parallel to the matter above. Just the memory of 
the last big one that got away. And this one is also big.
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Shale Gas Kills the Gas Pipeline
There always has been natural gas in association with the oil in Alaska. With 
no ready market, it is pumped back in the ground to the tune of 8 billion cubic 
feet (bcf) per day. Estimates of gas reserves vary, but there are at least 35 trillion 
cubic feet in the vicinity of Prudhoe Bay. Another 100 trillion are estimated as 
potential for all the other areas, including the Beaufort and Chukchi seas and 
ANWR. For conversion to oil equivalent, one roughly divides by 6,000. So the 
total likely is about 22 billion barrels of oil equivalent. That is close to the light 
oil estimate for Alaska. The point is that the gas is a world-class resource and 
presently without a market.
The perceived solution has been a gas pipeline to the Lower 48. At least 
it was until shale gas came along. All of a sudden cheap shale gas rendered 
the Alaskan gas completely unnecessary. Fortunately for everybody, the 
bickering delayed the decision to this point when it is truly passé. According 
to the National Energy Technology Laboratory (National Energy Technology 
Laboratory [NETL], 2009), a gas pipeline would require daily throughput 
of 4.5 billion cubic feet per day for 35 years. That translates into a reserve 
of about 59 trillion cubic feet, which you will note is more than the readily 
accessible 35 trillion mentioned earlier. But in the end that is hardly the point. 
The Lower 48 is expected to be self-sufficient, and there is already concern 
regarding prices staying too low. Alaskan gas would not help that. But there 
is a remedy that leaves us with a TAPS that is saved rather than played on a 
trumpet solo.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export is a new element for Alaska. The 
ConocoPhillips LNG plant in the Cook Inlet was granted an extension in 2013. 
In early, 2014 the Alaska governor announced completion of a study to send 
3.5 bcf per day down to the Cook Inlet with intent to export LNG. I believe 
much of the course would follow the existing oil pipeline. That volume would 
feed two substantial LNG plants, much bigger than the existing one. This is an 
interesting development and with a lot of merit. This is the only LNG export 
idea that has zero impact on the Henry Hub gas price. This gas is essentially 
stranded in Alaska.
The Gas-to-Liquids Option
A full discussion of converting gas to liquids in the context of cheap gas is in 
the following chapter, “Transport Liquids from Gas: Economical Now.” But in 
short, it involves first reacting the methane with oxygen or steam to produce a 
synthesis gas, a combination of carbon monoxide and hydrogen.
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This reaction is straightforward, and the reaction products can also be 
obtained with coal as a starting point. The tricky part is then catalytically 
converting this mixture into long-chain hydrocarbons, also as described in 
chapter 16. During World War II, virtually the entire war effort was run on 
transport fuel using the Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) process. The Germans had 
domestic coal but not oil. Closer to the present day is the optimization of this 
process by the South Africans. During the apartheid-driven embargo, South 
African oil companies were forced to develop fuel with domestic sources. 
Today Sasol is arguably the leading purveyor of this technology, although the 
likes of Shell would certainly argue that point.
ExxonMobil, one of the big Prudhoe Bay property owners, has a process 
for taking synthesis gas to methanol and thence to gasoline, the so-called 
MTG process. But whether F-T is used or MTG, the prospect of a liquid fuel 
from Alaskan gas is real. The gas itself ought to be priced very low. This is 
particularly the case if it is gas associated with oil production. Using it means 
not incurring the cost of putting it back in the ground. One could even argue, 
tongue planted close to the cheek, that the price is negative.
The key question is how much gas capacity is needed to support a 
commercial-scale GTL plant. A plant producing 100,000 bpd would be 
materially useful to keep TAPS open. The gas required for this is about 1 billion 
cubic feet per day. That is a far easier target than the 4.5 billion required for a 
gas pipeline, even were it to make economic sense, which it does not due to 
shale gas in the Lower 48. A comfortable target would be a 200,000-bpd GTL 
facility. Note also that the industry currently reinjects 8 bcf per day.
Things start to get interesting if one combines 200,000 bpd GTL output 
with a like quantity of heavy oil. In some ways this is near sacrilegious! GTL- 
produced liquids are incredibly clean; they are free of sulfur and all manner of 
impurities present in the same liquids from oil refining. But, getting past this 
squeamishness, the light fractions from a GTL plant would be very well suited 
to blending with heavy oil to make the latter transportable.
There are issues one would have to deal with. Sometimes when heavy oil 
is mixed with certain light hydrocarbon fractions, some of the carbon in the 
heavy oil will precipitate out as asphaltenes. You don’t want that happening in 
the pipeline. But this sort of thing is well understood and simply needs to be 
handled. In fact, one option would be to use light molecules associated with 
the natural gas to deliberately precipitate the asphaltenes prior to shipping. A 
commercial process exists for doing this and is known as the ROSE process. In 
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that case the GTL-derived product would simply be sent down the pipeline in 
batches between other oil batches.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System is critical for US energy security. It must 
be kept open. There is currently a lot of rhetoric to the effect that this specter is 
being used by oil interests to open up environmentally sensitive areas. A future 
that combines production of heavy oil, blended with a liquid from natural gas, 
is one that we can all live with. This solution ought to keep the pipeline open 
for decades. If the shale oil option is realized, that would just be icing on the 
proverbial cake. That would merely raise the flow in TAPS back to the glory 
days’ numbers. Alaska gas pipeline: rest in peace. A lone bugler can play “Taps.”

CHAPTER 16
Transport Liquids from Gas:  
Economical Now 
“I can’t get no satisfaction / ‘Cause I try and I try and I try . . .”
—From “(I Can’t Get No) Satisfaction” by The Rolling Stones 
(written by Mick Jagger and Keith Richards)
Economical conversion of gas to liquids (GTL) has been repeatedly attempted 
by every major oil company over the years and always come up short of 
expectations. Shale gas now offers up a future with more certainty on gas 
pricing in North America, and possibly other parts of the world as well. Until 
now the only viable sources of gas for GTL were Qatar and Iran. The vast 
resource base, predictably low delivered cost, and distance from consumer 
gas markets made conversion of gas to liquids relatively attractive. All three 
of these conditions apply to Alaskan gas and the first two to shale gas in the 
Lower 48.
Expectations were high with the efforts of Shell and Sasol separately with 
cheap Qatari gas, but capital cost overruns dogged those projects, especially for 
Shell. The timing was unfortunate in that the majority of the construction was 
contracted during the prerecession boom and associated higher costs. There 
were also some reported teething problems on the process side. One assumes 
that at least these two companies have a handle on doing it more cost effectively 
the next time.
Industry kept pecking away with innovative catalytic steps, and today cheap 
shale gas may enable economical production in North America. Certainly 
abundant low-cost stranded gas in Alaska is fair game for the conversion, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.
In the late 1920s two Germans, Franz Fischer and Hans Tropsch, invented 
the process named after them and commonly abbreviated to F-T. A singular 
lack of oil in Germany combined with abundant coal led them to devise 
a means to obtain transport fuel from coal. This coal-to-liquids (CTL) 
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process continued to be refined, but primarily for the gas-to-liquids (GTL) 
embodiment. The exception was Sasol in South Africa, which continued on 
the coal-derived path in response to the apartheid-induced embargo in 1987, 
which prevented oil imports. The Sasol work began well before that date in part 
due to the scarcity induced by the Arab oil embargo in 1973. As shown in the 
box, after the initial step of production of synthesis gas or syngas, the process 
steps are exactly the same for CTL and GTL.
Basic Principles of the Fischer-Tropsch Process 
The starting point for these reactions is some carbonaceous material and a 
source of hydrogen. In the original discovery, coal was reacted with water in 
the following manner: H2O + C ¨ H2 + CO. This is sometimes referred to as 
the water gas reaction. The reaction product is designated synthesis gas, or 
syngas for short. Syngas is a basic building block for a number of final uses, 
including simply combusting to produce electricity. In that case, often the 
reaction is taken further, as follows: H2O + CO ¨ H2 + CO2. The hydrogen is 
combusted for power, and the CO2 is disposed of in some way. If the CO2 is 
sequestered, this process is the basis for clean electricity from coal, as in the 
federally funded FutureGen program.
The syngas may also be produced by oxidation of methane according to 
the following reaction: H2O + CH4 ¨ CO + 3H2. This process is known as steam 
reforming. 
In the F-T process, the syngas produced is tailored to a ratio of H2:CO 
depending on the catalyst used, usually close to 2:1. It is then reacted 
according to the following equation: 
(2n+1)H2 + nCO ¨ CnH(2n+2) + nH2O, where n is an integer. 
At n = 1, we get methane, which is certainly not desirable because that was 
our starting point in the case of natural gas as the feedstock. The key chemical 
challenge is creating the carbon-to-carbon bond, and this is more challenging 
for higher n’s. The higher the n, the more energy-dense the liquid. Gasoline 
has n about 8, diesel around 12, and jet fuel in the range 10–15. All these fuels 
are mixtures with n as a range rather than a single number. The conditions 
of temperature and pressure determine the output. This reaction is very 
exothermic, that is, it generates a lot of heat, and this is a key process control 
variable.
F-T is the most versatile of the different methods for converting methane 
to liquids. This is because process conditions can be adjusted depending on 
the output desired. The starting feed for the gasification to syngas can be 
biomass as well, although typically preparation of the feed to be suitable for 
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a gasifier would be a precursor step. Although not the subject of this essay, a 
new technology for converting biomass to transport fuel is worth noting. This 
is known as catalytic pyrolysis and involves treatment to a state short of actual 
combustion, resulting in the formation of a liquid. This liquid is very similar to 
crude oil and could be a direct feed to an oil refinery. 
The MTG Process
One of the other technologies is the so-called methanol-to-gasoline (MTG) 
process conceived by Mobil about 40 years ago. This involves first going from 
syngas to methanol, which is a very simple process, and thence to dimethyl 
ether and finally to gasoline, which is a more complex catalytic process 
utilizing a zeolite designated ZSM-5. This reaction, too, is highly exothermic, 
so efficient removal of heat is a key.
The output is a gasoline ready to mix with conventionally produced 
gasoline. The MTG process was commercially operated in New Zealand by 
Methanex New Zealand Ltd. from about 1979 to 1996. The output was a 
gasoline with octane rating in the low 90s, in other words like the highest 
grades at our pumps today. The plant was then mothballed in 1996, with 
economics given as the reason. Since then ExxonMobil has improved the 
process and is offering it commercially today. The denser fuels (diesel and jet 
fuel) cannot be synthesized using this process. However, since gasoline is such 
a large part of the passenger car fleet, this is not an undue limitation.
Economics of Conversion
Consider a plant producing 65,000 bpd of output. For the statistics here I use 
the analysis of Michael Economides (Economides, 2005) for the input/output 
figures:
Input per day: 
 Natural gas:  685 million cubic feet
Output per day:
Diesel:  44,000 barrels
Naphtha:  17,000 barrels
LPG:  4,000 barrels
The selling price of the components can be highly variable. All refined fuels 
such as diesel have a value over that of crude oil which is known as the crack 
spread. The term originates from the fact that large crude oil molecules are 
“cracked” to the smaller molecules that make up diesel or gasoline. The term 
n in the formula shown in the box is greater than about 22 for crude oil, and 
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for gasoline it is around 8. The cost of this cracking plus a profit is termed the 
spread. This varies a lot over time and is one of the reasons that the price of 
gasoline at the pump sometimes appears not to be affected by the price changes 
of crude oil.
For diesel, a representative figure for the crack spread would be $15 to 
$20 per barrel. The spread for naphtha I’ll estimate at about $5, and LPG I’ll 
assume to be the same as light sweet crude, in other words zero spread. Based 
on these assumptions, and a crude oil price of $100, the value of the output 
is $7.24 million. The cost of the gas, at a price of $4 per mcf, is $2.74 million. 
Assuming a cost of $20 per barrel of output as the total cost of depreciation and 
operations, that adds $1.3 million to the cost, bringing the total cost to about 
$4.04 million, leaving a total profit of about $3.20 million. This is a very healthy 
margin, even assuming costs are higher in some places. But the main point is 
that it is sensitive to gas price. If the price goes to $12, as it did on occasion in 
the last decade, the cost jumps to $9.52, which is a severe loss position. Even $8 
makes it marginal as a business.
This underlines the fact that shale gas–enabled consistently low prices 
would be a key to the business decision to build conventional GTL plants in 
North America. The other variable in play is the cost of light sweet crude. I 
assumed $100 in the analysis. Elsewhere in the book I support the models that 
predict oil prices as being consistently high and gas prices low. This is a recipe 
for widespread GTL. Certainly Alaska, with essentially stranded gas, is a prime 
candidate. Construction costs will be higher there, but the gas prices can be 
assumed to be a good deal lower than prices in the Lower 48.
Analyses by the National Energy Technology Laboratory have shown that 
liquids synthesized in Alaska could be sent down the existing oil pipeline in 
slugs between crude flows. I also suggest in chapter 15 that the transport of 
heavy viscous crude could be enabled by appropriate blending with GTL liquid.
Drop-In Fuels
This is a term that has come into vogue to indicate a synthesized fuel that 
can blend in with gasoline or diesel, or in some cases replace it. In some ways 
ethanol fits the description in that it blends with gasoline, but it has less energy 
density and so impairs a car’s driving range. Butanol, on the other hand, would 
come close to being a true drop-in. A number of efforts are under way to 
produce such fuel from sugar (“The Future of Biofuels,” 2010). I’ll restrict my 
discussion here to fuels using methane as the feed.
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F-T plants are required to be large to achieve economies of scale. The cost 
runs into billions. The Shell facility in Qatar produces 260,000 barrels of total 
fluid output per day and cost $18 billion to build. Future plants could be 
somewhat lower in cost but not dramatically so. This has two implications. One 
is that a large volume of gas has to be contracted for at least 20 years, and there 
has to be reasonable assurance of cost stability. The other is that the sheer size 
of the investment makes financing difficult. Consequently, industrial research 
has continually been searching for that elusive small-scale process that is cost-
effective.
Oxidative Coupling of Methane
An approach that has been researched considerably is to attempt to directly 
couple two molecules of methane to produce a carbon-to-carbon bond of a 
larger molecule, ethylene. The desired reaction is:
2CH4 ¨ C2H4 + 2H2
This is highly exothermic, and temperature control is a key. The ethylene 
can be used for a number of applications, but further steps need to be taken 
to convert it to longer-chain molecules that can drop into gasoline. This is the 
goal of GTL.
This reaction has a low yield, and some component of ethane will also be 
produced. But the low yield is what has held back this approach. Now one 
company, Siluria, claims to have developed a unique catalyst to dramatically 
improve yields. Its website describes a process for creating a catalyst using an 
interesting amalgam of organic biochemistry and nano-catalyst dispersion 
in such a way as to yield a structure with highly reactive surfaces. If this 
indeed works as claimed, it will put oxidative coupling of methane into the 
commercial arena. One would then expect that modestly long-chain drop-in 
molecules could be produced for gasoline using much less energy than is 
needed for conventional GTL methods.
Conversion to ethylene and then to alkanes is one approach. Others are 
using advanced catalysis to go directly to diesel lookalikes. Yet others are 
working on controlling the kinetics using proven catalysts. The descriptor 
“game changer” is used with much abandon in the popular press, right up 
there with “paradigm shift.” Here, though, is the prospect of a technology that 
could truly change the game. The promise here is of low-cost conversion with 
a small footprint. This last is the key. Even if the cost were to be the same as 
conventional GTL, the ability to conduct distributed processing at small scales 
is what is seductive.
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In early 2014 at least a dozen companies were pursuing this objective. In a 
recent World Bank report (Fleisch, 2014), Theo Fleisch reviewed these, with 
the imperative being amelioration of the flared gas problem. He believes that 
four companies are close to commercialization: Velocys, CompactGTL, and 
Greyrock, all F-T targeting diesel, and Oberon Fuels, producing DME. All the 
diesel producers aim to have an output with a minimum of long molecules 
known as wax. This is because hydrocracking wax back to diesel is expensive. 
Also, not having that back-end process reduces the complexity of the plant. 
This is especially important for processes in field locations. 
This objective of limiting molecule size is best explained by Figure 13, 
which is an output from a research program at RTI International. Shown in 
Figure 13 is the weight percent distribution of molecules in the reactor output 
plotted against n, in the formula CnH2n+2, which is the basic formula for all 
oil constituents, as explained in chapter 1. The diamond points represent the 
distribution of molecules in the standard GTL process. One can see that a 
significant portion of the output is in the wax range of n greater than about 25. 
The square points are from an experimental process attempting to minimize 
the production of wax. Diesel, the desired fuel output of the process, is a 
mixture with n ranging from about 12 to about 18. As noted, a very small 
Figure 13. Distribution of molecule size in a process aiming to minimize 
wax production in the Fischer-Tropsch process 
Figure courtesy of RTI International.
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fraction of the output has molecules in the wax region. All four companies 
mentioned by the World Bank report and cited above have this objective in 
mind.
The ability to economically produce transport liquids from natural gas on 
a distributed basis has two impacts. One is the augmentation of conventional 
sources with transport fuel produced closer to the consumption, with minimal 
transport of the gas. The explosion of gas production has strained the pipeline 
systems, and utilizing at least a part of the gas locally will ease the problem. 
This will be particularly apropos in countries such as Poland and India, which 
don’t have extensive pipelines. The second advantage is that the small scale of 
each plant eases financing and does not require massive gas supply contracts 
to be in place. As a bonus, these plants will be in gas-producing states, keeping 
the economic value local.

CHAPTER 17
Natural Gas Vehicles:  
A Step in the Right Direction 
“All in all it’s just another brick in the wall”
—From “Another Brick in the Wall” by Pink Floyd (written by Roger Waters)
Direct use of natural gas as a fuel for vehicles could have a material impact 
on the reduction of imported oil. This is technically feasible and likely most 
applicable to commercial and fleet vehicles, especially for long-haul trucks. 
Light-duty passenger vehicle applications will need innovation to overcome 
some consumer-unfriendly features.
Some see natural gas as a transitional fuel toward a low-carbon future 
for North America. This can be manifest either simply in displacing coal 
for electricity production or in displacing imported oil for transportation 
purposes. The former reduces carbon dioxide emissions by virtue of the fact 
that the combustion of natural gas produces about half as much greenhouse gas 
as coal does. There is little argument on this point, except some argue that the 
act of producing the gas creates fugitive methane with adverse consequences; 
that is discussed in chapter 9. The more interesting avenue, substituting for oil 
in transport applications, creates debate. One approach would be to simply use 
the cleaner electricity to drive electric motors in cars.
Comparison to Electric Vehicles 
The well/mine-to-wheel efficiency of an electric car is far in excess of any 
internal combustion engine, no matter what the fuel. So, simply in terms of 
using the least energy to drive a given number of miles, an electric car is the 
best option (see box on the following page for the calculation). This addresses a 
point that is not made often enough: we need to figure out how to get the same 
amount of gratification with less energy. Then where the energy comes from 
is less of an issue because associated emissions will be reduced, as a result of 
simply using less energy.  
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Electric Cars Use Less Energy
To give support to this assertion, I will calculate here the efficiency of each 
step in the process and arrive at a fair comparison. I’ll use the following facts 
and assumptions:
• A gallon of gasoline has 116,100 Btu, which equals 34 kWh.
• The average car being replaced delivers 35 miles per gallon (I am being 
generous here).
• For years the dogma has been that electric vehicles (EVs) use 0.2 kWh per 
mile. Nissan reports that the Leaf averages 0.25 kWh per mile. As in all 
electric and hybrid cars, stop-and-go driving gives better mileage than 
continuous operation. So, that number could be higher in some cases. I 
will use the 0.25 number for this exercise.
• Refining oil to produce gasoline consumes 20 percent of the energy in the 
oil.
• Coal-fired plants have efficiency of 40 percent (60 percent energy loss); by 
using coal, not gas, I am being conservative, and this figure is that of newer 
supercritical combustors.
• Electricity lost in transmission is 8 percent (a good estimate for the US).
• Energy to get the oil out of the ground is a wash with coal mining. Had I 
used the less conservative gas source for electricity, the offset would have 
been precisely correct.
So, energy losses for gasoline prior to its being consumed in the vehicle 
are 20 percent. Energy used after combustion is: 34 kWh in a gallon divided by 
35 miles to the gallon, further divided by 0.8, equals 1.25 kWh per mile.
Energy losses for EVs are 60 percent at the generating plant, minus 
8 percent in transmission, equals 32 percent. Energy used by EVs equals 
0.25/0.32 equals 0.78 kWh per mile.
The ratio of the energy used to drive an average gasoline engine car to 
that used to drive an EV is 1.25 to 0.78, or 1.6. In other words, a conventional 
vehicle uses 60 percent more energy as an EV for the same purpose. Is this 
exactly right? Probably not, but it is not off by much. The key takeaway 
remains that the EV advantage has a facet that is not commonly recognized in 
quantitative terms.
For example, today, due in large part to a California initiative commenced 
in 1971, television sets have standby power use of less than 1 watt. This is the 
power to simply keep the device in ready mode to allow the use of the remote 
monitor without a hard on/off at the machine. This little bit of couch potato 
convenience used to cost up to 12 watts. Similar standby wastage is in evidence 
in power drawn by devices left plugged in ready for use. This includes cell 
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phone chargers—but the worst offenders are printers. Overall about 8 percent 
of US power usage is for this bit of convenience.
But a fleet turnover to electric vehicles will take decades. In the meantime 
it would be well to also have alternatives capitalizing on cheap and abundant 
natural gas. One is processing it to produce liquids that drop right in as 
replacements for gasoline or diesel. This is viable and is known as gas-to-
liquids, or GTL, discussed in chapter 16. 
A potentially important automotive fuel derivative of natural gas is 
methanol. The most effective use will likely be in the form of M85 (85 percent 
methanol, balance gasoline). Once again natural gas must be seen as a bridging 
raw material. Unlike ethanol, production from biomass is very straightforward. 
But if shale gas remains cheap it may be hard to displace as the primary source 
for methanol. In turn, gasoline substitution will be very economical.
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the pros and cons of using natural 
gas directly in existing or modified internal combustion engines. But one 
message is clear from the calculation in the box: other things such as cost and 
range anxiety being nearly equal, an electric vehicle is by far the preferred 
option from the standpoint of emissions. Not only is it more efficient, as 
shown, but the tailpipe emissions are zero. Sure, the electricity producer emits 
carbon dioxide, but capture at a plant is more tractable than on each vehicle. 
Having said that, the latter is not completely infeasible, and one attempt at 
doing so is being researched.
Natural gas for cars and buses is generally in the form of compressed natural 
gas (CNG). The gas is compressed to a pressure of about 3,600 pounds per 
square inch. This is about 250 times atmospheric pressure. The tank required 
for this has to be robust, which adds weight but makes it safe on impact. 
Also, research and development is ongoing to minimize weight and cost. 
A promising avenue is the use of adsorbents to store the gas at volumetric 
densities of a factor of 2 over CNG. The energy density is also lower than that 
of gasoline by about a factor of 4. Combined with the weight penalty, this 
causes range to be reduced. The only car designed to run only on CNG, the 
Honda Civic GX, has a range of something over 200 miles, depending on how 
you drive. That range is double that of the all-electric Nissan Leaf.
A purpose-designed vehicle such as the Honda Civic GX could well have 
the tank below the trunk, although Honda did not do that for the current 
model. However, retrofit vehicles will need to take up trunk space, and the 
space occupied is significant. Yet this has been done in taxis in New Delhi and 
Kuala Lumpur. They simply install roof racks for luggage. The retrofit market 
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is of interest for any quick uptake of this technology. The rate of uptake will 
determine the speed of installation of infrastructure.
Refuel Methods
Ease of refueling will be a key to acceptance. The uptake is much more likely 
to be swift for commercial vehicles than passenger. In many such cases, fleet 
refueling may be achieved simply on a dedicated basis. This has been the case 
for the cities in the world where all public transport has gone to CNG by fiat. 
Incidentally, those cities have documented health improvements, as noted on 
the following page. 
There are two types of refuel systems: the fast-fill and the time-fill (an 
interesting euphemism for “slow”). Fast-fills are more expensive because they 
have an intermediate chamber to hold pressure between the compressor and 
the vehicle tank. Yet the time to fill is comparable to that of filling a gasoline 
tank. Time-fill systems take several hours, and the compressor is connected 
directly to the vehicle tank. This is the type used in home charging stations, 
which use domestically supplied natural gas as the feed. Honda partly owned 
a company named Phill that offered such a system. It recently went bankrupt, 
most likely because of slow uptake of the technology as a whole. It has 
resurfaced with different ownership. In the end, an overnight charge is not a 
prohibitive approach, particularly if commercial fast-fill stations are available 
for emergency situations.
Engine Type
The internal combustion engine for gasoline or diesel can accept CNG with 
very little modification. So, dual fuel supply is feasible and is in fact the case 
in most retrofits. But this means tolerating the combined weight and volume 
of a gasoline tank and a CNG tank. Also, conventional engines suffer about 
a 10 percent efficiency penalty using the gas. Dedicated engines can take 
advantage of the 125 octane rating of CNG. If the compression ratio is raised, 
more energy will be derived. The Honda Civic GX has a compression ratio 
of 12.5 to 1. This appears short of what is possible with the immense octane 
rating, but is likely a compromise on weight and cost. Also, some other 
combustion-related aspect might be limiting the compression ratio.
I have mentioned that fleet vehicles of all types are advantaged by CNG, 
as they would be with electric vehicles: charging/refueling infrastructure is 
simple. Public buses, delivery vans, postal vans, and so forth should find ready 
acceptance except for the retrofit time and cost. Fuel cost is low, and with shale 
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gas the cost can be expected to be predictably low. Today reported figures 
are half the cost of gasoline per mile driven. This should be better with high- 
compression engines.
Long-haul transport cannot easily justify CNG because of its low energy 
density. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is called for. This suffers a volumetric 
penalty of just 1.4, as opposed to 4.0 for CNG. However, refueling is much 
more problematic. In 2010, Volvo field-tested a truck using a 75/25 blend of 
LNG and diesel. Volvo claimed the range to be between 500 km and 1,000 km 
depending on conditions. In 2011, Volvo appears to have decided to go in 
the direction of DME. The company has announced a 13-liter truck engine 
running on DME alone for the 2015 model year, this applying also to Mack 
Trucks. For European long-haul, 1,000 km seems to be a comfortable distance 
to refuel. But again, LNG transport and dispensing is specialized. LNG for 
trains to replace diesel is also being piloted in India, the US, and elsewhere. 
Range is again an issue, and it will remain so until refueling infrastructure 
is more widespread. Recent advances in mini LNG production will be an 
important element. The key driver in India appears to be the cost of diesel 
rather than environmental gains.
Health Benefits of Substituting Diesel with CNG
The principal issue with diesel emissions is particulates. Engines and fuel have 
improved to the point that the old thick black exhaust is not really a factor 
any more. But the particulate loading is still high. An Italian study considered 
two scenarios in the period 2009 to 2011: a trend scenario of 3.3 percent 
replacement with CNG vehicles and an aggressive scenario with 10 percent 
replacement. In metropolitan areas they estimated a 1.3 percent reduction in 
deaths related to respiratory and heart diseases with the trend scenario and a 
4 percent reduction in deaths under the more aggressive replacement scenario. 
Expected improvements included 4,197 and 13,115, respectively, fewer asthma 
attacks in adults. Similar figures were reported for lost work days and children’s 
illnesses. 
Such studies have also been conducted in New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur, 
in those cases with actual retrospective data. A New Delhi study (Akbar et 
al., 2005) claims 3,629 fewer deaths due to the switch to CNG by all public 
transport, which was ordered by the Supreme Court of India. This success has 
allowed expansion of the program to 22 major cities. Again, fleet operations are 
easier for implementation.
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Europe is much more positively affected by the diesel switch to CNG than 
is North America, where diesel passenger vehicles are simply not in demand. 
That could change soon. Automobile manufacturers are realizing that the 
miles per gallon standard may most readily be achievable through partial fleet 
conversion to diesel with its 35 percent better mileage over gasoline.
Mandatory CNG for public vehicles (including taxis) and utility vehicles 
such as delivery vans in metropolitan areas, LNG for long-haul trucks, and 
possibly CNG for light-duty trucks: these are all worthy targets that could 
make a serious dent in our imported oil bill. Ultimately electric vehicles are the 
future, provided needed advances in battery cost and performance are made.
CHAPTER 18
Horses for Courses: Challenging the 
Orthodoxy in Fuels and Chemicals
“Did you ever have to make up your mind?”
—From “Did You Ever Have to Make Up Your Mind?” by The Lovin’ Spoonful (written by John Sebastian)
Fuels and chemicals have been manufactured in the same way for a long time. 
The deeply ingrained beliefs centered on the economies of scale have caused 
plants to get larger over the years. Oil refineries used to be simple and as small 
as 10,000 bpd of output. The newest ones are topping a million barrels. Against 
this backdrop has arrived the concept of distributed production, with smaller 
refineries located closer to either the raw material source or the consumer. In 
this chapter I detail the advances and posit the notion that the methodologies 
will coexist, each suited to certain situations. Some horses run certain courses 
better. Kentucky Derby winners who have faltered at the slightly longer 
Belmont Stakes know the feeling well. In the fuels and chemicals area we are 
going to have options for the first time, but work remains to be done to realize 
this vision.
The concept of distributed production is not new. Electricity has embraced 
this to some degree when the technology was suited, such as with solar 
photovoltaics. The default option is still large generators exceeding 1 gigawatt, 
with transmission lines everywhere. While this has merit in countries such 
as the US, where transmission line losses average 7 percent, countries with 
losses up to 40 percent ought to consider alternatives. In these settings the vast 
majority of the losses are theft-related, but no matter the cause, it does not get 
there. This is a case where distributed production of electricity makes eminent 
sense. Fuels have analogs to this, as I discuss below; the thievery is more 
sophisticated and involves subversion of the subsidy system.
The early driver for innovating in the small footprint production space was 
stranded natural gas. Today roughly 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared (burned 
for no benefit) annually. This is one-fourth of the total annual consumption 
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in the US and has a value of $20 billion, even at today’s depressed prices. Most 
of the stranding is occasioned by the absence of pipelines to move the gas to 
market. In the case where the stranded gas is on an offshore platform, the space 
available for conversion to liquids is small. This waste was a major driver for 
the research.
More lately shale gas has provided a somewhat different justification. Unlike 
conventional wells, shale gas wells produce smaller quantities of gas per well. 
Shale gas wells average 1.5 MM standard cubic feet per day (scfd), compared 
with over 100 MM scfd for deepwater wells. The stranding in these cases could 
well be the absence of delivery pipelines. But if liquids could profitably be 
produced at the rig site or close to it, this would provide an alternative avenue 
for monetization over the construction of a pipeline. I refer to this as a virtual 
pipeline. Also, many wells are economically stranded, meaning the market 
price does not allow profitable production. In early 2014 this was the case for 
many wells in eastern Pennsylvania and the Haynesville play in Louisiana. 
Boom towns have become shadows of their former selves, if not outright ghost 
towns. The entire class of operations converting gas to liquids with some value 
I am dubbing “GTL Lite.” In so doing I am defining “liquid” pretty broadly to 
include transport liquids as well as others, such as methanol.
The Case for Natural Gas as Raw Material
Natural gas is already the preferred feedstock for many chemicals, such as 
ammonia. But oil continues to be the dominant source for transport fuels 
and for certain chemicals such as ethylene and propylene. These last two are 
important precursors for much of what we wear or package. It has always 
been technically feasible to produce these from gas, but lately, with the spread 
between oil and gas prices, at least in North America, the economic viability 
has improved.
Figure 14 shows the selling price per MM Btu for several important 
products in a snapshot taken in April 2013. Market conditions can cause 
variations, but by and large the numbers for 2014 are not far off the ones 
shown. In early 2014 the exception was methanol; its price had a large increase, 
but it is likely temporary. The interesting point of note is that when compared 
on this uniform basis of energy content, the prices of the fuels are in parity 
with those of chemicals. These do not share the same markets, so why would 
this be so? My explanation is that they are all sourced from oil, which has 
output strictly controlled by the OPEC cartel. When some of these are sourced 
from natural gas, some separation could start occurring.
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If oil were to be priced at $100 per barrel, it would show up at $18/MM Btu 
on the figure. With some processing cost, it could be refined to one of the fuels 
and chemicals shown at $27/MM Btu or so. But the same chemicals could 
be synthesized from natural gas starting at $4/MM Btu. Sure, synthesizing 
the chemicals from natural gas would incur higher processing costs, but the 
margins would still likely be much better. In the following chapter, I go into 
more detail on methanol and point out that it could be made for around 
$12/MM Btu. That leaves a lot of headroom to the selling price. 
Economies of Mass Production
A school of thought is developing that economies of mass production could 
displace economies of scale in many instances. All large-scale chemical 
plants, and in this I am lumping fuel production plants such as refineries, 
have in common the method of assembly and construction. Each is custom-
designed even though many elements may be commonly used elsewhere. Then 
it is assembled and tested on location by skilled personnel. This inevitably 
constrains the locations to those in which skilled labor is available. Certain 
areas such as the Houston Ship Channel and the New Jersey corridor are 
advantaged and form areas of concentration.
Figure 14. Value of different fluids produced from natural gas 
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The new concept would entail building small reactors that are economical 
in their own right. Part of the objective would be to design them to be 
manufactured in volume and enjoy the economies of mass production. These 
could be deployed singly in distributed fashion. They could also be collected 
in one location and hooked up together. This process would be much simpler 
because it involves a much lower level of complexity than a custom plant does. 
Another important consideration is that they be low cost and not necessarily 
long-lived. One would sacrifice long life for low cost and low maintenance. An 
analog is the internal combustion engine: relatively low cost for the horsepower 
and economical for the intended lifetime. By contrast, large chemical plants are 
designed to last decades. Aside from the high cost to finance, the plan has to 
ensure raw material supply for long periods. This uncertainty makes financing 
large plants more expensive through a higher discount rate.
A large plant composed of small modules hooked together would also 
rely on another feature. It would have to be highly automated, with sensors 
to detect the performance of each module. Since these modules would be 
designed to be replaced as frequently as every five years, monitoring would 
be a key to success. Additional economies could be derived from remote 
control of these modules, thus minimizing the need for skilled operators at the 
location. This technique has been used to advantage in the oil and gas business 
in exploiting hydrocarbons in remote and otherwise challenging areas such as 
ultra-deep water. Experts can monitor and control multiple locations, reducing 
cost and providing job satisfaction through not having to spend time in the 
field.
Making Choices
Until the vision described above is realized, there really is no choice to be 
made. Small distributed reactors not yet taking advantage of the economies 
of mass production exist now. This is either already here or right around the 
corner, depending upon whom you believe. At least six companies have natural 
gas to diesel, methanol, or DME processes in late stages of commercialization. 
Each is about 100 times smaller than conventional plants.
Figure 15 illustrates the logic companies might follow in choosing which 
type of process or plant to build in a particular situation.
For large sources of high-quality gas, be it methane or ethane, it makes 
sense to have a conventional-size conversion plant located in the vicinity. At 
the other end of the spectrum, is the situation where the field is small and 
the gas of poor quality. Dry gas in smaller accumulations would fit in that 
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category. They would be well-suited to small-footprint plants distributed to 
be close to the source. Intermediate locations on the chart could be served by 
combinations of modules or by pipelines transporting to existing conventional 
facilities. Such logic will drive the best mix of conventional and distributed 
production. When systems taking advantage of economies of mass production 
come on stream, they will compete with conventional technology for new build 
capacity. 
The natural gas price disparity between the US and Canada and the rest 
of the world is driving a manufacturing renaissance in the US. This added 
capacity, often with foreign investment, will force investors to choose between 
technologies pretty soon. Assuming the new approach is viable, the country 
would benefit if distributed production became available before too much new 
capacity comes on stream.
Figure 15. Logic for choosing a monetization solution 
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The Need for New Business Models
GTL Lite technology appears to be well on its way to becoming available. 
Especially in the case of monetization of stranded gas, however, the hurdles go 
beyond those of technology incorporation. Security of supply is much simpler 
with small units, particularly because a lot of the producers are themselves 
small. Further, it is immensely simpler if the producer and conversion 
process owner are vertically integrated. Even long-term pricing would not 
be a contractual hurdle. But true vertical integration is hampered by the fact 
the gas producer has no domain understanding of the other area, which is 
essentially a chemical plant, albeit a small one. A construct which could work is 
a partnership for the sole purposes of that one venture. But the lack of domain 
understanding could hamper even partnerships. 
In theory, integrated oil and gas companies would not face this hurdle; 
in practice, however, the separation of management of the down and up 
streams could be a complication. Also, the competitive advantage of the large, 
integrated companies rests in part in the ability to finance and manage giant 
projects. In GTL Lite projects, they would be on similar competitive footing 
with the small guys. In fact all the players in the GTL Lite space right now are 
small outfits. This brings to mind an important distinction between the regular 
and Lite versions. Large-scale facilities can be designed and built by only a very 
small handful of companies; fewer than five would be entrusted with a world-
scale GTL plant. Lite plants would not only open the field to smaller oil and gas 
players, but a large number of companies, possibly a hundred, could perform 
the engineering and build. This is good for the industry as a whole.
Distributed Production in Remote Villages
Over half the population of India has access to little to no electricity. What 
meager power they get is from diesel generators, sometimes kerosene. The 
latter is also used for lighting, as is paraffin. Cooking is done with biomass 
in open stoves or sometimes with kerosene. All but the biomass is derived 
from oil, the majority of which is imported at world market prices. Diesel 
and kerosene are heavily subsidized. Kerosene in particular has the subsidy 
applied early in the distribution chain and not at the consumer. Such subsidies 
are subject to a lot of corruption. In any case, government-subsidized diesel 
and kerosene constitute a burden on the taxpayer, and economical substitutes 
would make a difference by providing cost-effective energy without the need 
for heavy subsidies.
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Biogas produced from organic wastes could be converted to a liquid 
fuel using methods discussed earlier in this chapter, with the small-scale 
methods likely being the most viable. A technology in late-stage development 
(Dayton, 2013) processes woody biomass into a synthetic oil. This oil has been 
successfully used as a refinery feed. In this instance, though, it could be used 
directly for electric power generation in a Stirling engine, which is an external 
combustion engine suited to taking fuel other than the conventional diesel. 
Another use for this oil could be in cook stoves. Direct use may be possible, but 
more likely it would need to be converted to a kerosene-like fuel. This would 
require a relatively simple step known as hydrotreatment.
Replacement of both diesel and kerosene will have positive impacts upon 
respiratory and cardiac health. Diesel generators emit particulate matter, the 
most noxious being PM2.5, which are particles smaller than 2.5 microns (micro 
meters) in size. The issues surrounding this are described in the box.
Particulates Matter
Particulate matter emitted from combustion systems constitutes a significant 
health hazard. Particles smaller than 10 microns are known as PM10 and are 
associated with some respiratory illnesses. PM2.5 is much more hazardous 
because it penetrates tissue. It is implicated in cardiac and respiratory 
illnesses. The principal sources of exposure for the general public are coal 
combustion and diesel engine exhaust. Advances in filters continue to 
improve the situation with respect to diesel engines but particulate matter 
is still a hazard. Some estimates (Muller & Muller, 2013) peg the annual 
unintended US mortality at 70,000; morbidity numbers are more difficult to 
estimate. The mortality number for the world is close to 1.5 million. 
In the US, progressive replacement of coal by cheap natural gas will do its 
part in attacking the problem. This is likely to be especially effective because 
the plants being replaced are the oldest ones and therefore the worst actors 
in regard to PM2.5. Diesel displacement is also likely to occur, as discussed in 
chapter 26. 
But in growing India and China, coal will continue to be the major 
electricity source. In India and parts of Africa such as Uganda, the problem 
ought to be attacked at the village level. Here the electricity generated is from 
diesel, and cooking is done using kerosene or woody biomass. All of these 
generate copious PM2.5. In the case of cooking, the portion of the population 
most at risk are the women and the small children who by custom are in 
close proximity. Substitutes for these fuels—solar electricity and innovations 
such as smokeless cook stoves—would do much to improve the lot of these 
unfortunate billion people.
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When introducing innovation in village settings, technology is necessary 
but not sufficient. Sufficiency requires a depth of understanding of the 
societal context. If you build it they may not necessarily come. For example, 
if a kerosene substitute were to be found, the folks in the kerosene supply 
chain are likely to place roadblocks. One smokeless cook stove introduction 
was hampered by the villagers’ simply not wanting to use them because the 
appearance was not acceptable. The poor, too, have aesthetic sensibilities. These 
hurdles can be traversed but need to be addressed right up front using local 
knowledge.
Small-footprint chemical conversion processes present a challenge to 
the orthodoxy in the fuels and chemical industries. Certainly they allow for 
distributed production of fuel. They even offer the promise of substitution of 
economies of scale with economies of mass production. In the end the method 
most fit for the purpose will be adopted and the new and the old will coexist. 
CHAPTER 19
Advantage Methanol 
“Mere alcohol doesn’t thrill me at all. /  
So tell me why should it be true”
—From  “I Get a Kick Out of You” by Ethel Merman (written by Cole Porter)
As I have discussed in previous chapters, a cheap natural gas future is 
conducive to the production of liquids for internal combustion engines. 
Fischer-Tropsch synthesis gives us drop-in replacement for oil-derived 
gasoline or diesel. The methanol-to-gasoline (MTG) process likewise produces 
moderate octane gasoline, with methanol and dimethyl ether (DME) as 
intermediate products. Methanol can be processed to DME, which can be a 
cleaner-burning substitute for diesel. But what of methanol itself? Could the 
supporting actor become the marquee attraction?
A careful examination shows that if certain measures are taken, methanol 
could be a viable endpoint. In fact, of all the gasoline substitutes derived 
from natural gas, methanol may well have the inside track based solely on 
economics. In tennis terminology, methanol has moved from the deuce to 
the advantage court. That is one step from winning the game. Harnessing the 
high octane rating would give it set and match against the perennial champion 
gasoline.
Widespread acceptance of any gasoline or diesel substitute requires three 
conditions to be met. The first is low cost per mile driven relative to the 
incumbent fuel, preferably without the assistance of subsidies. In the event 
of subsidies, the consumer would need some assurance that the post-subsidy 
price would still be attractive. In fact this assurance is likely more needed by the 
retailer who would need the security of long-term demand to incur the expense 
of a dispensing system. This brings us to the second condition, the need for 
a low-cost distribution infrastructure, including pumps at retailing stations 
within reasonable driving distances for most consumers. This last was one 
factor in the unpopularity of E85 (Kindy & Keating, 2008). The final condition 
required is that of easy availability of vehicles that are able to operate with the 
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alternative fuel. In the limit, all new vehicles ought to be able to run on any mix 
of gasoline and alcohol alternatives. Bills in both chambers of Congress await 
passage that would ensure that most new vehicles after a period of time would 
be flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs).
Price of Methanol Compared to Gasoline
In early 2012, the methanol wholesale price was $1.13 per gallon. I will use this 
figure rather than the unusual $1.50 prevalent in early 2014, because the lower 
figure is more representative of a steady state case. Distribution and markup 
will add 10 cents, and another 20 cents for federal and state taxes brings the 
total to $1.43. To compare with gasoline, this needs to be doubled because 
methanol has about half the calories of gasoline. Later I will discuss how this 
calorific disadvantage can be ameliorated or eliminated. But in the normal 
situation for use in an FFV, the effective cost of methanol is $2.86. On the day 
of this estimate, regular gasoline was selling for $3.43 as a national average. So, 
clearly methanol enjoys a cost advantage. Add to that another fact: methanol 
has an octane rating of 117. So the comparison ought to be with high-octane, 
or super, gasoline, not regular. In most states one would need to add another 
25 cents, bringing the gasoline total to about $4.04. As a practical matter the 
most likely fuel used would be M85, comprising 85 percent methanol. But the 
substitution comparison based on the neat liquid is still valid.
All this raises the question: will methanol prices in the future enjoy this 
advantage? Since the bulk of methanol today is produced from natural gas, the 
question shifts to the forecast in natural gas prices. In fact, at a methanol policy 
forum in 2011, David Sandalow, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and 
International Affairs, in touting the value of methanol, cautioned, “If natural 
gas prices increase substantially and price differentials between methanol and 
gasoline revert back to historical norms, the economics could be difficult.” 
This is precisely the concern addressed in the analysis below. I conclude 
that methanol will be cheaper than gasoline on a per-mile basis for decades. 
The only wild card is extraordinary demand for natural gas outstripping the 
production capability
The cost to produce methanol is plotted in Figure 16 as a function of 
natural gas price. In March 2012 natural gas prices were essentially at decadal 
lows, driven by an abnormally warm winter. These prices are not normal; the 
October 2010 figure shown is more what one could have expected. That figure, 
incidentally, was roughly the average for 2010 as well. One readily observes that 
at those values, methanol can be produced for about 50 cents per US gallon. 
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Keeping in mind this is cost to produce and adding a profit of 15 percent gives 
about 58 cents. Add to that the aforementioned retailing and tax components 
and you get about 88 cents per gallon.
In chapter 3, I presented a model indicating a ceiling for gas price between 
$6.50 and $8.00 per MM Btu. Support for this is available from the work of 
Amy Jaffe and colleagues (Medlock et al., 2011), who used different scenarios 
of shale gas development. In none of their scenarios do they exceed decadal 
averages of $6.50 for the next three decades. More recently, the EIA forecast 
calls for the price to stay below $5.50 out to 2025. 
My forecasted ceiling is plotted in Figure 16 and represents the upper end 
of what one could expect for the methanol cost of production. At the highest 
end, methanol rings up at a pump cost of about $1.28 per gallon (85 cents to 
produce plus 15 percent profit plus 30 cents in distribution and taxes). An 
important point of note is that these calculations notwithstanding, the price of 
methanol will be driven by market factors. However, as one can see there is a 
fair bit of headroom between gasoline and methanol, and even accounting for 
variability in both, methanol is still a viable choice. Gasoline price will always 
be driven by world events, whereas methanol will be largely regional. In that 
sense one could expect more stability. Natural gas represents about 75 percent 
of the cost of methanol production, so stability in that commodity will at least 
keep cost under control. 
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Figure 16. Methanol cost as a function of natural gas price
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Another factor is that methanol can be produced from coal and biomass, 
so alternative feedstocks are a moderating element. In particular, low-grade 
coal such as lignite is a useful feedstock. Lignite, available at the mine mouth 
for $25/tonne (recent figure from the EIA) will yield methanol at a cost of 
around 70 cents per gallon. So, if my forecast is vitiated by unusual demand for 
natural gas, plentiful low-grade coal can kick in. This coal is not particularly 
useful for electricity production because of its high moisture and ash. In fact, 
the high proportion of this useless component adding to freight cost is the 
reason I advocate mine mouth processing. With vast deposits in Texas and 
states northeast from there, the mine mouth is not far from infrastructure. Of 
note regarding the switch to another raw material is that the process after the 
formation of syngas is the same regardless of the feed character.
Methanol Production Cost
For this computation I used a standard plant producing 5,000 tonnes per day 
of methanol. This translates to about 40,000 barrels per day. As a frame of 
reference, the announced Sasol GTL plant for Louisiana is rated at a bit over 
double that figure. In general methanol plants require less capital than F-T 
process plants. The 5,000-tonne-per-day plants could be expected to cost 
about $800 million, whereas an F-T plant of the same capacity would be about 
two and a half times that. The time to construct would be similar in ratio.
This plant would consume 150 MM cfd per day of natural gas. This is the 
output from about 100 Marcellus wells, or about 4 to 7 pads. Such plants 
could be distributed in the producing areas, keeping the jobs local. In fact, the 
simplicity of the process could well allow even smaller plants without much 
loss in economies of scale. 
Viability of Flexible-Fuel Vehicles
The intent of an FFV would be to use any mix of gasoline, ethanol, or 
methanol. While there is some difference of opinion, most believe that 
the current FFVs could use methanol. Possibly a somewhat more robust 
fluorinated elastomer would be needed. Certainly the software or firmware 
would have to be modified to allow for a methanol mix. With an M85-filled 
tank, the range loss would be about 42 percent. In other words, a car with a 
range of 350 miles would now go about 200 miles with a full tank of fuel. The 
consumer would have to decide whether a lower price and lower emissions are 
worth filling up more frequently. 
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Today that lower price would be calculated as follows: 15 percent at an 
average gasoline price as noted above of $3.43 plus 85 percent at $1.76 (natural 
gas at $4 delivers methanol at this price after the doubling to take into account 
the fact gasoline has twice the energy content) equals $2.06 for a gallon of M85. 
I used the price of regular gasoline in the calculation. But M85 performance 
would need to be compared to high-octane super, priced at $4. Still, the 
consumer would pay half for the fuel in exchange for filling up almost twice as 
often. Eventually, if auto makers make larger tanks to accommodate this, then 
the fill up will be at a normal frequency. Most of the public would take that 
tradeoff; these are folks who are inclined to drive a mile or more for 10-cents- 
cheaper fuel. The comparison to the price of super gasoline is not completely 
fair because regular-compression engines get no benefit from the higher octane 
rating. The clever nomenclature “super” unintentionally causes some of the 
public to erroneously believe it is better.
The distribution argument goes as follows. If a large proportion of cars were 
to be FFVs, and if methanol had enough allure to get some fraction of these to 
owners to use it, a dedicated M85 pump would pay for itself. Furthermore, all 
the other cars on the road have either regular compression, needing 87 octane 
regular gasoline, or sporty cars with higher compression. These latter engines 
need 91 octane fuels. Cars currently in service do not need a third grade of 
gasoline. In fact the practice today of having octane ratings of 87, 89, and 93 
makes no sense. Future pumps would be 87 and 91 octane gasoline and M85.
High-Compression FFVs
This is the future: smaller, more powerful vehicles with a longer range and, 
in the case of methanol, nearly half the carbon emissions for the same miles 
driven as with gasoline. The “Flex-Fuel Fairy Tale” (chapter 25) lightheartedly 
alludes to such things. But fantastic sounding though it may be, there is firm 
scientific basis for these assertions. All of it relies primarily on one feature: 
all three gasoline alternatives—methane, methanol, and ethanol—have in 
common the feature of extremely high octane ratings. 
Our goal: an FFV that accepts any alcohol combination with gasoline, and 
also methane if practical. Of course the gasoline portion would need to be 
small or zero for the octane number to be high enough. Certainly E85, M85, 
and CNG would function in such an engine. But until there is a breakthrough 
in ethanol production cost and a similar advance in storing CNG in a smaller 
volume than currently, methanol will be the game. So, any further discussion 
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will be for this fuel. But an FFV accepting both alcohols, and possibly methane, 
has the virtue of providing consumer choice.
How Gasoline Is Affected 
Gasoline appears to be a loser on this, and some may argue that it would be 
premature to force a wholesale switch. As I discuss below, there is a variant 
that allows a mixture with a majority of gasoline in an effectively high-
compression engine, known as the direct injection engine. Also, existing 
vehicles will be on the road for a long time. But if gasoline is forced into the 
position of being just another fuel, the future sought by Gal Luft and Anne 
Korin in Turning Oil Into Salt (Luft & Korin, 2009) will be realized. 
Their thesis is that salt used to be a strategic commodity because of its 
critical function in preserving food. Wars were fought over it, and people were 
paid in it. The word salary comes from salt. Then refrigeration changed all of 
that. Salt became a useful, even essential, but not strategic commodity. Luft 
and Korin suggest that cars allowing fuel choice will render gasoline, and by 
extension oil, a nonstrategic commodity.
First let’s discuss the direct-injected, alcohol-boosted engine. This is a 
relatively high-compression engine primarily powered by gasoline. When 
the likelihood of premature ignition is detected, methanol is injected using 
a special line and port. It has a high latent heat of evaporation, so when it is 
injected, it cools the chamber. This suppresses premature ignition, eliminating 
the knocking and realizing the high efficiency of the high compression with 
very little total methanol. Such a gasoline engine can give efficiencies equal to 
or greater than a turbocharged diesel, which is more expensive.
The greater promise from the standpoint of displacing gasoline is an 
engine with a much higher compression ratio, closer to 17. Any alcohol 
blend with low gasoline content would operate in such an engine. Work at 
the EPA laboratories in Detroit (Brusstar et al., 2002) and at MIT (Bromberg 
& Cohn, 2008) has shown that both M85 and E85 in a low-displacement, 
spark-ignited, high-compression gasoline engine can obtain efficiencies 
exceeding that of diesel engines. So, in effect not only does this eliminate the 
near-factor-of-2 calorific (mileage) penalty of methanol, but you end up with 
a smaller engine that gets better mileage than a gasoline equivalent. Also a 
higher-torque, sportier car to boot!
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Heavy-Duty Vehicles
This class of vehicle uses of 2.5 MM bpd of oil, out of a total 8.1 million 
barrels imported each day. Consequently it is a logical target. FedEx recently 
announced an intention to switch its trucks to LNG. MIT research has shown 
(Cohn, 2012) that a direct-injected spark-ignition engine can be made smaller 
and more efficient. A typical 15-liter-displacement engine can be replaced 
with a 9-liter engine. This utilizes the high octane rating of methanol as well as 
the evaporative cooling mentioned earlier. The engine weight can be reduced 
from 3,400 pounds to 1,800 pounds, and the exhaust control can be simplified. 
However, the fuel tank needs to be 300 gallons instead of 200 gallons. But the 
added weight of this feature is completely offset by the lighter engine.
The High-Efficiency FFV: How Do We Get There? 
Any large industry such as the automotive industry is slow to change, and 
with good reason. The original ethanol-based FFV was assisted with a federal 
subsidy to cover the engine modifications. If the broad mandate for FFV 
capability on most new cars goes through and if methanol production gears 
up, the compelling economics will cause consumer demand. This will create 
fueling infrastructure, perhaps assisted by one-time subsidies. At this point 
the commercial risk of introduction of a high-efficiency FFV is minimal. By all 
accounts the automobile cost will be lower than for the gasoline counterpart of 
equivalent performance. This is in part due to the smaller engine and the more 
inexpensive emissions control equipment.
The automobiles will appeal to the buying public for their defining 
characteristics of a small, high-performance engine with long range fueled by 
a cheaper alternative to gasoline. The feature of nearly half the carbon dioxide 
emissions per mile as compared to an equivalent gasoline engine will also 
appeal to some. This last comes about from the fact that methanol has about 
half the carbon of gasoline, which causes the mileage penalty in an ordinary 
engine. But the high compression feature simply makes the engine more 
efficient, in effect negating the low carbon penalty.
An interesting entrée could well be through the military. On the one hand, 
they should have an interest in more efficient fuel utilization to minimize fuel 
transported to the front lines. On the other, methanol production at major 
bases using the feedstock of convenience would not be out of the question. A 
civilian version of a military vehicle could then follow, much as happened with 
the Humvee (originally the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or 
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HMMWV). Ironically, the high-efficiency FFV (Heffvee) would be almost the 
opposite of the gas-guzzling Humvee.
When Nobel Laureate George Olah and colleagues proposed the Methanol 
Economy (Olah et al., 2009) first in 2006, they were a bit ahead of their 
time. Shale gas had not made its presence felt to assure a long-term future of 
moderately priced gas. Now the promise can be realized. While methanol will 
be the main driver in gasoline replacement, uniform acceptance of first FFVs 
and then Heffvees will allow for ethanol to be used as well. Gasoline will take 
its place as just another fuel, not the dominant one.
The Road to Energy Independence
Responsible production of shale gas will essentially eliminate import of natural 
gas. That leaves the big ticket item—oil. Here, too, the notion of independence 
can usefully be defined as independence from distant and unreliable sources. 
The first step could be to target the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. 
In 2012, the EIA forecast that in 2022 we would import 7 MM bpd, down 
from the 8.1 MM bpd in 2011 (EIA, January 23, 2012). I think that if pipelines 
are built from North Dakota, oil from the Bakken formation will eat into 
this number more than already forecast. In fact, the 2013 forecast called for 
import reduction to 6 MM bpd by 2018. Going with the newer figure, first 
subtract imports from Canada and Mexico. Canada can be expected to ramp 
up its current flow of 2.2 MM bpd to at least 3.0 MM bpd. We have a special 
relationship with the Canadians: the bulk of their oil can only be refined in 
the US. Aside from the high carbon footprint of this oil, this is a desirable 
and secure relationship. Mexico currently supplies 0.8 MM bpd. This is at 
considerable risk of decrease but we will leave it at that figure for 2022. This, 
too, is heavy oil suited to our refineries.
Of the 2.2 MM bpd balance, I estimate about 1.7 MM bpd passing 
through the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, one strategy would be to target oil 
alternatives to that level. Ignoring for the present the fact that a barrel of oil 
does not generate a full barrel of transport fuel, we can target 1.7 MM bpd of 
oil replacement. A rough calculation of all sources indicates this is viable, as 
enumerated below:
• Sasol has already announced construction of a GTL plant in Louisiana 
reportedly rated at 96,000 bpd of fuel. Assume at least one other such, 
bringing the total close to 200,000 bpd from GTL emboldened by low gas 
prices. (Shell’s cancelling its Louisiana GTL plant in early 2014 is seen as 
unique to their company, not necessarily a trend.)
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• In my chapter on Alaska (chapter 15), I suggested means by which at least 
200,000 bpd capacity could be added to the pipeline. Absent some such 
action, the 500,000 bpd currently sent down from Alaska is at risk due to 
pipeline economics.
• Long-haul trucks switching to LNG or methanol could reasonably target 
20 percent of current fuel usage, which accounts for 0.5 MM bpd of oil.
• Methanol, ethanol, CNG, biofuel, and electric cars could target 1.0 MM 
bpd. A significant part of this, and relatively straightforward, would be 
CNG displacement of diesel in metropolitan public and commercial 
transport.
An angle other than a Strait strategy is a study of the marginal domestic 
barrel and what it replaces. New domestic oil production is all light sweet oil. 
This is most like the oil from Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. So that may make 
sense as the first to be displaced, and in fact in 2014 Nigerian imports are 
down to a dribble. The Saudi portion is, of course, Strait-related and currently 
stands at about 1 MM bpd. Similarly, the uptick in Canadian oil that I predict 
will displace heavy crude such as that from Venezuela is currently about 
0.65 MM bpd. The main point is that crude quality is variable and refineries are 
choosy, so country strategies have to recognize this.
Shale gas produced responsibly will be a key enabler for methanol to be 
produced at prices attractive with respect to gasoline. Broad availability of 
FFVs and associated fueling infrastructure will give the public choice; more 
on that in a later chapter. Tomorrow that choice could include other alcohols 
or methane, and a suggested high-performance FFV will enable that. Today 
methanol appears to be particularly advantaged. Ultimately, gasoline (and 
diesel) can be rendered just another player, not a champion. Game, set, and 
match.

PART IV 
Informing  
on Policy
The societal impact of shale oil and gas production has been profound. It has informed local, state, and national policies. 
Shale gas replacing coal for electricity generation is 
credited with the US reverting to 1992 levels for carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, the best performance of any 
country. Yet without doubt, the low price of gas will have 
a chilling effect on renewable energy on pure economic 
grounds. The shale oil–mediated plummet in oil price will 
also affect transport fuels. Oil-based transportation fuels 
will be displaced by substitutes such as natural gas, woody 
biomass, and oil derived from seeds. Policy measures will be 
necessary to level those particular playing fields.
In this section I explain energy level and octane of 
gasoline alternatives such as ethanol, methanol, and 
natural gas. A light-hearted treatment with sound technical 
underpinnings is in the Flex-Fuel Fairy Tale chapter 
(chapter 25). 
The drop in oil and gas prices worldwide has diminished 
the treasuries of the producers, reducing their ability to 
impose political will using oil or gas supply shutoff as a 
weapon. This has national security implications, not merely 
energy security ones.
IV.  Informing on Policy
CHAPTER 20
Turning the Pennsylvania Two-(Mis)Step 
Into a Waltz
“There should be sunshine after rain”
—From “Why Worry” by Dire Straits (Written by Mark Knopfler)
There is an old adage: the people in the front get shot. Pennsylvania took some 
bold steps in the development of shale gas. They allowed shale gas production 
and the associated fracturing process. New York put a moratorium on 
fracturing and decided to study the matter. France and Switzerland did much 
the same. An industry-sponsored study estimated that in 2012 Pennsylvania 
added $14.0 billion in economic activity, generated $3.0 billion in additional 
state and local taxes, and supported nearly 100,000 jobs (Considine et al., 
2011). Industry opponents argue that groundwater was polluted. While 
each of these figures and assertions can be contested, and they are, they have 
underlying truths.
Fracturing operations have been routine for 60 years. Fracturing-enabled 
production of gas, and to a lesser extent oil, has been commonplace in Texas, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, and the 
Dakotas. So why the fuss about Pennsylvania, the birthplace of oil in this 
country?
The origins of oil in the US notwithstanding, Pennsylvania is largely 
unused to this sort of activity. The prospects lying in populated areas were 
also a factor. But the biggest impact likely came from the fact that the safe and 
cheap disposal of fracturing water was not practical here. In those other states, 
EPA-certified UIC Class II deep disposal wells were commonly available. The 
geology of Pennsylvania militated against this. In some cases the measures 
taken were woefully inadequate, such as sending the contaminated water to 
municipal disposal sites, which were ill-equipped to handle this waste. Others 
allegedly dumped the water. Yet others paid a lot to haul the water to deep 
disposal sites in Ohio. 
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The state is now taking stock of the substantial pluses and minuses. The 
actions will be watched closely by late-to-enter states such as West Virginia 
and Ohio. The ones on the sidelines (such as New York, Maryland, and North 
Carolina) will also watch with interest. Sometimes it pays to be a fast follower.
Making a Virtue of Being Late 
This statement has the makings of an oxymoron. In many settings it certainly 
is. For example there can be no discernable virtue in being late for your own 
nuptials. Being late for one’s own funeral, if that could be pulled off, has 
decided good points.
Being late is not the same as coming in second. Nobody knows that Tom 
Bourdillon and Charles Evans were within 300 feet of the summit of Mount 
Everest three days before the second team of Edmund Hillary and Tenzing 
Norgay got to the top. Bourdillon and Evans likely did not even make it into 
Trivial Pursuit.
In the business of innovation there is a body of literature on the value 
of being first. “First mover advantage” is firmly in the business lexicon. But 
so is the “fast follower” principle. Indubitably, fast followers could be faced 
with patents preventing their success. Intel went out in front early and never 
was materially threatened by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). But many 
businesses have been built on the premise of letting somebody else develop 
the market and make the mistakes.
What does all of this have to do with energy? The history of development 
of shale gas is instructive. After the realization that horizontal wells and 
fracturing enabled gas production from these tight rocks, the early attempts 
employed methods previously used. In particular these involved using sugars 
as thickening agents to more easily fracture the rock. The sugar residue 
impaired production. Newer techniques, in areas such as the Marcellus, use 
“slickwater.” The results have been dramatic, albeit at the expense of higher 
volumes of fresh water.
All of the foregoing is just plain building on the experience of the past. This 
essay on the virtue of being late keys on the point that if fate has dealt you a 
hand that causes you to be late to the party, find ways to make that a positive. 
This is the opportunity presented to the areas of the East Coast that have 
not yet materially been swept up by the shale gale. These include Ohio, West 
Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina. These states must institute measures 
whereby the exploitation of the resource is done in an environmentally 
sound fashion while still maximizing the realization of economic value for the 
communities affected. The Grand Experiment in Pennsylvania will be highly 
instructive.
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Taxing Natural Gas Production
We all recollect the now-famous phrase spoken by then-presidential candidate 
George H. W. Bush: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” The public simply abhors 
new taxes and the politicians who propose them. House Bill 1950, the 
Marcellus Shale legislation, was passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly. 
The major provision was an “impact fee” to be levied by each county. It would 
be proportional to the market price of the gas and have a time limit of 15 years. 
Understandably, the governor is loath to call it a tax.
While this appears to smack of politics-laden semantics, the suggested 
construct makes impact fee the accurate term. The levy is made by the counties 
and the proceeds are shared by the local municipality, the county, and the 
state. This allows for the money to be used explicitly to offset negative impacts 
of the industry, such as road damage. If targeted exclusively to this, not only 
would the term be completely accurate, but also the levy fair with respect to 
the industry. The state share may well be used in part to further job-related 
programs.
The public is more likely to accept gas production if it realizes that some 
of the proceeds are being used to benefit the community. This is especially 
the case for the majority who do not profit from lease royalties and yet suffer 
the traffic and other production-related inconvenience. In some ways this 
impact fee would stand in stark contrast to how the externalities with respect 
to coal and imported oil are largely given short shrift. In North Carolina, the 
Mining and Energy Commission, which I chair, has no direct jurisdiction on 
the taxation point but has been asked to study the matter. The Commission 
recommended to the state legislature that an impact fee be assessed, distinct 
from a severance tax, with the impact fee proportional to the number of 
fracturing stages. This metric more precisely relates to road and bridge damage 
because during those stages there are bursts of  truck activity for the transport 
of water and sand in the main. The Commission urged that the bulk of the 
impact fee go to local municipalities.
Pennsylvania is the only major gas-producing state without a severance tax 
on hydrocarbons. This is basically a tax on either the volume of gas or its value 
and often has limited or total forgiveness for certain situations. As in the case 
of Pennsylvania’s suggested impact fee, these tend to have sliding scales based 
on gas value.
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Environmental Protection Measures
The report of the Pennsylvania governor’s Marcellus Shale Advisory 
Commission is also instructive to any other states wishing to learn from the 
Pennsylvania experience. It covers a lot of ground, some of which is reflected in 
the discussion in chapter 30, “Policy Directions.” The resulting bills passed in 
Pennsylvania fairly faithfully follow the recommendations of the Commission.
An important provision is the requirement to have baseline testing of 
proximal water wells prior to drilling activity. In addition to requiring this, 
the report stipulates that the operating company perform the task. They are 
also required to use an independent testing laboratory that is pre-certified by 
the state. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 
posted a list of state-certified testing labs to facilitate the process. A variant of 
this process could be a requirement for notification of proximal homeowners 
when a drilling permit is granted (this is in the DEP’s recommendation now) 
and county assistance for proximal homeowners to get the baseline well testing 
done at the expense of the operating company. Among the advantages of this 
method would be the direct involvement of the homeowner in both selecting 
the testing entity and keeping track of the results. In North Carolina we have 
drawn up rules pretty much along the same lines. We have added the feature of 
periodic testing following the drilling. Other states, and eventually countries, 
would be advised to do the same.
An interesting recommendation is to double the civil monetary penalties 
for violations of Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act. The DEP is to be given 
authority to act in this matter and will generally be given a bigger stick for 
noncompliance, including suspension or revocation of permits. In general, so 
many of the needed regulations on production-related care and diligence are 
just good business for the operator. Punitive action ought to rarely come into 
play. This should reduce the cost of enforcement. Also reducing the cost would 
be the effective use of the latest technology in monitoring and transmission of 
the data to central locations at the oil and gas company. Remote monitoring 
and control of well operations are coming into vogue and would facilitate 
this regulatory purpose. This would largely negate the need for DEP physical 
presence on the rigs, avoiding a good deal of cost in the process.
Workforce Development
The state of Pennsylvania recognizes the need for thousands of trained workers 
in coming years. This is proving to be something of a challenge in some 
communities. The companies providing drilling and completion services 
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provide their own specialized training. But base levels of qualifications are 
required depending upon the job. For many jobs, the required training can be 
as little as an associate’s degree. Others require a bachelor’s degree, preferably 
in technical disciplines. But almost all jobs face some common features: the 
hours are long (often unpredictable) and the work is hard. Furthermore, 
workers trained by these companies may be required to operate in other states 
and sometimes other countries. While the employers will be motivated to 
keep the personnel close to their original homes, the nature of the oil and gas 
business is one of a commuting life in many instances.
The Cranberry Effect 
Cranberry Township in Pennsylvania has seen immense revenue growth due 
to the shale gas boom. No shale gas wells have been permitted or drilled in 
the entire township. What they did was create an atmosphere that attracted 
shale gas players, which located regional offices there. Support personnel 
such as accountants, lawyers, repair and maintenance outfits, and other 
professionals followed. It was simply a great place to live, work, and be 
entertained.
In some ways earlier history with another industry gave Cranberry an 
advantage. The town had succeeded in attracting a major research and 
development complex of Westinghouse, with nearly 5,000 employees. To do 
this, they developed the type of support services attractive to moderate- to 
high-income families. When shale gas drilling commenced all around them, 
they successfully targeted the operating entities. Today, the regional branches 
of several of the players in the Marcellus are housed in Cranberry.
This ability to get the gain without the pain I dub the “Cranberry Effect.” 
They could in fact take the Effect to the next level by encouraging the 
downstream processing to be done in the township. One target could be the 
synthesis of anhydrous ammonia from methane. As noted in chapter 13, when 
methane is cheap this is a high-margin business. The other would be relatively 
small-footprint ethylene crackers along the lines suggested in chapter 14, 
“The Ethane Dilemma.”
The town’s close proximity to the ethane from wet gas would make the 
location particularly attractive. These jobs are high paying and tend to have 
well-scheduled shifts, unlike the drilling business. The work would also not 
be considered hard in comparison with other industrial jobs (some of the 
reluctant drilling job applicants had given this as a reason for recalcitrance). 
Most importantly, workers would be hired for that location only and not be 
required to spend time in other states. In other words, none of the objections 
to the drilling jobs would be applicable here.
148  Part IV. Informing on Policy
The unusual time patterns can be a severe handicap to family life. It is less so 
for young workers without families, and seniority usually brings with it more 
regular hours. Studies among uranium miners in West Virginia have identified 
behavioral problems caused by the nonstandard working hours. In some cases 
the incidence of alcoholism went up.
In Butler County, unemployment numbers in 2010 were at decadal highs. 
One would have expected a high level of interest in these jobs. This has proven 
to largely not be the case due to the expected working conditions and has 
caused the authorities to take two approaches. One is to focus on attracting 
midstream and downstream companies to the area. Midstream includes 
aspects such as pipelines and associated pumping equipment. Downstream is 
defined largely by activities such as gas processing and conversion to higher 
value products. Shell has already announced an ethylene cracker for the region, 
although they have postponed it as of early 2015. The second approach to jobs 
is to attract regional headquarters of the operating companies. The township of 
Cranberry has had success with this angle.
Other Societal Issues
True adherence to the principles of sustainability would require that the 
community not only not be harmed but that it actually accrue some of the 
benefits from industrial enterprise. A case in point is the entire state of Alaska. 
Every resident receives a dividend check from the state representing a portion 
of the government revenue from the oil business. Families in Texas in effect 
receive a dividend: there are no state income taxes.
These examples will not necessarily find equivalence in other states because 
much of the revenue likely is from leasing of state land. Also, these payments 
are cash transfers, which are welcome by residents, of course. But it is arguably 
time to better integrate the benefits of science, technology, and industry within 
the nearby communities that have natural gas deposits. An example could 
be creating research stations relevant to the specific technologies used for 
extraction and transportation. Is there a way to create more positive spillovers 
for locals so the benefits are felt over time? These are complicated prospects, 
but fresh thinking on ways to do this may make natural gas extraction and 
fracturing much more palatable to communities.
Pennsylvania took a bold step. All the evidence points to them waltzing 
into prosperity provided the new rules are complied with. This is facilitated 
to some degree by larger oil companies buying out the smaller outfits. Larger 
companies have more to lose by missteps. Others will learn from this, but Ben 
Franklin’s state is likely to capture the first-mover advantage.
CHAPTER 21
Will Cheap Natural Gas Hurt 
Renewables?
“The answer, my friend, is blowin’ in the wind”
—From “Blowin’ in the Wind” by Bob Dylan
Yes, cheap natural gas will hurt the rate of growth of renewable energy. There 
is no way to sugarcoat this unfortunate outcome. But much can be done to 
ameliorate the effect, and most of that lies in the policy arena.
Ironically, the celebrated successes of NGOs, primarily the Sierra Club, 
in shutting down coal plants and halting the building of new ones may hurt 
the cause of renewable energy. In the time frame required, in many instances 
wind and solar options will not meet base load grid parity. This is generally 
defined as parity with the cost of base load electricity production in that area. 
So, absent strict policy measures, which will be very hard to come by, natural 
gas will be the fuel of choice. Natural gas plants will not simply be mothballed 
when wind power reaches economic parity. The early demise of coal plants will 
lead to natural gas-fueled electric power plants with greater installed capacity.
In recognition of this, the Sierra Club had initially taken a position of 
natural gas as a bridge fuel until renewable sources became more economically 
viable. Hand in hand was the insistence on environmentally responsible 
production. In early 2012, Sierra Club executive director Michael Brune 
seemingly reversed that position, citing the environmental risks posed by 
shale gas production. He said, “As we phase out coal, we need to leapfrog over 
gas whenever possible in favor of truly clean energy” (Brune, 2012). While 
the “whenever possible” phrasing leaves some wiggle room, this is a definite 
movement away from the Club’s original position.
In the view of this author, a life member of the Sierra Club, the solution 
is the responsible production of shale gas as bridge fuel. Clean coal is not an 
oxymoron, but it is expensive. At the same time, the move to renewable energy 
must be accelerated. In another odd twist, natural gas may be needed at first as 
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a load leveler, even for wind and solar production, due to their diurnal cycles. 
Someday we hope to develop effective storage mechanisms. But someday 
can be a while, and we must be realistic regarding the need for bridging 
mechanisms. The 2012 Department of Energy budget included funding for an 
Energy Innovation Hub researching energy storage which was awarded to a 
group led by Argonne National Laboratory. This is good policy.
The price of natural gas in North America is roughly one-fourth that 
of $100-a-barrel oil on the basis of energy content. For this computation, I 
consider a more normal $4 per MM Btu, not the $2.50 in March 2012. In early 
2015, the price of oil dropped to the range $50 to $65 per barrel, but gas also 
dropped, to $2.50 per MM Btu. Ultimately it is the low gas price that will hurt 
renewables, most of them being in the electricity sector. In Europe the price 
is higher but still a factor of 2 to 3 cheaper than oil. The discussion of whether 
renewables will be hurt falls in two distinct realms: electricity generation and 
transport fuel production. Accordingly, I consider these separately because the 
impacts will be distinctively different.
But first, let us examine the very premise of cheap natural gas. Until the 
shale gale swept us up, natural gas prices fluctuated considerably. For the last 
13 years, the Henry Hub price was as low as $2 per MM Btu and as high as $13 
(Figure 17). The Henry Hub price is the price of gas in Erath, Louisiana, and 
is used as the price for trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. It is a 
rough proxy for US natural gas price.
Figure 17. The Henry Hub price per million Btus, 1999 to 2012
Source: US Energy Information Administration, May 9, 2012
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The inherent uncertainty in gas price caused coal and nuclear to remain 
as viable options for electricity generation. Entire chemical industries moved 
abroad to regions of predictably cheap gas.
Gas from shale at first was costly. After the kinks got worked out and 
further advances were made, it could be produced profitably at costs lower 
than many conventional gas operations. Meanwhile, the sheer volume kept the 
price down. At the prices today the most profitable operations are those with 
higher proportions of natural gas liquids in association, because the value of 
this component is pegged to the price of oil and benefits from the high price of 
oil. The dry portion of the gas therefore continues to be produced, even at low 
prices.
Inevitably, consistently low prices will create demand and eventually prices 
will rise. In the face of this I offer the view that shale gas production will keep 
gas prices moderate. This is largely due to shale gas wells being on land and 
shallow by industry standards. These wells can be in production in 30 to 60 
days after commencement. This short duration effectively keeps a lid on the 
price. If the three-month strip (the commodity price three months into the 
future) is seen as going up, new wells can be in production well within three 
months. This sort of certitude will also discourage speculative investment in 
the commodity.
Effect on Electricity Production
The floor price will get set by the conversion from coal to gas for electricity. 
Forty percent of coal plants not expected to meet the latest EPA standards on 
mercury and NOx are over 50 years old; these fully depreciated plants will not 
be refurbished. The only options are new coal, nuclear, and natural gas plants. 
New coal is disadvantaged on price alone until natural gas reaches a price 
of $8 per MM Btu. Recently in early 2015 that price has been under $2.50. 
So, with the ceiling mentioned in chapter 3, coal is not the economic choice. 
Nuclear has suffered a blow due to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. So, natural 
gas will be the fuel of choice. Eventually, the shift to gas could cause the price 
to rise, but the lid will still be around $8. A wild card on price is the possibility 
of strong liquefied natural gas (LNG) export demand. This is not far-fetched, 
especially to Japan, where natural gas prices are about triple those in North 
America. The total added cost of liquefying, transporting, and re-gassing 
natural gas would be up to about $5 per MM Btu. This puts the landed cost 
at well below the market price in Japan. However, such export would require 
federal permits. Russian belligerence in the Ukraine in early 2014 caused calls 
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for LNG exports to Europe. Over the course of 2012 and 2013, three permits 
were issued, adding up to 4.5 bcf gas per day. More are expected, possibly up to 
10 bcf per day. By early 2015 that number is up to 10.5 bcf per day.
Cheap natural gas will also cause a shift from oil to gas whenever possible. 
This additional demand will keep the price up in the medium term. So, let 
us assume a price of $8 as the ceiling price. At this price, electricity will be 
delivered at a little under 7 cents/kWh. This is the price that alternatives will 
have to meet on a direct economic basis.
This natural gas–derived electricity price is lower than the fully loaded price 
of energy from new nuclear plants, which will be over 10 cents. Currently wind 
delivers at 9 to 16 cents, depending on where it is. Offshore wind may be higher 
yet at this time. Wind also often suffers from the need to add transmission 
infrastructure. This is especially the case for offshore facilities. There is also 
the celebrated case of T. Boone Pickens’ terminating a major land-based 
investment due to the absence of definite plans to add transmission lines.
Strictly from a techno-economic standpoint, wind still has an upside. 
Engineered solutions are likely to drop the price from current levels. But it 
continues to suffer from diurnality, and so it needs to be companion to another 
source or to storage mechanisms.
Effect on Transport Fuel
Transport fuel today is dominantly produced from oil. Oil prices can be 
expected to remain high, in part due to the burgeoning demand from India 
and China. This demand is a direct result of the sustained increase in per capita 
GDP in India and China; a strong correlation exists between this metric and 
per capita vehicle ownership. On the face of it, this prediction strongly favors 
gasoline and diesel substitutes derived from renewable sources.
While only a few today, such as Brazilian ethanol, have achieved parity on 
a cost basis, there is room for improvement. This is particularly the case for 
drop-in fuels from sugarcane or sugar beets. Butanol is an example of a liquid 
that is a complete gasoline substitute in any proportion, unlike ethanol, which 
is more corrosive and water absorbent, and suffers a calorific penalty—that 
is, it has a third fewer calories than gasoline and commensurately worse fuel 
economy.
However, one does need about 8 percent ethanol in gasoline simply to act 
as an oxygenate, which makes the combustion of gasoline more complete. 
The chemical MTBE was previously used for this purpose, but has since been 
outlawed for environmental reasons involving pollution of groundwater.
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Currently the most promising avenue for drop-in fuels is production of 
alkanes from sugar. The candidate raw materials are sugarcane, sugar beet, 
and sweet sorghum. Alkanes are straight-chain compounds with the formula 
CnH2n+2. Conventional oil-derived fuels have this formula as well. The number 
n is about 7 to 9 for gasoline and about 12 to 18 for diesel and a bit lower for 
jet fuel. So, alkanes with the right number are for all practical purposes direct 
drop-ins for these conventional fuels.
Herein lies the attraction. Also, being tailored, often through genetic 
engineering, the composition will be predictably uniform. This is not the 
case for the input to refineries from a variety of crude oil sources. In fact oil 
refineries today are forced to be very picky about the mix of crude they will 
accept. Seed-based oils also suffer from this variability.
No small wonder, therefore, that many of the leading players in the drop-
in biofuels space are supported by major oil companies such as ExxonMobil, 
Shell, and Total—all heavy hitters.
Cheap natural gas can affect transport fuel from renewables in two ways. 
One is the direct use of methane as fuel for combustion in the engine (see 
chapter 17); the bottom line is that methane is unlikely to be a material factor 
for passenger vehicles until there are material advances in storage of CNG. The 
other is the production of transport fuel from conversion of natural gas, known 
as gas-to-liquids (GTL; see chapter 16); the point of discussion here is that 
cheap natural gas may be converted to transport fuel for a relatively low cost. If 
that cost is low enough it could disadvantage the schemes described above.
However, the proven technology in this arena, Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, 
is still expensive. Further research in catalysis will reduce its cost. Right now 
no compelling evidence suggests that alkanes from sugar will be particularly 
disadvantaged with respect to GTL, even from cheap methane. Finally, 
methanol from methane is a wild card, as discussed in chapter 19. Another 
wild card is methanol from biomass. Biomass-derived methane is likely to 
achieve renewable fuel status, and that will help.
In the end, the true yardstick will be comparison with the price of imported 
oil, not with other oil alternatives. Gas-based oil substitutes could coexist with 
renewable liquid fuels.
Policy Matters
Without a price on carbon, the carbon-free alternatives wind, nuclear, and 
solar are seriously disadvantaged. Taxes are anathema to Congress. Cap and 
trade has not worked particularly well in Europe, in part due to the uncertainty, 
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which effectively increased the discount rate on investment. Also, any cap 
and trade conceived by Congress will undoubtedly have numerous exclusions 
and grandfathering. The province of Alberta in Canada has an interesting 
model. They tax high-carbon-footprint heavy oil production over a certain 
volume. The rate is $15 per tonne (“Go Figure,” 2007). The money is placed in 
a special fund expressly for the purpose of addressing environmental issues 
associated with oil and gas. Such directed use of tax proceeds is more palatable. 
Conceivably, the fund could subsidize renewables for a period of time.
Finally, one could resort to the current method of imposing a renewable 
portfolio standard, which essentially mandates that a proportion of delivered 
power be from renewable sources. This in effect is a tax on the consuming 
public because the renewable energy costs more. The solar subsidy in Germany 
is passed on directly to the consumer as well. But that is largely possible due 
to the considerable influence of the Green Party. Short of taxing conventional 
oil and gas, consideration could be given to decreasing the incentives and 
redirecting those funds. But policy, if not based on an understanding of market 
forces, can have unintended consequences. An example of that is the “Flex-Fuel 
Fairy Tale” (chapter 25).
Conclusion
Cheap natural gas will place every other source of electricity production, 
including renewable energy, at a disadvantage for the short to medium term. 
Reliance on market forces alone will slow the introduction of renewable 
energy. Policy mechanisms are needed to level the playing field, at least from 
the standpoint of carbon neutrality. The most equitable methods may be 
a US analog to the method used in Alberta. By all accounts that policy is 
embraced by the public and industry alike. If the cheap-gas-enabled methanol 
displacement of gasoline and diesel becomes a major factor, even biofuels 
could be negatively impacted. On the plus side, methanol could be synthesized 
from biomass.
CHAPTER 22
Kicking Shale Into the Eyes of the 
Russian Bear
“You don’t tug on Superman’s cape”
—From “You Don’t Mess Around with Jim” by Jim Croce
On January 7, 2009, Russia shut off the natural gas (“Europeans Shiver,” 
2009) flowing through the main European pipeline in the Ukraine. This was 
a particularly cold winter and 20 European countries encountered serious 
natural gas shortfalls. Discussed below are the reasons given by all of the 
players. But the principal point was, and continues to be, that Russia can use 
natural gas supplies as a weapon to achieve political objectives. In late 2008 
Russia threatened to form a gas-based OPEC (dubbed OGEC) with Iran and 
Qatar with the express intent of manipulating world gas prices. Has shale gas 
dampened their ardor? Recent events in 2014 present mixed evidence on this 
point. The Ukrainian overthrow of its Russia-aligned leader caused Russia to 
take limited military action in Crimea. But as could have been predicted, they 
are using natural gas supply as a weapon by raising prices (reducing discounts) 
in the Ukraine. European response to the Russian aggression is muted 
compared to that of the US. In large measure this is because of the gas supply 
sabre that the Russians are brandishing openly.
Unilateral fuel cutoff as an instrument of political will would be essentially 
not possible with oil. Oil is more fungible, and alternative supplies can be 
brought to bear if a major supplier falters, deliberately or otherwise. It may cost 
more but you could get it. This is why Russia is unlikely to resort to any threats 
with respect to their coal and oil supply to Europe.
Natural gas is a regional commodity. Bulk transport across land can only 
be done through pipelines, and these are expensive and have long lead times. 
Transport across the ocean is feasible only if the gas is liquefied. (For shorter 
distances there are exceptions, where gas pipelines cross bodies of water, such 
as the North Sea.) The product is known as liquefied natural gas (LNG). This 
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process entails cooling the gas to -161°C into a liquid that is 600 times as dense 
as free gas. This is then transported at close to atmospheric pressure. The low 
temperatures are maintained by auto-refrigeration through allowing small 
amounts to boil off, which causes chilling of the remaining liquid. An everyday 
analog is cooling of our skin by a fan or a breeze causing evaporation of our 
perspiration.
While LNG is a viable alternative to a domestic gas supply, it can only be 
delivered to a port location, and in fact only one with a re-gas terminal. The 
high capital cost of such terminals is unlikely to justify a capability merely 
to be available for upset conditions. So, as a practical matter, withholding of 
a domestic source is a powerful weapon, LNG alternatives notwithstanding. 
Also, LNG is more costly. Typically the added cost over the price of the gaseous 
version is about $3 to $4 per MM Btu. (Transport distance is the determinant 
of where you are in that price range.) As a frame of reference, that is roughly 
the price of natural gas in the US today. So LNG would essentially double that. 
This is why cheap shale gas in North America has rendered imported LNG 
passé.
The sheer distance between producer and user is the reason natural gas 
prices are so variable across the world. The price in Europe is about double 
that in the US, and in Japan the price is about triple and even more, as seen in 
Figure 18. Although I am not presenting a new figure, the numbers in early 
2014 are very similar to those shown for 2012. The latest figures are likely 
impacted by the Fukushima Daiichi disaster–driven shift to natural gas for 
power. With the Japanese government’s steadfastly negative position with 
respect to future nuclear plants, the price could remain high. In general, the 
prices are high in part because costly LNG is the marginal cubic foot, and so 
sets the price. “Marginal cubic foot” is industry terminology to mean the last 
tranche of gas added to serve demand. Since it is essential, the high price gets 
paid. This inevitably increases the price from all sources because the domestic 
producers can charge that figure. The exception is countries such as India and 
Argentina, where government-controlled prices artificially allow high LNG 
prices while prices for domestic production are kept low. The LNG business is 
built on long-term contracts because the capital cost is in the neighborhood of 
$4 billion. Nevertheless, there is considerable arbitrage; tankers will sometimes 
reroute in open waters to new destinations offering higher prices.
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Figure 18. Trends in natural gas spot prices at major global markets
Source: Energy Information Administration, September 30, 2011.
Russian Use of Gas as a Weapon
Unlike in the Soviet era, Russia can no longer impose its political will through 
threatened military action. However, Russian gas is a significant natural 
gas source for most European countries. It is the dominant source for nine 
countries, including Greece, Finland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The 
recent imbroglio in the Ukraine has caused a number of these countries to 
seek alternatives. While this will take time, the movement is certainly under 
way. This monopoly allows unilateral action against any one of the countries. 
Action against too many would result in loss of needed revenue. (The Arab 
oil embargo in 1973 had a profound and lasting effect on the price of oil, 
aside from the short-term privation. But the original political objective was 
not realized, that of causing a significant shift in support away from Israel. 
Interestingly, though, the lasting price escalation that was a direct result of 
the embargo swelled producing country coffers. This allowed financing of 
politically motivated actions in other countries, including the funding of 
Islamic schools known as madrasas in Indonesia and other countries. These are 
believed by some to be linked to militancy.)
In an odd twist, the embargo-driven sustained higher oil prices opened 
up exploration in promising but costly areas such as ultra-deep water and the 
Arctic, thus reducing dependency on OPEC. Since then Norway and Brazil 
have become important players, on the backs of deepwater development.
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The Russian action in 2009 was allegedly driven by a dispute with the 
Ukraine with respect to poaching on the gas line. While there may have been 
truth to this, most believe the action was intended to injure the Ukrainian 
Orange Revolution, which was seen by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
as not commensurate with Russian interests. The temporal connection with 
the gas cutoff action strongly implies causality. In many ways this act was 
more effective than would have been a military one. It also undoubtedly sent a 
message to other European states. This message was clearly heard. Germany in 
particular has not agreed with the US on the severity of economic sanctions in 
response to the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. Even Western Europe 
was affected in 2009, with southern Germany losing about 60 percent of its 
imported gas.
Shale Gas Could Change That
As discussed in a chapter 1, the mechanism by which shale gas accumulates 
makes it likely to be ubiquitous. So the likelihood of substantial deposits in 
Europe is high. Initial estimates by the EIA show large deposits in Poland and 
France, with smaller amounts elsewhere, including the UK and the Ukraine. 
Poland is actively exploring and the UK is following suit. France currently has a 
moratorium on fracturing, but is also not as much in strategic need due to low 
dependency on coal-based power. US efforts to produce gas with a minimal 
environmental impact will be important for widespread exploitation in Europe. 
Poland is certainly resolute on the matter. But their experience to date has 
not been very promising. Other countries such as Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia 
appear to have promise, and there is talk of a pipeline to supply the Ukraine. In 
late 2013 the UK government encouraged development, to the consternation 
of many. Furthermore, as in the US, as exploration proceeds, the resource 
estimates are bound to increase. All new hydrocarbon resource plays follow 
that pattern.
Gazprom, the mammoth Russian company operating gas assets, has publicly 
expressed concern regarding the effect of shale gas on future pricing. The fact 
that Russia too will have large deposits is irrelevant. Further increase in their 
resource base is interesting, but not a factor in the concern regarding domestic 
sources in client countries. To date Russian exploration of shale gas assets has 
been sporadic. They have used US service companies, which complicates US 
economic sanctions. Their shale oil assets are huge, estimated by the EIA to be 
the most of any country.
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An interesting development is that US shale gas is increasingly being 
exported as LNG. Until European deposits are developed, US-sourced LNG 
could be a factor in offsetting Russian supply. If US prices remain low, as is 
expected, the cost of delivered LNG in Europe could profitably be at under $9 
per MM Btu for some years; it is closer to $8 today in mid-2014. Furthermore, 
major LNG developments in Qatar and elsewhere which had been destined to 
supply the US will now find Europe a ready buyer. From a Russian standpoint 
this will not be a pricing concern, but certainly the gas as weapon argument is 
affected: a steady stream of LNG to Europe from new LNG plants would cut 
into the Russian gas market and certainly offer alternatives in case of threats 
to cut off supply. However, LNG takes years to be brought on stream. New 
capacity is not a credible response to such threats. Strictly from an economic 
perspective, the best sources for North American LNG are Alaska and British 
Columbia, and the most logical target customer is Japan because of location 
and price. That notwithstanding, the principal permits given to date in mid-
2014 are for three Gulf Coast LNG importers turned exporters, adding up to 
about 5.5 bcf per day of consumption. My guess is that permits of up to 15 
bcf per day will eventually be given. By coincidence that is exactly how much 
Europe imports from Russia. 
OGEC Is Dead
Sixty percent of the conventional gas reserves reside in Russia, Iran, and 
Qatar. Operating costs are very low, especially in Iran and Qatar. In late 2008 
the three announced intent to form a gas-based OPEC, which was dubbed 
OGEC. (Note: The P in OPEC is for Petroleum, and by definition, albeit not by 
common usage, gas is included in the term petroleum, so the acronym OPEC 
could have applied to gas as well in theory, but for the existing different cast 
of characters that would not have made sense.) Alexey Miller, chairman of 
Russia’s Gazprom, said they were forming a “big gas troika.” He also predicted 
an end to the era of cheap hydrocarbons, thus signaling the intent of the gas 
cartel to raise prices and keep them high. OPEC accomplishes this despite 
supplying only about a third of the world’s oil.
The troika would likely have been pretty effective, in part because Russian 
markets are Europe and China over land, and Iran and Qatar are much 
more LNG-dependent. So, unlike current OPEC members who compete in 
the same markets, at least the senior partner, Russia, would be essentially 
noncompetitive with the other two, except for LNG relief valves for Russian 
force majeure, contrived or otherwise.
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Shale gas over time will kill attempts at OGEC. China is expected to have 
even more shale gas resource than the US and will exploit it quickly. China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has already taken ownership 
positions in two US shale gas development projects and in the first large one in 
the UK. (There is little doubt that part of the intent is to transfer technology to 
China deposits.) Shell is partnering with Chinese entities to develop resources 
in the southern provinces. Argentina, the second biggest resource holder 
according to the EIA, will be a significant supplier over time, as I discuss in 
chapter 28.
European shale gas will certainly be a factor. There is reason to believe most 
of the countries currently importing LNG, including India, have shale gas 
opportunities. Finally, there is the reality of the US as an LNG export player; 
how much of a player is all that remains to be found out. All of this adds up 
to a world with a lot of gas in consuming countries and more options. When 
consumers have options, cartels are ineffective. Gas has always been harder 
to manipulate than oil. Transportation needs can only be met by oil-derived 
products. Gas on the other hand can be replaced by coal, wind, and solar for 
power. OGEC can be pronounced dead on arrival, and we have shale gas to 
thank for that.
CHAPTER 23
Shale Gas and US National Security
“Oh peace train take this country”
—From “Peace Train” by Cat Stevens
The biggest winner from a prohibition of fracturing and hence shale gas 
production would be Russia, closely followed by Iran. The ability of Russia 
to impose its political will upon the world, and Europe in particular, will be 
significantly enhanced. Absent shale gas, Russian gas will increasingly enjoy a 
monopoly in many European countries. Gas supply throttling could be used 
as a weapon of political will, as it was in 2009 and as is very much in evidence 
in 2014 with the Ukrainian crisis. Although the target was the Ukraine in 
2009, the Slovak Republic suffered enormous collateral damage, estimated 
by some to be 100 million Euros per day for the 10-day period. This caused 
gas-deprivation-related recession. While much of this effect is attributed to 
unpreparedness, gas supply as a weapon is clearly real. This time around, 
in 2014, the issue is complicated with the additional military action, so the 
financial effect on the Ukraine of just the gas suppression is not clear as yet.
In a scenario where gas was used as a weapon, Russia would also have an 
increased ability to side with countries with interests opposed to those of the 
US. Already in 2014 the European position on economic sanctions against 
Russia is clearly colored by the need to maintain natural gas and other trade 
with Russia. In particular this could apply to not joining in sanctions or other 
measures against Iran. Consequently, Iran would be an indirect beneficiary of 
this power.
Iran would benefit more directly from a world without shale gas. Prices 
for gas will rise, and almost as importantly, will be unstable. Internal 
squabbles have delayed bilateral deals with countries such as India and 
Pakistan. Sustained shale gas production in the US has closed this country 
as a destination for LNG, thus closing a window for Iranian LNG exports in 
general. The LNG from Qatar and elsewhere originally destined for the US will 
find other markets that Iran may have targeted. In fact today, with shale gas 
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accounting for about 40 percent of US domestic production, LNG contracted 
to be delivered to the US is being delivered elsewhere, including India.
India is perennially short of hydrocarbons. Absent shale gas, and possibly 
even with it, India will rely heavily upon gas from countries such as Myanmar, 
Iran, and Qatar. The first two have the potential to be pipeline services, 
although each is beset with the issue of traversing nations not friendly to 
India. That leaves LNG from Iran and Qatar. Any pipeline would be very 
expensive, especially if it follows an ocean route, as would be the case for an 
Iranian pipeline avoiding the Pakistani land mass. This would mean long-term 
contracts. Shale gas–induced lower pricing would dramatically reduce the 
pricing on these contracts, with attendant beneficial impacts on the Indian 
economy. Today India is importing gas at about three times the US price.
Any Indian dependency on Iran will strain US relations, although the 
expected relaxation by the US of the economic embargo related to nuclear 
weapons in 2014, if it holds up, will likely remove that tension. Any hiccup 
in the relaxation of the embargo, together with a long-term Iranian supply 
of gas to India, could result in reduced US influence in the subcontinent. 
The US-Pakistan relationship is already in some strife over drone strikes and 
related matters, and the US can ill afford this additional complication in the 
subcontinent.
Reemergence of OGEC
The Organization of Gas Exporting Countries (OGEC), comprising Russia, 
Iran, and Qatar, will certainly have the ability to be resurrected if shale gas 
production is curtailed. Around 2009, Russia was very open about using the 
cartel as a means to higher gas prices. Higher export prices for gas would 
put even more revenue into their pockets and those of Iran. The world has 
already seen the mischief wrought by Middle Eastern oil money following 
the 1973 Arab oil embargo–driven sustained higher oil prices. It would 
however be specious to suggest that OGEC-driven gas price rises would have 
similar effects, because gas simply is not as fungible as oil. But gas is a much 
more basic commodity in that it affects many walks of life, whereas oil is 
predominantly used for transport.
If LNG becomes a significant fraction of gas consumption, keeping shipping 
lanes open will now assume importance for this commodity as well. Military 
costs will for the first time constitute an externality for gas. Much as is now the 
case with oil, conflict in the Middle East could start having an impact on US 
natural gas prices.
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Energy Security
The International Energy Agency defines energy security as “uninterruptable 
physical availability of energy at a price which is affordable, while respecting 
environment concerns” (International Energy Agency, 2012). From the 
standpoint of national security, energy security is an important part. While 
a physical threat to the populace in the form of attack is a part of national 
security, a large aspect is protection of the economic way of life. 
Examining first the issue of affordability, domestic sources do not equate 
to low cost, at least in the case of oil, because it is a world commodity. 
Some countries create low prices through subsidies, but these often have 
consequences. In India, where kerosene is a way of life for cooking and 
other purposes, affordability is created with a subsidy. However, this is at the 
distributor level and so is subject to diversion of subsidized fuel to profit- 
making enterprises. Even were this not the case, this setup creates a burden on 
the taxpayer. Subsidies or inducements to use less ought to be at the consumer 
level. On the latter point, some commercial offerings are subject to a tiered 
pricing system, but this is not the norm for household power. With electricity 
it ought to be simple to provide the first tranche of power at low prices, thus 
ensuring essential heating and cooling for the less fortunate.
Affordability applies to industry in a big way. As discussed earlier, entire 
industries left the US when gas prices were high and variable. Oil does not 
elicit that reaction as much because there tends to be a world price because the 
commodity is fungible. Certain states have been able to attract industry almost 
solely by the low power costs in the region. A subplot in that case is that in 
some instances the average cost is low due to a preponderance of older, fully 
depreciated, coal plants. With the passage of time these will need replacement 
and costs will rise. The move to renewable energy will also raise costs. These 
effects can be dampened if shale gas–enabled prices stay low for natural gas.
The usual broad argument for drawing a bright line between energy 
availability and national security is that of support of oil-rich countries with 
dubious leadership. Protecting our way of life involves ensuring supply, which 
implicitly supports activity potentially adverse to the national interest. One 
of the positives associated with shale gas is that it affords us our way of life 
without swelling the coffers of the likes of Russia and Iran with gas revenue to 
create mischief.
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The Baker Institute Study
A study by the Baker Institute (Medlock et al., 2011) in Houston describes 
a detailed analysis of the effects of shale gas on national security. They 
constructed three scenarios, of which I will analyze just two for simplicity: the 
base case of full exploitation of shale gas and the extreme case of no further 
exploitation beyond that in Texas and Louisiana. In each case they calculated 
the decadal averages for gas price for the next three decades. In the base case 
they showed the average price of gas at $5.84 and $6.46, respectively, for the 
2020s and 2030s. These numbers are in general accord with my projections in 
chapter 3. But my key point is that not only will averages remain moderate, but 
the excursions will not be large. Stability is almost as important as low prices 
because this certainty drives investment. The reason the chemical industry is 
returning to the US is as much the certainty as the current low gas prices.
The Baker Institute study is probably a bit optimistic regarding gas prices 
in the scenario without widespread shale gas exploitation. The averages may 
be right, but the excursions, which they do not appear to model, will almost 
certainly be large due to reliance on imported gas and perturbations due to 
upset conditions in the exporting countries.
The Military and Energy Security Nexus
The military is the largest consumer of energy in the US public sector, 
consuming 5 billion gallons of fuel in 2010. Access is not really the issue 
even in times of tight supply. But it is incumbent on the military to reduce its 
reliance on fuel while at the same time not sacrificing operational effectiveness. 
This applies to all forms of energy, not just fuel for transport, although that is 
the one with the greatest imperative. 
Shale oil production, combined with natural gas displacing oil and fuel-
efficiency programs, is reducing the import of oil. Not far-fetched is the 
possibility that by 2025 the US will source all its oil from North America. As 
this day approaches the reliance on Middle East oil essentially disappears. 
Some believe (Michaud et al., 2014) that this will allow the US to reduce the 
policing of shipping lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz. Ending the naval 
support is unlikely, but sharing with other beneficiaries is seen as possible. 
Michaud et al further suggest that this might allow the US to shift emphasis to 
the Pacific, even to the extent of a maritime security arrangement with China.
During the Iraq War, there was great deal of public angst regarding the price 
of fuel for the war effort, and many in the supply chain got blamed. The fact is 
that a captain in a forward emplacement is not worrying about the price when 
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he or she needs fuel urgently. The monetary cost aside, the human cost of such 
delivery is substantial. In the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2007, an estimated 
3,000 military and civilian support personnel were killed or wounded while 
transporting fuel or water. Reduction in fuel usage, substitution with more 
benign alternatives, local sourcing of energy and water—these all ought to be 
priority strategies for the military today.
Semi-permanent bases domestically and abroad could even invest in 
distributed fuel production. If natural gas were readily available, small- 
footprint production of a drop-in fuel would not be out of the question. Given 
this possibility, the military ought to fund such developments rather than 
massive coal- and gas-to-liquids projects. In any case, small-scale distributed 
power in the form of mini-nuclear (what would be more secure than a military 
base?), wind, and solar combined with a micro-grid could power entire bases 
off the grid. This would not only give a green feel, but also would render 
the base relatively impervious to weather- or sabotage-related grid outages. 
Certainly in forward locations, the solar option would apply.
Base vehicles are uniquely suited to fuel switchover. This is because 
infrastructure support for refueling is straightforward. Furthermore, in the 
example of CNG and LNG substitution of diesel and gasoline, where feasible 
the engines ought to be modified to take advantage of the high octane rating of 
methane, thereby delivering more power and distance for less fuel. The same 
goes for electric vehicles. Again, distributed electricity is easier and an electric 
vehicle delivers 60 percent more miles per unit of energy consumed. Not only 
will imported oil be substituted for, but less energy will be used. Only certain 
vehicles may be suited to electrification, but any gains would also have the 
virtue of symbolism. 
Fresh water transport to front lines does not get much press but is a 
tractable objective for reduction. The shale gas industry will be learning to 
deal with low-cost water sourcing and treatment. These advances could be 
used to advantage by the military. Saltwater aquifers are fairly ubiquitous, 
and the shallower they are, the less salty. The Defense Department ought to 
consider sponsoring developments of small-footprint desalination plants, 
especially targeting the types of salt water anticipated in theatres of action. 
Every president in the last decade or so, no matter from which side of the aisle, 
has drawn that bright line connecting energy security and national security. 
President Bush, a champion of oil and a one-time owner of oil interests, 
famously complained about our “addiction to oil.” President Obama has said, 
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“America’s dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats that our nation 
has faced.” That sounds like a national security statement. So, equating national 
security to energy security and thence to reduction of imported oil will not be 
disputed by many.
CHAPTER 24
Sustainable Development: A Double 
Bottom Line, Plus Afterthought
“For the times they are a-changin’ ”
—From “The Times They Are a-Changin’ ” by Bob Dylan
The definition of sustainable enterprises is the so-called triple bottom line, 
wherein economic, ecologic, and community benefit are all considered and 
balanced. Is that last leg of the stool given mere lip service, or is the energy 
production industry recognizing this element fully? And ought it to be?
The economic consideration is a given. Without that there is no profit, 
and absent profit, no enterprise. The ecologic or environmental piece is much 
in evidence today, and few new energy enterprises would dare ignore this 
element. The societal element is harder to define. One is tempted to think 
that this is strictly composed of negative impacts upon society, because that is 
where the rhetoric is directed. In some ways it suits detractors of the goal of 
sustainable enterprises to cast it in this light rather than a more generic one. So, 
for example, visual pollution is denigrated as a personal preference rather than 
as pollution in the classic sense.
The Reality of Visual Pollution
Perception is reality, the saying goes, and marketing folks well know that this is 
a powerful adage. One cannot bully people into feeling a certain way. Certainly 
not in commerce. But on an issue of alternative energy, some nudging, in the 
sense of Thaler and Sunstein, is in order. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein 
wrote a powerful essay, “Libertarian Paternalism,” in the top economics journal 
American Economic Review (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). Non-economists, such 
as I, must not be daunted by the staid prominence of the journal; this is an 
easy read. A further easier read, one that costs some money or trouble (going 
to the library) is their book Nudge. Basically they posit the notion that given 
free choice, people generally do not make the best decisions for themselves, 
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even in an economic sense. People need to be given a nudge. My point is that 
just because folks feel a certain way about visual pollution does not mean they 
cannot be nudged to a different position.
One way to do that is to clarify the options. Until recently the Sierra Club 
was against coal, nuclear, and hydrocarbons in general. (Incidentally, coal is 
a hydrocarbon, but one challenged in hydrogen content, and many think of it 
as a different species, but it is not.) Last time I looked, that position was taken 
as tantamount to suggesting we switch off the lights. Wind and solar are great 
options. But they are still fledgling and incapable of base load service. In the 
interest of fairness, the Sierra Club until recently supported natural gas as a 
transitional fuel, to the consternation of much of the membership. Even more 
lately that position has softened to one of “leapfrog over gas whenever possible 
in favor of truly clean energy” (Brune, 2012). This is a laudable sentiment that 
will be tough to execute in time for all the forthcoming coal plant closures 
brought about in part by Sierra Club activism.
Duke professors, made famous by their paper (Osborn et al., 2011) 
connecting well water methane concentrations to shale gas production, 
suggested in an op-ed piece in The Philadelphia Enquirer (Jackson & Vengosh, 
2011) that we eschew shale gas in favor of wind and solar. No matter that each 
of these has opposition as well. There are entire communities that will not 
permit a visible display of solar panels on homes. Wind power has long been 
opposed on visual lines. North Carolina, the home state of the aforementioned 
professors, has a law preventing wind farms on mountain sites, known as 
the Ridge Law. Many communities have strong opposition to offshore wind 
production in sight of land.
When one flies into Amsterdam Airport, one sees an abundance of wind 
farms in the water. Personally, I think they look like a flock of birds—but I am 
a techie, what do I know? Perhaps their acceptance is premised on the Dutch 
having had windmills as a way of life on farms. More likely is the explanation 
that it is a choice between that and Russian gas. In Holland that may not be the 
direct option, but in Greece, which is predominantly dependent on Russian 
gas, it would be. Southern Germany still has frigid memories of when the 
Russians capriciously shut down the pipeline through the Ukraine in the early 
days of January 2009 as a political move. The 2014 upheaval in the Ukraine and 
Russian response in June to cut off gas supplies ought to provide an impetus 
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toward alternatives. Sadly the initial reaction has been solely to seek gas from 
other sources. In general, opposition to something should come hand in hand 
with a consideration of an alternative.
Societal Benefit
Fair and equitable economic benefit to the local and regional communities 
ought to be a goal of sustainable energy development. In Australia’s Northern 
Territory, uranium mining has provided a dividend to the native Aborigine 
community, conjuring up the image of traditionally garbed locals riding on the 
beds of Toyota trucks. Every resident of Alaska gets an oil-related dividend of 
substance. But these are the exceptions.
One measure would be similar to that in Alaska. Royalties on production 
would in part be distributed to the county in question. At the very least, this 
would go to ameliorate some of the damage to infrastructure. In the case of 
shale gas drilling, the principal damage coming to mind is the deterioration of 
lightly constructed farm roads by heavy trucks carrying sand or water. This will 
be a problem regardless of how well the water-related concerns are handled. 
Beyond the issue of mitigation of damage, the community as a whole ought to 
benefit in some measure from the overall enterprise. The fortunate leasers of 
mineral rights should not be the only ones to benefit. That sort of inequity is a 
sure recipe for neighbor turning on neighbor, particularly when the have-not 
neighbor incurs some direct negative consequences of the activity.
An interesting thought on revenue generation for broader distribution is 
the adjustment of valuation of the properties generating revenue from the 
production. That property is now arguably more valuable on resale than before. 
(The only argument against it is that some will consider production equipment 
on the property as a negative.) The portion of the increased tax from this 
aspect could go into a special pot for the purposes discussed above.
In general, taxation related to shale gas production will be the subject of 
considerable debate. The producing camp will argue that taxation will diminish 
activity. But anecdotal evidence to date does not support this belief. West 
Virginia has been much more aggressive in this regard than Pennsylvania, and 
the drilling activity comparisons are in West Virginia’s favor. These single-
variable analyses are fraught. In this case, the higher activity in West Virginia 
may be in spite of the taxation, and driven by the higher quality of the fluids.
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Separate from these arguments is the inherent societal benefit from 
affordable energy. In that sense, the very fact of cheap natural gas represents a 
benefit for all.
Technology Forks in the Road
Technology choice can often have a direct effect on the local populace. These 
forks in the technology road fall into two broad categories: benefitting the 
local environment and aiding the local economy. The first one is an easy 
choice if other things are about equal. An example of that is in fracturing 
operations associated with oil or gas production. As the industry became more 
skilled at drilling horizontally, the increasing reach of a given well allowed a 
new technology, known as pad drilling. This involves drilling and producing 
from up to 25 wells from a single location, known as a pad. The number of 
roads needed drops as does the areal extent of the effects of traffic. Also, this 
aggregation of wells allows for better supervision and oversight to minimize 
mistakes. Pad technology was developed in Colorado for the express purpose 
of minimizing road footprint. It now is even more important in farming 
communities such as in Pennsylvania.
Biofuels could face similar forks. The conventional approach would 
be to transport the biomass or crop great distances to giant chemical 
processing plants. The energy densities of these materials are inherently low. 
Consequently, the costs and logistics of transportation are high. Technologies 
are being developed to build more biomass processing plants close to farmland, 
to bring the mountain to Mohammad, as it were. These must be specialized 
to not incur the penalties of reduced scale. A few such are in early-stage 
development. This will not only reduce road transport, but also it would create 
local jobs, which in many instances are high-paying ones.
Distributed power is another example. Small 50- to 100-megawatt plants 
using biomass, wind or mini-nuclear, to name a few, could supply localities. In 
the limit they could eliminate the need for costly and unsightly transmission 
lines. At short distances, direct current (DC) would be a viable and preferred 
option to alternating current (AC). Edison would have smiled. For those 
not familiar with this arcane bit of technological history, this country faced 
a critical decision in the late years of the nineteenth century. The AC/DC 
choice was on the table for long-distance power transmission. Pitted were 
Westinghouse Electric and Thomas Edison. Edison lost that one.
Not far-fetched is the notion of developing technologies specifically fit 
for the purpose of benefitting host communities and nations. An example 
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relevant to the latter would be the deliberate design forks taken to allow for 
manufacture in that country. One could accomplish this by selecting materials 
locally available. A design assembly could be modified to use low-grade steel 
as opposed to high-alloy steel that would have to be imported. Assemblies 
could be simplified to allow local assembly. In chapter 14, I discussed the 
distributed processing option for monetizing the ethane found in wet shale gas. 
That particular option is somewhat hamstrung by the immediate absence of a 
business model to execute. But these things are traversable, and there is little 
doubt that local jobs will be created.
In summation, the societal benefit component of energy alternatives need 
not be an afterthought. Many elements can be brought to bear with no adverse 
consequences to the economics of the enterprise. Also, the lasting value of 
being a good citizen cannot be underestimated. It’s simply good business.

CHAPTER 25
Flex-Fuel Fairy Tale
“Dream on”
—From “Dream On” by Aerosmith (written by Steven Tyler)
The Utopian State, known the world over as the US, was in the throes of 
a dilemma. Much maligned for not doing enough to limit carbon dioxide 
emissions, it developed a plan that seemingly in one fell swoop tackled 
global warming associated with automobile emissions while at the same time 
reducing import of oil from nations, some of whom were deemed unfriendly, 
at least in the rhetoric of elections.
This solution was known as the 20/10 plan. The goal, to replace 20 percent 
of gasoline with ethanol in 10 years, was seen as visionary, if for no other 
reason as that 20/10 was about as good as one got with vision. However, even 
before vast quantities of alcohol had been consumed, a hangover of major 
proportions was in the making. Therein lies the tale.
The Utopian State, as befitted its name, was inclined to believe that the 
public would recognize a really good thing when they saw it. They especially 
believed in the maxim “If you build it, they will come,” because said maxim 
was irresistibly derived from the powerful combination of Kevin Costner, the 
national sport, and mysticism.
So they built it, a complex web of subsidies to farmers, automobile 
companies, and refiners, and tariffs on imported ethanol, all designed to 
produce domestic ethanol to blend with gasoline, and vehicles that would run 
on the stuff. In a nod to perceived consumer preferences, they incentivized the 
auto companies to make flex-fuel cars, capable of using regular gasoline and 
also E85, a blend with 85 percent ethanol.
They even created demand for these cars by ordering their agencies to use 
them and mandating the use of the new fuel. Waivers to the mandate were 
given generously, no doubt in the Utopian belief that said waivers would not 
be sought if not merited. It seems that some of these agencies are seeing a net 
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increase in gasoline usage (Kindy & Keating, 2008), a result contributing in no 
small measure to the aforementioned hangover.
At the core of Utopian belief is that folks will “do the right thing.” So, 
purchasers of flex-fuel vehicles were expected to purchase E85, even from 
filling stations some distance away, ignoring the fuel consumption getting there 
and back. Then word filtered through that E85 delivered 28 percent fewer miles 
per gallon. In short, it was more expensive to use and harder to find. They 
started filling up with regular gasoline because the flex-fuel vehicle allowed 
that, and filling stations noted the drop in volume and stopped stocking E85.
This nightmare scenario was interrupted by the seemingly sudden 
realization that natural gas could be produced very cheaply from shale, a 
rock previously deemed too hard to produce from. US industry knew how to 
routinely convert natural gas to methanol. This type of alcohol could also be 
blended with gasoline to make an E85 analog dubbed M85. It was even worse 
on gas mileage than E85. But methanol from shale gas was so much cheaper 
than gasoline that the cost per mile driven was less. One had to refuel more 
often, but at least the public was given the choice. Choice was good but not 
compelling enough for filling stations to change their design.
The turning point came when Prof. Wunderbar from a prestigious Eastern 
university invented a small engine that led to a car running on M85 that 
delivered both fuel economy and the muscle of a larger engine. The design took 
advantage of the high octane number of methanol (117 versus 87 for regular 
gasoline), which allowed effectively high compression ratios, which in turn 
improved the efficiency of combustion. The result was elimination of the gas 
mileage penalty from using methanol, increased power for an engine of given 
size, and retention of the improved emissions associated with methanol usage. 
And all of this was achieved with a fuel that was consistently less than half the 
price of gasoline.
Auto makers vied with each other to retool and produce these cars without 
any federal incentive because the public actually wanted them. Fuel distributors 
rushed to install M85 pumps and realized that this was simply achieved by 
eliminating one grade of fuel. They came to the realization that all vehicles 
on the road today specify either 87 or 91 octane. A third grade (89) was not 
needed, and the third pump was now available with modification to dispense 
M85. The US government, not wanting to be left out of this, set policies to 
further these steps.
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Shale gas development technology improved to where low-cost natural gas 
was assured for decades. This certainty with respect to methanol price staying 
low allowed massive investment in vehicles and methanol production and 
delivery infrastructure. All was well again. 
And then they elected a president who resolved never again to set policy 
that was not market-based. The country united behind him on this, and it was 
never quite the same again. The country was henceforth known as the United 
States.

CHAPTER 26
Displacing Oil
“Killing me softly with his song ”
—From “Killing Me Softly With His Song” by Roberta Flack (written by Charles Fox and Norman Gimbel)
Oil will be displaced but not entirely replaced in the foreseeable future, if 
ever. Oil dominates the transportation sector. This is enabled by engines that 
run best when employing an oil derivative such as gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel. 
Substitutes do not function as well because the engines have been optimized 
for those fuels over the last century. So, even if one were to make substitutes 
at a per-gallon cost comparable to the conventional fuel, they would suffer 
performance penalties. For one, the distribution infrastructure is not well 
suited to substitutes. In general we could refer to all of this as the power of 
incumbency.
Toppling powerful incumbents is rarely achieved in a short space of time 
and equally rarely by any one stratagem. Displacing oil in transport will also 
be incremental in part due to the existence of a massive legacy fleet optimized 
for it. But shale gas, which has recently burst into our collective consciousness, 
has the potential to be our “Arab Spring” in testing the supremacy of the oil 
monarchy. Few now doubt the staying power of shale gas to be an abundant 
low-cost hydrocarbon, provided completely feasible environmentally 
sustainable practices are followed. But one verse does not make a song. This 
discourse is about the confluence of innovations in technology and thought 
designed to remove oil from its monopoly and render it just another useful 
commodity (Luft & Korin, 2009).
Having predictably low-cost natural gas for decades is a concept so alien 
that investors and producers alike are still grappling with the implications. 
Support for this belief is now to be found in a few places, including the 
chapters of this book. Predictably low-cost gas over the useful lifetime of 
processing equipment will embolden the production of fuel substitutes with 
current known gas-to-liquids (GTL) processes. By definition, these produce 
fuels indistinguishable from the conventional versions except for being cleaner.
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The truly exciting possibilities center on the production of fuel substitutes 
such as ethanol, methanol, and dimethyl ether (DME), together with the direct 
use of methane in gas or liquid form. Each of these delivers fewer miles to the 
gallon than the fuel it replaces. But each of these has much higher octane (or 
cetane, in the case of DME) ratings than the commensurate conventional fuel. 
This book provides a recipe for gradually chipping away at the dominance of 
oil. Ingredients include breakthrough innovations that challenge the orthodoxy 
in the production, distribution, and use of transport fuels. Key federal and state 
policy enablers are also important for rapid change. 
The orthodoxy referred to here is the underlying dogma that dominates 
each portion of the value chain. This chain begins at the oil in the ground. 
The wells are drilled and the oil lifted out to the surface. It is then transported 
through a system of pipelines to refineries. These are massive chemical plants 
that process the oil into useful fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. 
Refineries tend to be concentrated in just a few geographical locales. In the 
US, the vast majority are on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, although there are 
smaller pockets in the Midwest and the two coasts. So, by design, no matter 
where the oil is pulled out of the ground, it is transported to these locations 
for processing. The thinking likely was to place the refineries close to the 
consumption points and move the crude oil the needed distance. This made 
sense until the last few years. What changed was the nature of the oil. 
Oil is not oil. The key point is that oil ranges from light oil, which has 
the consistency of honey in the summer, to extra heavy oil, which has the 
consistency of chilled molasses. (For those not accustomed to Southern 
cuisine, this stuff goes “glop” when poured out of the bottle.) The heavier liquid 
simply will not flow down pipelines because of its viscosity. To make it flow, 
expensive thinning chemicals known as diluents are required. Also, the more 
viscous a fluid, the higher the energy expended, and the attendant cost, in 
pumping it. All of a sudden the old paradigm does not make much sense. In 
an odd twist, in North America the heavier grade of oil travels much longer 
distances to refineries than does the light stuff. This sort of thing is the result 
of entrenched dogma. In chapter 14 I discussed this matter in context of the 
fact that pipeline infrastructure is inadequate to handle this new oil source. 
The Keystone XL pipeline, whose purpose in part is to serve the Bakken shale 
oil, has become a political football, its fate unresolved as of this writing. Even 
as oil is being displaced by alternatives, much can be done to make the original 
process more efficient. This is because of the key word displaced. Oil will not be 
replaced for a very long time, if ever.
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The alternatives to gasoline are also conventionally produced in massive 
chemical plants. Much in the same way as for oil, natural gas is also transported 
great distances to these plants using a system of pipelines. Leakage from these 
pipelines, especially when they get old, is implicated in some models of global 
warming (Howarth et al., 2011) due to fugitive methane emissions. (Over a 
hundred-year span, methane is about 21 times more potent as a greenhouse gas 
than is carbon dioxide.) 
Minimizing pipelines would have significant benefits when the producing 
zones are in areas with greater density of farming or homes, as is happening 
with shale gas in Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio. Pipelines can be 
minimized by locating either big plants in the same state as the production or 
smaller plants distributed close to the wells. This latter is technically difficult, 
however, because most processes benefit from economies of scale. Simply 
put, bigger plants are more efficient. Challenging what in effect is a truism in 
chemical engineering practice used to be unthinkable. Not any longer. 
In chapter 18, I described the progress being made toward a future of jobs 
all over the country, not just in a few concentrated pockets. A future with 
job creation in about half the time for conventional plants. A future with jet 
fuel being synthesized at each air base. The key enablers for this aggressive 
agenda are small-footprint processes for the production of fuel: Instead of 
custom builds at each location, small modules are mass manufactured and 
merely assembled in place. In essence, economies of scale are being replaced by 
economies of mass production and remote control systems. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the future will hold a mix of conventional 
and small-footprint methodologies. While the production method may be 
the difference maker in some instances, the more important concept is that 
of displacement of oil-based transportation fuel. The main driver will be 
economics. The 2013 forecast by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
calls for a steady increase in the price of oil for the next couple of decades 
(EIA, 2013, June 13). This, coupled with predicted low prices for natural gas, 
is the key incentive for natural gas–derived transport fuel. A secondary but 
significant driver is the regulation requiring lower tailpipe emissions. GTL-
derived liquids are low in contaminants such as sulfur. Methanol has that 
advantage and additionally burns at a lower temperature, especially if one 
uses the stratagem of evaporative cooling, as described in chapter 27, “More Is 
Better.” Some of the nitrogen in the air used for combustion is expelled from 
the tailpipe as nitrogen oxide (NOx), which is a pollutant. Lower combustion 
temperatures result in less production of NOx.
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As mentioned earlier, all the substitutes have lower energy per unit volume. 
In other words, they deliver fewer miles to the gallon than gasoline does. In the 
following chapter I discuss the viability of a fleet of high-compression engines 
uniquely taking advantage of the high octane ratings of methanol, ethanol, and 
methane. Aside from aiding in the use of a more environmentally responsible 
fuel, cars with high-compression engines would simply be more efficient. Using 
less energy for the same gratification is a worthy goal in all walks of life. Any 
reasonable carbon emissions goal for 2050 will require that at least 40 percent 
of carbon mitigation come from simply using less. 
Electricity producers have taken this message to heart, and efficiency 
improvement through the use of waste heat is common in coal, natural gas, and 
nuclear plants. All new plants have these features. The Energy Star program 
encourages more efficient devices such as air conditioners, home electronics, 
and appliances. Building insulation standards are in continuous improvement. 
In the transportation sector, improvements have been sought through federal 
targets on fuel efficiency. Much of this has been achieved with lighter materials. 
But the big prize of engine efficiency improvement through compression ratio 
increase has not been taken seriously. Systematic increases in compression 
ratio have not been seen for many decades. Even when flex-fuel vehicles 
were introduced to facilitate the use of corn-based ethanol, the high-octane 
rating of ethanol was not capitalized upon. A flex-fuel vehicle running on 
E85 (85 percent ethanol, balance gasoline) would easily have tolerated a near 
doubling of the compression ratios to the vicinity of 16:1.
I am not going to trivialize the difficulty of turning that massive ocean 
liner known as the automotive industry. The finely tuned assembly line 
manufacturing does not welcome change. The chassis is rarely interfered 
with. Seemingly new lines are built on old chassis. Back in my day, the Chevy 
Camaro and Pontiac Firebird shared a common chassis. Even the revolutionary 
electric car, the Tesla Roadster, is built on the design of the chassis of an 
existing Lotus sports car. Our proposal would require changes to the design of 
engine cylinders and operating controls. These are less daunting, and in fact 
Mazda voluntarily introduced an engine with a compression ratio of 14:1 to 
improve fuel efficiency. With some clever engineering, they can operate this on 
premium gasoline. A flex-fuel version would run like a top on E85 or M85, and 
in the case of the latter, for sure, would be a good deal cheaper.
But operating a fleet, no matter how efficient, that runs only on an 
alternative fuel is daunting. That is in fact being attempted by electric cars 
today, in particular the Nissan Leaf, which operates solely on electricity. In 
 Chapter 26. Displacing Oil 181
2014 the jury is still out on consumer acceptance, and demand is proving weak 
for now. A car running on electricity alone is a marvelously simple device: no 
gear box, no transmission, and no differential if the design has a motor for 
each wheel. It will be simple to manufacture and maintain: no oil changes, 
no air filter changes, no catalytic converter malfunction lighting up the idiot 
lights on your dashboard. The biggest draw from an environmental standpoint 
is not even the zero tailpipe emissions. That is nice for sure. Particularly nice 
for the youth counselors at the neighborhood YMCA engulfed in the exhaust 
from idling engines of parents picking up tots. Ironically an electric car would 
simply not idle; it would switch off when stationary as do hybrids today. But 
the compelling value is in the fact that a pure electric vehicle is 60 percent more 
efficient than an internal combustion engine. This is on a fair-minded mine 
(or oil well)-to-wheel basis; the calculation is shown in chapter 17 for those 
inclined to be skeptical, as would I have been had I not run the numbers.
In portions of the world not served by an electricity grid, limited power 
is supplied using diesel or kerosene. In India this is largely subsidized so the 
apparent cost is not high. But the fully loaded cost to the nation is substantial, 
particularly because most of the oil is imported. In chapter 18 I discuss 
the feasibility of small-footprint synthesis of fuel using the raw material of 
convenience. This could include natural gas, methane from waste, and biomass. 
The target use would be for electricity generation, pumps for water wells, and 
cook stoves.
Direct use of natural gas in transportation has its supporters. For fleet 
vehicles such as buses and delivery trucks, the disadvantages associated with a 
low energy density are less in evidence. Cities such as Delhi and Kuala Lumpur 
have replaced diesel in public transport vehicles with compressed natural gas 
(CNG) with dramatic improvements in health outcomes due to the elimination 
of particulates in the air from diesel. For passenger vehicles, improvements in 
volumetric density will likely be needed for broad acceptance. The progress in 
this area is described in chapter 17, and the future appears promising.
In reading this chapter one could be left with the impression that this 
is an ode to natural gas. That is not the intent. I see cheap natural gas as an 
avenue for the displacement of gasoline and diesel with substitutes. For these 
substitutes to acquire currency, we need distribution systems. We also need 
acceptance by the consumer. Take the example of methanol as a gasoline 
replacement in a conventional automobile. Cheap natural gas will cause 
methanol to be cheaper per mile driven than gasoline down to a gasoline price 
at the pump under $2 per gallon. However, the range for a car that ordinarily 
182  Part IV. Informing on Policy
gives 350 miles will be closer to 200 miles with M85 use. Some consumers 
will trade that inconvenience for lower cost, some will not. Of course, high-
compression engines will narrow that gap. I among others believe that the 
public will opt for the lower-cost, higher-performance option and fill up more 
often.
Once gasoline and diesel substitutes are firmly entrenched, alternatives 
to natural gas will emerge as the raw materials for their synthesis. One such 
alternative is petroleum coke, a residue from the refining of heavy oil that has 
little use. Heavy oil is an increasingly large proportion of oil production. Given 
that oil is not going away any time soon, and the marginal barrel is getting 
heavier by the day (except for the shale oil anomaly in the US), the utilization 
of otherwise useless components is a good thing. There is also a minor irony 
in using a waste product of oil refining to displace the portion currently 
considered valuable. 
Woody biomass would be a viable raw material as well, as would be any 
cellulosic waste such as corn stalks and bagasse (the fibrous residue after sugar 
is extracted from sugarcane). Other candidates are purpose-grown crops 
such as switchgrass. These materials are especially hard to convert to ethanol, 
although much research is ongoing in that area.
The compelling point is this: All these raw materials, including methane, are 
first processed to an intermediate gas known as synthesis gas or syngas. After 
that the further conversion to methanol, DME, or synthetic gasoline or diesel, 
uses syngas as a starting point no matter what the raw material used to make 
the syngas is. This means that if a new era is ushered in by cheap natural gas, 
the door is left open for other materials, including renewables, to capitalize on 
the opportunity. This then is our true future, a transport world in which oil is 
a useful but not strategic commodity, and one in which more environmentally 
benign raw materials play an important, and possibly dominant, role.
CHAPTER 27
More Is Better
“My four-speed dual-quad positraction 409”
—From “409” by The Beach Boys (written by Gary Usher, Brian Wilson, and Mike Love)
Few would argue with the premise that more is better. A third more toothpaste 
in the tube, an extra shaving blade in the pack, two extra ounces of cereal in 
the box—these are merchandizing techniques that work. About the only one 
better is “free.” Dan Ariely wrote an entire book based on this (Ariely, 2008). 
Incidentally, in your grocery store when you have a product marked “buy one, 
get one free,” often you don’t have to do just that. When you buy one item only, 
they are likely to give it to you at half price. 
In the early years, automobiles ran on both ethanol and gasoline. The Ford 
Model T had an adjustable carburetor to allow this feature. This was in part a 
nod to the farming community, which could produce its own ethanol. Those 
early years of the 20th century saw considerable jockeying by oil interests. 
Ethanol was taxed for human consumption, but this tax was forgiven for 
industrial use. This was championed by President Theodore Roosevelt, who was 
openly critical of Standard Oil’s domination. In 1920, prohibition introduced 
considerable pushback on even industrial use of ethanol because of the 
perceived risk of crossover into human consumption. 
Higher-Compression Engines
Ultimately gasoline became the sole fuel in part due to the successful 
introduction of tetraethyl-lead (TEL) as an anti-knock agent in the 1920s. This 
allowed higher compression ratios, which improved fuel economy and engine 
torque, and hence consumer satisfaction. This idea—of increasing compression 
ratio for better performance—is the crux of this chapter. The box defines the 
term and explains the significance, but here I simply assert that the indicated 
improvements are a direct result of improved compression ratio. 
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The feasibility of blending ethanol with gasoline was known. Even the 
anti-knocking properties of ethanol were known. In fact, pure alcohol or a 
high-alcohol blend would have performed fine in a high-compression engine 
without TEL. But reportedly the oil interests that developed TEL successfully 
promulgated the view that TEL was the only solution. TEL was invented 
by General Motors, which joined with Standard Oil of New Jersey (later to 
become Esso/Exxon) to form Ethyl Corporation. The liquid containing TEL 
and some lead scavengers was named ethyl, presumably to not advertise the 
fact that it had lead. However, the gasoline was commonly referred to as leaded 
fuel. Much later, when TEL was replaced by MTBE, the fuel was referred to as 
“unleaded.” 
One could conjecture that the big driver for acceptance of TEL relative to 
alcohol was that only about 0.1 percent TEL was needed. For an equivalent 
performance by ethanol several percent of the fuel would be needed. Whatever 
the reasons, TEL-blended gasoline became the standard until over 40 years 
Compression Ratio 
The internal combustion engine running on gasoline has multiple cylinders 
that combust the fuel to produce energy for the wheels. Fuel mixed with air 
is injected into each cylinder. Then a piston closely fitting against the cylinder 
wall is pushed down onto the fuel mixture. The compression ratio (CR) is 
essentially a measure of how much the fuel-air mixture is compressed prior 
to ignition of the fuel. In gasoline engines, ignition is produced by a spark 
from a spark plug. The CR designed for an engine depends upon which fuel is 
expected to be used. Engines destined to run on regular gasoline these days 
have a CR of about 8:1 to 9:1. In earlier days and in some countries such as 
Brazil in the 1970s, CRs close to 7:1 were used. CRs in excess of 10 are deemed 
high compression.
At higher ratios, the pressure of the fuel-air mixture at the time of ignition 
is greater. This higher pressure results in more energy being delivered upon 
combustion and the piston being driven with more force. This translates into 
more energy supplied to the transmission, resulting in higher torque. Also, the 
overall efficiency of the engine is improved because more power is delivered 
for the same fuel use.
However, if regular gasoline with an octane rating of 87 is used in a high-
compression engine, ignition may occur prior to reaching full pressure. This is 
known as “knocking” because of the audible sound created. The result is loss 
of power, plus undesirable carbon deposits. This is why high-compression 
engines need super gasoline, with octane rating of 93. Indy race cars have a 
CR of about 17:1. They use pure ethanol, which has an octane rating of about 
113, or methanol, with an octane rating of 117.
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later. In the 1970s, the lead content in TEL was deemed environmentally 
unacceptable and a phase-out and replacement with ethanol was begun.
The phase-out of TEL induced another change in the engine. The fuel intake 
into the combustion cylinder and exhaust out of it was through valves. The 
sealing surface of the exhaust valves roughens and abrades, and TEL acted as 
a lubricant coating, presumably because of the lead produced, as noted in the 
box on the following page. Unleaded gasoline was expected to result in leaky 
valves. In recognition of this, the industry went to hardened steel for the valves 
and seats. Almost certainly the valve design detail was tweaked to ensure that 
the harder material still sealed effectively. (In general softer materials seal 
the best, which is why elastomers are commonly used for sealing. However, 
elastomers cannot be used in temperature extremes. For ultra-low-temperature 
sealing, especially of gases, the soft and relatively scarce metal indium is used. 
Certain specialized elastomers function at moderate temperatures of up to 
350°C, especially if cooled down in some way. For very high temperatures, 
metal-on-metal sealing is used.)
This discourse on valve sealing and changes wrought by the move to 
unleaded gasoline is offered to demonstrate the ability of the automotive 
industry to respond to new requirements. Mass production methods are not 
very tolerant of change. But if it has to be, change in a few components is 
relatively easy to accept. This is the case with the design modifications required 
for flex-fuel vehicles, which again are primarily related to a change in materials, 
albeit in a less demanding situation than valving. Later in this chapter I discuss 
the desirability of modifications facilitating use of alternative fuels. These 
fuels are more complex, but the building blocks are already in the toolkit of 
automotive design engineers.
The toxicity of TEL centers on the fact that when combusted, the reaction 
product contains metallic lead. Prior to exhaust from the tailpipe, it more 
than likely would be in the oxide form or as a compound combined with the 
aforementioned lead scavenger additives. In either form, this heavy metal 
is toxic when ingested or inhaled. However, the driver for getting the lead 
out of gasoline was not the impact on health per se. Environmental health 
considerations resulted in the invention of the catalytic converter. This 
platinum-coated ceramic catalyst reacted with pollutants such as unburned 
carbon monoxide and nitric and nitrous oxides. Lead compounds deposited on 
the platinum and drastically reduced the useful life of the catalytic converter. 
The car industry, General Motors in particular, led the charge to eliminate lead 
from gasoline, commencing in 1974.
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TEL continues to be used in aviation fuel for piston engines. Modest 
amounts are sufficient for use in supercharged engines and currently no 
alternative is perceived to exist. Alcohol in gasoline has a tendency to absorb 
moisture. In certain situations the water can separate out. In the conditions 
of flight, the potential for ice formation in the lines is too risky. Also, alcohol 
would reduce the range, which for a plane could be prohibitive. In automotive 
applications the main issue would be corrosion of the fuel lines due to the 
moisture. This is avoided through the use of stainless steel tubing. All flex-
fuel vehicles have this feature and additionally have more robust fluorinated 
elastomers in the sealing mechanisms.
Lead and Lead Substitutes 
Lead may have been eliminated from gasoline, but it is present in everyday 
life. All conventional car batteries have this element as the major ingredient. 
The lead-acid battery is still the most reliable source of power that can 
withstand the charge/discharge cycle over the useful lifetime of a few 
years. Car batteries are recycled to recover the lead. In fact, about half of all 
lead produced is from secondary sources. This insulates the public in large 
measure because the old battery is almost always returned to the store selling 
the new one. But in terms of the risk of emissions, the recycling process is not 
dissimilar to that used to extract lead from ores. This does not account for the 
environmental effects of open pit mining of the ore.
Lithium batteries are the latest to challenge the supremacy of lead-
acid batteries. Cleaner, and currently more expensive, they have their own 
challenges. The grounding of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner in January 2013 was 
due to lithium battery packs catching on fire. This, too, will be solved. Scarcely 
anything of value replacing an incumbent ever comes free of baggage, at 
least in the early going.
Until the middle of the 20th century, one of the high-volume uses of 
lead was in paint of all sorts. Lead oxide could be made pure white or yellow 
or red. It also had the key desirable characteristic of paint: flows smoothly 
when brushed but becomes viscous and stays put when the brushing ceases. 
Ingestion by children and consequential health issues caused its gradual 
replacement by titanium dioxide. Today the majority of paint uses this 
extremely white substance as the base pigment. The best bond paper also 
uses it for whitening. In the US the material is derived from the ore ilmenite, 
which is a mixture of titanium oxide and iron oxide. The extraction method 
uses sulfuric acid to preferentially remove the iron as a sulfate, leaving behind 
the titanium oxide. Producers of the waste iron sulfate with residual acid, 
known as Copperas, have at various times been challenged for improper 
disposal of it. This is yet another example of benign substitutes having their 
own environmental issues.
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Octane Rating of Gasoline 
As mentioned in the discussion of compression ratios earlier in this chapter, 
octane rating is the property of gasoline that defines the highest compression 
ratio that can be used. When crude oil is heated up, the constituents vaporize 
at different temperatures. These are then condensed separately to result in 
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and so forth. Gasoline is in the lowest-temperature 
fraction. As distilled, it has an octane rating of about 70. That would safely 
run an engine with a compression ratio of only around 7:1, inadequate for 
modern cars. Refiners can process the “straight run” gasoline to produce some 
fraction of larger molecules, which have more energy density. The other 
approach is to add large molecules known as aromatics. These are so-named 
because the compounds have an aroma. Those with a pleasant aroma are 
fragrances. The aromatics added to gasoline are decidedly not fragrant. The 
class of compounds known as BTEX, which are environmental pollutants, fall 
into this category.
Some combination of processing and additives raises the gasoline octane 
rating to the value desired for regular gasoline, which is 87. This is suitable for 
the workhorse compression ratios of 8:1 to 9:1. Higher-compression engines 
need the higher grade of 91 octane. Some sporty cars require 93 octane. The 
added cost of the additives is passed on to the consumer.
Gasoline Substitutes Benefit From High Compression
The principal candidates for gasoline substitution are ethanol, methanol, 
and methane (natural gas with liquid components removed). Each of these 
has significantly less energy content per unit volume compared to gasoline. 
Adoption of these alternatives is hampered by this failing. A car running on 
E85 (85 percent ethanol and balance gasoline) will deliver roughly 28 percent 
fewer miles to the gallon. The comparable figure for M85 is about 42 percent 
reduction. The compressed natural gas (CNG) penalty needs to be expressed 
differently and is more fully discussed in another chapter. But the gist of it 
is that the tank has to be four times the size for the same range. The tank is 
thicker-walled as well and carries an additional weight penalty compared with 
a gasoline tank, which reduces range.
These fuels are consequently encumbered by the need to be less expensive 
per gallon. The terminology “dollars per gallon of gasoline equivalent” has 
entered the lexicon. Curiously, however, each of these gasoline wannabes has 
a valuable property that, if exploited, would overcome its shortcomings. That 
property is octane rating.
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The octane ratings of ethanol, methanol, and methane are, respectively, 113, 
117, and 125. Reported numbers on these vary slightly, but these numbers are 
clearly much greater than regular gasoline at 87. When added to gasoline the 
effect is linear. This means that a 10 percent addition of ethanol to 87 octane 
gasoline will raise the value to 89.6. Does this mean that regular gasoline with 
10 percent ethanol, common in most states, has an octane rating of mid-grade 
or plus? Almost certainly not. In recognition of this effect, the refiner is more 
than likely reducing his expensive octane-enhancing ingredients and relying on 
the ethanol in part to boost the octane rating to 87. 
Flex-fuel vehicles, or FFVs, can operate on any mix of gasoline and alcohol 
up to 85 percent (that upper-end mix is designated E85). In Brazil, FFVs can 
operate with 100 percent alcohol. This measure was undertaken both in Brazil 
and in the US partly in response to the desire to reduce dependence on oil 
for transport fuel. The cost of conversion was low, on the order of $100 per 
vehicle. Since E85 was not commonly available in the early going, it made sense 
to impose the flexibility of being able to use straight gasoline. But since E85 
delivers 28 percent fewer miles to the gallon, the consumer driven purely by 
economics would opt for the gasoline option. The result has been a paucity of 
E85 filling pumps. 
 Also, we have collectively missed a big bet: capitalizing on the high octane 
rating of E85, or M85 for that matter, which latter fuel would also function 
in an FFV, with some minor changes. These two fuels and methane (as CNG) 
would deliver very high efficiencies if run in high-compression engines. 
This improved efficiency would offset the lower energy content. Note that 
Indy race cars run on pure methanol. They have compression ratios (CRs) of 
around 17:1.
Flex-Fuel Vehicles with High Compression
Just in case this smacks of wishful thinking, consider a relatively recent 
commercial development. Mazda has introduced a line of cars with high 
compression ratios operating on conventional gasoline using an engine system 
that they have termed the SkyActiv engine. But Mazda’s move appears to have 
nothing to do with enabling the gasoline alternatives. More below on how we 
can avail of that, no matter their intent. Mazda appears to have been shooting 
for higher engine efficiencies to meet the latest CAFE standard. Virtually all the 
other major companies were using electric vehicles and hybrids as the avenue 
to that goal. As I opine in the chapter relating to electric vehicles (chapter 17), 
battery costs are prohibitively high, and cost reduction to under $200 per 
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kWh is needed for widespread consumer acceptance. Mazda appears to agree 
and has placed its eggs in the short term in the basket of efficiency through 
high compression. Since the design started years ago, somebody was reading 
excellent tea leaves.
What Mazda has done is to make the cylinder narrower and longer. But the 
critical innovation is to provide two injections of fuel during a single cycle. 
The second injection is right at the point when sensors detect temperatures 
reaching the point at which knocking (premature ignition) is imminent. When 
gasoline is injected into a hot chamber and evaporates, it sucks up heat to 
provide energy for the evaporation. An everyday example is the cooling effect 
on one’s skin when aftershave lotion evaporates upon application.
The evaporative cooling drops the temperature enough to prevent 
premature ignition. This allows them to increase the CR to 12:1. Fancy exhaust 
system management allows them to go up another notch to 13:1. For 14:1 they 
need to use premium gasoline. They are offering this only in Europe. They 
believe American consumers will balk at the fuel premium, which is around 
30 cents in most states. The Mazda3, offered with just the junior version 
of 12:1, is reported to improve mileage from 24/31 mpg city/highway to  
29/39 mpg. There is some arm waving on manual versus automatic 
transmissions, improvements to the latter, and so on. But these are big 
improvements with no change in the gasoline.
So, what we have here is a commercially available car with a CR of 14:1 
needing premium gasoline. It has substantially improved fuel mileage over the 
normal compression ratio car. If modified to be an FFV at a cost less than $100, 
this car would operate very comfortably indeed on E85 or M85. This would 
be an FFV with a realistic choice for the consumer: premium gasoline at 30 
cents or no cost premium with E85 at the price of regular gasoline. With M85, 
the economic argument is even more compelling, as explained in chapter 19. 
Now for the punch line. If Mazda were to extend the technology to a CR of 
16:1 or even 17:1, more than likely both E85 and M85 would function just 
fine, especially with the dual injection scheme taking advantage of evaporative 
cooling. This would deliver even better mileage at no additional fuel cost. Sure, 
it would not operate with gasoline, but neither do diesel vehicles. There is no 
reason to believe it would not be well suited to CNG.
We need to get out of the trap of finding gasoline substitutes for cars 
optimized for gasoline. An attractive menu would include the following. An 
FFV at CR of 14:1 or so, running on premium gasoline or E85, M85, or CNG, 
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would be the moderate offering. An FFV with an ultra-high-compression 
engine operable only with E85, M85, or CNG would be another. CNG for 
passenger vehicles needs some advances, so that may be in the future. But these 
vehicles would be positioned for that. In the meantime, a fueling station would 
have regular and premium gasoline, together with a pump for M85 and/or E85. 
Of these last two, pure economics will drive the choice to M85 today. But if 
breakthroughs in cellulosic ethanol drive the cost down, the FFVs will be ready 
to accept that. Importantly, consumers will be empowered with fuel choice.
PART V 
Next 
Steps
The oil price crash commencing in late 2014 could prove a blessing in disguise for the shale oil and gas industry. The US has already become the swing 
producer since early 2015. In other words, US production 
swings are deterministic of world oil price changes. A US 
oil surge could create serious winners and losers worldwide. 
In this climate of very low oil prices, displacement by 
alternative energy sources will prove more difficult and 
need policy support.
Energy policy is likely to undergo scrutiny and change 
in the US. Regulation affecting US export of US crude oil, 
the transport of oil by train, and induced seismicity related 
to waste water disposal are likely, at the state or federal 
level. Here I discuss the effects of various policy alternatives 
and identify areas needing further research. In addition, I 
discuss the effects of discoveries of deep sources of shale oil 
and gas in Argentina, currently a net importer of gas from 
Bolivia.
V. Next Steps
CHAPTER 28
A Dead Cow Kicks Up Its Heels
“Break on through to the other side”
—From “Break on Through (To the Other Side)” by The Doors
The Vaca Muerta in Argentina may well be the most promising shale oil and 
gas reservoir discovered to date. Strictly translated the name means “dead 
cow.” But this particular dead cow is poised to make some noise, possibly a 
lot of noise. A hopeful President Cristina Kirchner refers to it as “Vaca Vive 
(Living Cow).” But the desolation of Patagonia is more in tune with the actual 
name. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), shale in 
Argentina ranks third in the world for gas and fourth for oil. The Vaca Muerta 
alone is estimated by the EIA to hold recoverable quantities of 16.2 billion 
barrels of oil and 308 trillion cubic feet of natural gas good for 150 years at 
current Argentina national consumption rates. Earlier in 2014, the quality 
of EIA estimating took a bit of a reputational hit when it reduced the similar 
estimate for the US Monterey shale by 95 percent. In contrast, estimates in 
already-producing areas such as the Bakken continued to go up from 2007 to 
2010. This propensity for increases in reserves estimates after development of 
a field has begun is normal because more information increases the certainty. 
This improvement in probability has a direct positive impact on the reserves 
figure.
The Vaca Muerta need not rely on the EIA estimates to prove its mettle. 
Exploratory and developmental drilling has resulted in no reported unpleasant 
surprises. The reservoirs are up to 1,500 feet thick, making them on average 
three times thicker than the Eagle Ford, with which it is rightly compared. 
The total organic content (TOC) runs a healthy 3 to 10 percent, rivaling the 
best performers in the US. The most interesting attribute may be the reservoir 
pressure. In that regard it is more like the Haynesville, which is deeper and 
hotter, and therefore more expensive. However, the Haynesville is also bone 
dry—quite unlike the Vaca Muerta, which, like the Eagle Ford and Utica, 
has the full spectrum of fluids ranging from dry gas to oil. In fact the Utica, 
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discussed in chapter 4, may end up being the best analog, except for its lower 
TOCs. The depths are similar, and more importantly the expected reservoir 
pressures are comparable. Higher reservoir pressures mean higher production 
rates.
Mineralogy and Other Considerations
The mineralogy of a shale reservoir is an important characteristic for ease of 
recovery. The mineralogy of various shale reservoirs is depicted in Figure 19.  
All shale formations are some mixture of the constituents noted on each vertex 
of the triangle. Calcite and dolomite are carbonates of calcium and magnesium. 
Clay is an aluminosilicate, usually of sodium and potassium, and very ductile. 
Quartz is essentially sand (silica) in crystalline form. It and the carbonates are 
very brittle. For effective fracturing operations slight brittleness is desirable, but 
not too much. Plotted here are many of the known formations. The best ones 
are dominated by either silica or carbonate, but you can see that they are not 
close to either corner and there are none on the clay side. This is a technically 
difficult to explain format. Suffice to say near any apex, you have almost purely 
Figure 19. Mineralogy of various productive shale formations
Source: Data and format courtesy of the Colorado School of Mines.
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that substance. In the very middle of the triangle you would have a third 
of each constituent. The purpose is to compare with formations of known 
character.
Vaca Muerta is most like the Eagle Ford and Niobrara (which lies beneath 
much of the Great Plains of the US and Canada) in mineral character. Not 
shown are the results for the Utica, but it is also in the carbonate-dominated 
area. Production history for the Utica is still sparse, however, so the Eagle 
Ford experience may be the most valid in terms of predicting the comparative 
output of the Vaca Muerta. Results for Eagle Ford are shown in chapter 4, and 
the explosive growth is startling. Offsetting that in an Argentinian setting are 
the country’s high inflation rates, estimated by some to be in the vicinity of 
40 percent per year, although 30 percent may be a more generally accepted 
figure (Turner, 2014). Virtually all the drilling and production will be done by 
US-based service companies, and the pricing and availability of these services 
could be a factor. An interesting positive development in this regard is the 
growth of the Brazilian petroleum sector. 
The Brazilian government requires that a percentage of the revenue be spent 
in-country on research and development. This has caused at least the two 
major service companies in the key area of hydraulic fracturing, Halliburton 
and Schlumberger, to set up significant R&D facilities in Rio de Janeiro. 
Manufacturing of service equipment in São Paulo has been ongoing and could 
be expanded. These two factors could play an important role, especially if the 
two countries choose to cooperate in this regard. The soccer rivalry will need 
to take a back seat, especially the perceived failures in the 2014 World Cup. 
In the case of Brazil it was total ignominy, an unceremonious exit before the 
semifinals. Argentina at least made it to the finals, but national hero Lionel 
Messi was not his World-Player-of-the-Year self, and Germany hoisted the 
trophy. The national psyche was assuaged by the fact that at least it had not 
been Brazil.
A Profile of YPF
YPF, the largest energy firm in Argentina partially owned by the Argentine 
government, is the dominant player in the Vaca Muerta. Together with US-
based Chevron Corporation, it is developing the Loma Campana area. With 
an investment to date in mid-2014 of about $2 billion, YPF is producing over 
25,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil equivalent from 194 wells. The joint venture 
has committed to spend $16 billion over the next decade and a half. One 
would be tempted to make a linear estimate from the current performance and 
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forecast production of 250,000 bpd. But if the US experience is a guide, and 
it ought to be, the cost per barrel of production will drop significantly. YPF’s 
well costs at Loma Campana have already come down by over 30 percent from 
when development began.
YPF is led by Miguel Galuccio. What makes him particularly interesting 
is that prior to taking on the chief executive position, he was not an oilman 
in the classic sense, although he did work in oil and gas operations when 
younger. He came from running the Integrated Project Management division 
of Schlumberger and subsequently a variant of the same. 
At one stage, I was in charge of the reservoir group of the Halliburton 
equivalent. The group conducted the sophisticated evaluation of a prospect in 
precisely the same way as did the oil companies. We then ran the drilling and 
production operations and were paid for performance, not work done by the 
day. Both Halliburton and Schlumberger had variants on the business models 
surrounding this principle. Both at various times incurred oil company ire, by 
being seen as competitors, and models had to be changed. A clear dividing line, 
at least at Halliburton, had always been to not compete for leases. The elephant 
in the room had clearly been the possible supplanting of the integrated oil and 
gas company’s role as supplier of technology to national oil companies. Back in 
the day, the major national oil companies needed both capital and technology. 
In many parts of the world, after coffers were filled with production revenue, 
only the latter began to be needed. Argentina currently needs both.
At Schlumberger, Galuccio led a group that for all intents and purposes was 
an upstream oil company. His basic upbringing in a service company ought to 
allow him to be a judge of performance by service companies. This is of value 
in his role at YPF considering the fact that service companies perform virtually 
all the functions on a rig. Oilmen rising simply from the oil ranks would not 
have that insight from within, as it were.
 YPF also has downstream operations, comprising three refineries of 
different complexity. It is very unlikely that Galuccio came with experience in 
that sector. But then, most chief executives of integrated oil companies (these 
are oil production companies that also own refineries) have come from one 
side or the other, usually the upstream side.
Galuccio brings a few other favorable attributes. He is an Argentine 
petroleum engineer who was born in the northern city of Paraná. His early 
work experience includes time spent with conventional production in 
Patagonia, home to Vaca Muerta. But curiously it is his experience abroad that 
will serve him in good stead. By all accounts he assimilates. This trait is not on 
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every CEO search committee list, but it ought to be. For such people handling 
diversity becomes a way of life. While working in Malaysia he chose to acquire 
a working knowledge of Bahasa Malaysia (the country’s official language). This 
effort may have played a part in the recent announcement of investment in 
Vaca Muerta by the Malaysian national oil company Petronas (Turner, 2011). 
An initial investment of $500 million in the La Amarga Chica oil field is likely 
to be followed by much more.
Too Much of a Good Thing
Sometimes it is better to be a follower than a leader. The folks in the front tend 
to get shot. Argentina is in a position to learn from both the successes and the 
failures of shale oil and gas production in the US. The implications relative to 
avoiding environmental pitfalls, with technology as well as regulation, are to 
be found in other chapters. Here I discuss how to deal with having too much 
of a good thing. This is not the same as the “resource curse,” also known as 
the Dutch disease. “Too much of a good thing” is solely directed to the nature 
of the Vaca Muerta prospect. To be more precise, it relates to the fact that we 
expect the production of oil, gas, and natural gas liquids (NGLs) there. The 
oil will be light and sweet (low in sulfur). Most oil gets heavy and sour from 
bacterial degradation; the original “source” oil is therefore likely to be light and 
sweet. The NGLs will likely have a high proportion of ethane, as they do in the 
US. Both of these characteristics (the oil being sweet and the high proportion 
of ethane in the NGLs) have caught the US unprepared. Consequently, in 
2014 US shale oil is selling at a substantial discount to the world market price 
for oil of this quality. Similarly, ethane is largely stranded, as discussed in 
chapter 14. Argentina is in a position to do two things. One is to construct 
simple refineries, as described in chapter 12, close to the oil production in 
the Neuquén and Mendoza provinces. This will create local jobs, add to the 
economy, and eliminate the need for crude oil pipelines. While finished goods 
pipelines may be necessary, the distilled products would in part be distributed 
locally.
The more interesting play is in the conversion of ethane to ethylene. This 
is a very straightforward process and can be done locally. The US was saddled 
with the fact that 33 of the 36 ethane crackers were located over a thousand 
miles away from much of the ethane production. The anomalous case of 
LyondellBasell is discussed in the box on the following page. Starting from 
scratch allows Argentina to place these crackers in the Neuquén province in 
close proximity to wet gas production. The country could go from being an 
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importer of ethylene and derivatives to a net exporter. For a country saddled 
with a poor foreign exchange balance, this would help level it out. I have 
opined elsewhere (Rao, 2014) that monetization of natural gas components 
is particularly advantaged by vertical integration on a project basis. YPF, 
while in the refining business, would do well to acquire technology unique 
to ethane cracking, and associated capital, through such vertical integration. 
The principal tenet of the advantage of vertical integration is that when the 
producer and converter are partners, the raw material acquisition does not 
require complicated, long-term supply agreements and the producer can also 
benefit from the high price for the finished good. Ethane priced at $4 per MM 
Btu (the price in the US in mid-2014; see Figure 20 for trend) could be cracked 
for a cost of about $600 less per tonne than ethylene produced conventionally 
from naphtha derived from $100-per-barrel oil.
Figure 20. Ethane price trend compared to oil price (WTI), 2008 to 2015
Pricing data from the EIA for January 2, 2008 to March 30, 2015.
WTI refers to West Texas Intermediate, a benchmark for crude oil pricing.
Source: Plot used by permission of David Bem and Mark Jones, The Dow Chemical Company.
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The Curious Case of LyondellBasell 
A recent story in Forbes (Vardi, 2014) tells the tale of the rise, fall, and rise again 
of LyondellBasell, a Houston-based chemical manufacturer. At first blush the 
story is a gripping tale of savvy investing, risk taking, and two opposite bets by 
equally shrewd investors, both of whom made large profits. But the true message 
is really none of that. It is entirely the plus side of the ethane dilemma discussed in 
chapter 14. It is also a lesson in the possibility that behind every problem lurks an 
opportunity.
The tale unfolded in 2007 when Basell, a European chemical company, 
bought struggling Lyondell Chemical Company. By 2009 the newly named 
LyondellBasell sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Apollo Global Management saw 
an opportunity and essentially purchased the company for about $2 billion. 
Meanwhile, Leonard Blavatnik, one of the principals in Basell, also bought into 
positions in the restructured company. The company took off, and Apollo cashed 
in about $12 billion in 2013. Not a bad profit in five years. Blavatnik, with a similar 
proportional profit in hand, instead of cashing out, continued to buy and is 
reported to be sitting on $8 billion in unrealized profits. 
The Forbes story credits the shale gas revolution with the performance. In 
a sense that is true, but the explanation is more nuanced than that. First is the 
fact that the bulk of LyondellBasell profits come from ethylene and derivatives. 
Second is that ethane prices started to drop relative to oil in 2009. By mid-2010 
ethane was nearly half the price of oil on the basis of energy content (see Figure 
20). Ethylene is conventionally produced from the oil derivative naphtha. Ethylene 
produced from cheap ethane is hundreds of dollars cheaper to make per tonne, 
and a tonne of ethylene sells from $1,000 to $1,500 (the price in 2014) depending 
on market conditions. This was the primary reason for LyondellBasell’s profitability 
coming strongly out of bankruptcy. But why did other ethylene producers not 
profit similarly? In chapter 14, I mentioned that 33 of 36 US crackers are on the Gulf 
Coast, with just two in the Midwest and one small one in Kentucky. Those two in 
the Midwest just happen to belong to LyondellBasell and are very close to ethane 
supply. In recognition of this, the company quickly added capacity to these two. 
Result: enormous profits from capitalizing on the low raw material prices.
In 2013, when Apollo cashed out and Blavatnik increased his stake, ethane 
pricing dropped through the floor (see Figure 20). This explains why the company 
profits continued to climb, and the stock stands at 50 percent over the figure 
when Blavatnik last purchased stock from Apollo. In the Forbes interview Blavatnik 
attributes the success of his strategy to luck and hopes the luck will continue. 
More likely is the possibility that he saw the trend, which started in 2012. The 
fundamentals underlying the trend, low natural gas prices and high prices for 
propane and butane, will continue to cause wet gas to be produced preferentially. 
Ethane will continue to be a glut until crackers show up. But unlike expansions 
of LyondellBasell crackers, building new ones takes many more years, significant 
financing, and ethane pricing crystal balls extending 20 years. Small, distributed 
crackers, as suggested in chapter 14, could be a shorter-term factor.
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The Outlook for Argentina
Argentina is the most promising shale oil and gas play outside the US, even 
taking into account the EIA estimate in China, where less is publicly known 
regarding the reservoir character. The combined characteristics of Vaca Muerta 
make it more attractive than any single play in the US. Shale oil and gas have 
transformed the US economy, and not just in the energy sector. A net importer 
of gas is now an exporter. Oil imports have plummeted. A net importer of 
ammonia fertilizer and of ethylene and derivatives, to name just two classes 
of chemicals, it will soon be an exporter of these commodities. The effect 
on the balance of trade is significant. Argentina can aspire to all of this and 
more. Policy constraints such as the prohibition against export of crude oil are 
holding back aspects of development in the US. Policy constraints are likely the 
single biggest class of barriers to a shale revolution in Argentina.
Elephants abound in the room. The nationalization of Repsol-YPF, initially 
seemingly without compensation, was chilling. The government-majority-
owned YPF is doing well, but the chill remains. Until recently, natural gas was 
allowed to be sold for as low as $2.50 per MM Btu. New production such as 
shale gas is now permitted a price of $7.50, which is healthy for investors if it 
holds up. Bolivian gas is being imported for around $10 in mid-2014. LNG 
is being allowed to be imported at numbers exceeding $13. All of this lends a 
significant element of uncertainty. Finally, there was the national decision in 
mid-2014 to default on loans from a US entity. All of the foregoing makes it 
more difficult to attract financing.
Assuming financing is enabled in some fashion, the highest margin fluids 
will attract the earliest attention. Even at $7.50 per MM Btu natural gas is not 
as lucrative as oil at $100 per barrel. At the 2015 price of around $60, things 
are more in balance. Wet gas is more attractive than dry gas because the wet 
component sells for close to oil prices and the dry part still has a market. 
Current estimates have wet gas as a minor part of the Vaca Muerta reserves but 
with such a lofty numerator even a minor portion is valuable for many years. 
But if wet gas is produced the ethane will need a home. Conversion to ethylene 
is attractive compared to production from naphtha, and it would ameliorate the 
Argentine position as importer of ethylene derivatives. The dry gas in isolation 
has national energy security value because it could in time eliminate expensive 
LNG and Bolivian gas. As a net importer of refined products, crude oil, natural 
gas, and certain petrochemicals, the choice from the smorgasbord above may 
not matter at first in terms of a national imperative. But at some point certain 
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directions will be more in keeping with national interests as opposed to private 
commercial ones. 
Some directions are crystal clear. The initial YPF/Chevron foray is in 
the oil leg. The output from this must be refined in the Neuquén province, 
resisting the temptation to build pipelines to the large refineries in Buenos 
Aires. This is because this is light sweet oil and needs only a “simple refinery” 
as defined in chapter 12. One such already exists, the small 25,000 bpd Plaza 
Huincul refinery in the Neuquén province belonging to YPF. Adding capacity 
to it would be quicker and less expensive than any other alternative. This is 
happening in the US today in the Eagle Ford and Bakken. 
Plaza Huincul already has gas to methanol conversion capability. This 
could easily be augmented. In general the federal policy of limiting natural 
gas availability for methanol production could be relaxed in time. Eventually 
the country ought to consider legislating allowing methanol as the gasoline 
oxygenate in place of the current mandate for 5 percent ethanol, especially 
because half as much methanol achieves the same result. Much as in China, 
higher concentrations would reduce dependence on gasoline.
Ultimately Argentina can look forward to overall prosperity for every 
citizen caused by cheap and plentiful domestic energy. In a lecture in Buenos 
Aires in 2014 I remarked that in the US shale oil and gas had appeared like 
a tidal wave that lifted all boats of economic prosperity. Much the same is in 
Argentina’s future if policy constraints do not get in the way.

CHAPTER 29
Research Directions
“A new day will dawn for those who stand long”
—From “Stairway to Heaven” by Led Zeppelin (written by Jimmy Page and Robert Plant)
The intrusion of a new reality always brings with it the opportunity for 
significant research. The sheer newness has associated uncertainties and in 
many instances also disbelief. This latter was certainly the case with Stanley 
Prusiner’s discovery of prions, at the University of California, San Francisco. 
The idea of infectious proteins was met with a reaction close to derision from 
colleagues and bordering on vilification by the scientific press. The prominent 
journal Cell rejected his first paper on the subject. Prusiner and colleagues 
eventually got it published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, in principle an even more prestigious journal. But a directed review 
by a member of the National Academy of Sciences is one mechanism (the 
member, not an independent editor, picks the reviewers)—when this happens 
it is not classic peer review.
But publishing in the journal still brings prestige because the members, the 
crème de la crème of scientific society, are trusted to adhere to scientific rigor 
in the directed review process. This is sometimes subject to falling prey to 
impassioned beliefs. Then again, as in this case, groundbreaking science may 
see the light of day and not be buried by reviewer orthodoxy.
The idea of producing hydrocarbons from a source rock cannot possibly 
be considered to be in the same league as the discovery of prions. But it shares 
the attribute that much research activity will be spawned. Unsurprisingly, 
the major emphasis will be on improving economics of production and 
minimizing the environmental impact. Beyond this, the sheer abundance 
and sustained low cost of this resource will drive innovation in the chemical 
processing and transportation areas. Natural gas fluids will now be an attractive 
feedstock.
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Improving the Productivity of Wells
This important problem is already being heavily researched by industry. 
Currently only about 5 to 7 percent of the oil and gas in place is being 
recovered. This compares to a world average of around 35 percent for 
conventional reservoirs. Below are just some of my personal favorites regarding 
directions to be taken.
The steep production decline rate in the first two years or so has been the 
subject of much conjecture by opponents of shale oil and gas. As noted earlier, 
this is not a big factor if the overall economics work. But understanding 
and ameliorating this phenomenon could produce positive returns. One 
approach already being investigated is that of a proppant that achieves greater 
The Prion Story 
At the time it was considered impossible that a protein could replicate and 
that it could transmit disease. Interestingly, the Nobel Prize was awarded to 
Stanley Prusiner in 1997 before causality was properly established. Criticism 
for that decision was immense; one science writer likened it to Henry 
Kissinger’s being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, which is a low blow of major 
proportions. Basically, people took sides.
Now there is no doubt that bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow 
disease), Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, and scrapie (in sheep) are all transmitted 
by prions. And the case for the dreaded species-to-species transfer has been 
made.
Even before the solution was seen as groundbreaking, the problem of 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy was seen as important enough 
to merit another Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for its elucidation. 
In 1976 Carleton Gajdusek was awarded the Nobel Prize. He was studying 
the disease kuru and hypothesized that the disease was transmitted due to 
a custom of a particular Papua New Guinea tribe. This essentially involved 
honoring the death of a family member by eating a portion of that person’s 
brain. The disease existed only among the 65,000 tribal villagers in one set of 
valleys. Gajdusek also popularized the notion of a slow-acting virus being the 
cause, and this, too, was considered controversial because no such species 
had been isolated.
In an interesting parallel to the award to Prusiner, the Nobel was given 
before definite proof of the hypothesis. But his award spurred an intense 
search for slow-acting viruses to cure slow-developing illnesses such as cancer 
and Alzheimer’s. The investigators hit a dead end not long after the Nobel 
award. This is likely the only instance in which a Nobel was awarded first for 
the wrong explanation for a disease mechanism and then later for the right 
one.
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penetration than the conventional. This is responsive to the hypothesis that 
insufficient proppant coverage in the fractures is allowing earth stresses to close 
the cracks. This progressively chokes off the flow. An extravagant approach 
would be to throw the conventional book out. No proppants. Figure out some 
other way to hold the rock faces apart and allow fluid flow. All these measures 
will be even more important in the case of shale oil, which has less mobility in 
the fractures than does gas.
I discussed refracturing in chapter 11 and mentioned that there is ongoing 
research in this area. I have a personal belief that harnessing this may be more 
fruitful than improving the longer-term flow characteristics of fractures. This is 
because of the inherently tight nature of the rock. No matter how you improve 
the conductivity of the fractures, the fact that the rock not immediately 
proximal is unlikely to drain is something to be dealt with. 
An important area is better characterization of the reservoir rock. In many 
cases up to 35 percent of fracturing stages are believed to be nonproductive. In 
conventional reservoirs this would essentially be unheard of. Were the rocks 
better understood, the return on investment would be significantly enhanced. 
Some of the more interesting work in this area is by a small company named 
Ingrain using technology (Dvorkin et al., 2003) developed at Stanford 
University. Here rock core is being evaluated using imaging techniques to 
provide a quantitative estimate of important reservoir properties such as 
relative permeability. If the extension of this to evaluating simple drill cuttings 
is successful, the hit rate on productive intervals ought to improve substantially.
Maybe a combination of technologies is the answer. It will come down to 
cost-effectiveness. Wet gas, and by extension shale oil, can tolerate a lot of cost 
if the benefit is there.
Gas to Liquids
Predictably low gas prices combined with the desire to reduce oil imports 
ought to drive GTL activity. The conventional Fischer-Tropsch process needs 
improved economics to be able to be competitive with episodic drops in oil 
price. The North American outlook, and stranded gas in Alaska in particular, 
should be sufficient impetus for the needed research, most likely in the 
catalysis aspect. An interesting area for development is that of small-footprint 
conversion of methane to liquids. This would enable distributed conversion, as 
mentioned in earlier chapters. But the readily realizable product is a gasoline 
substitute, diesel being more complicated. The preponderance of gasoline usage 
in North America for passenger vehicles takes the sting out of this limitation.
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The small-footprint conversion of ethane to ethylene is also a target. This 
is by far simpler in processing terms than the methane conversion mentioned 
above because ethane already has a carbon-to-carbon bond, and ethylene is 
simply ethane with two hydrogen atoms removed. Here, too, the principal 
challenge is innovation in catalysts, although advances will also be needed in 
the effective separation of constituents, particularly in a portable configuration.
A more mundane but important area is the removal of minor constituents 
prior to any of this processing. This primarily involves removal of sulfurous 
gases and carbon dioxide. Alaskan gas sometimes contains up to 12 percent 
carbon dioxide, although Lower 48 shale gas is advantaged in this regard (with 
some exceptions). The research again will likely center on small-footprint and 
minimally energy-intensive methods.
Environmental Issues
These fall broadly in the categories of matters related to water usage and 
disposal, measurement and control of air emissions, and measures to ensure 
best practices in all of these.
Water withdrawals: To minimize fresh water usage, saline waters of 
convenience ought to be employed. The research to tolerate salinity in 
fracturing fluids has been done to a point. An interesting objective would 
be to pilot the use of reverse-osmosis reject brine as the base fluid. A quick 
explanation: reverse osmosis is the current workhorse desalination method. 
A starting concentration of sea water would end with fresh water and heavy 
brine. The latter needs to be discarded, and this is problematic in some 
instances.
The more likely saline water of convenience is from saline aquifers, as 
discussed earlier. The research needed is in characterizing those proximal to 
shale reservoirs. At a minimum the constituents evaluated would be bacteria 
and some of the different salts. A broad effort in each target state is called for. 
Once characterized and made available to the public, the steps of cleaning and 
use ought to be straightforward.
Flowback water disposal: In areas with no deep disposal well capability, 
the problem is significant. All of the Marcellus and Utica for sure have no 
easy disposal capability, and this has been the cause of serious angst in 
Pennsylvania. The research will likely focus on the most cost-effective means to 
reuse the flowback water for fracturing. A lot of work has gone into this aspect, 
so in the main it will probably be just development activity. Having said that, a 
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better mouse trap could speed the reuse. This probably again will be in small- 
footprint or portable systems. Large water treatment facilities that aggregate the 
flowback water from multiple wells will not be the favored route unless there 
are specific, compelling reasons. Movement of this water in trucks is subject to 
accidental spills, and the farm roads would welcome less traffic.
Fugitive emissions of methane and, separately, volatile organic compounds 
have acquired some currency in discussion. While many of these are amenable 
to simple good practices, there could be scope for better measurement and 
reporting systems. In April 2012, the US EPA issued a comprehensive set of 
regulations that primarily address release into the atmosphere. These ought 
to be actionable by industry without much research. However, the most 
celebrated of the fugitive methane issues are those of aquifer contamination. 
Release of detailed plans for testing water wells before drilling (baseline) and 
at regular intervals during and after drilling is called for. Systems need to be in 
place to advise homeowners unfamiliar with their rights.
Capturing and utilizing the gas associated with flowback water during 
the early days of the wells could be a target. To do so economically could be 
quite challenging. The vented gas onboard LNG ships is utilized effectively 
because engines exist that can usefully employ the gas. In shale gas operations, 
switching operating equipment fuel to natural gas would be one target. But that 
may not consume enough. A high-value target would be the small-footprint 
conversion of the methane to something useful. Since it will be difficult to 
make this economic, inducements could be offered to further this sort of 
endeavor.
Mini LNG: Effective utilization of LNG in transport needs a breakthrough in 
LNG distribution. LNG is transported at -161°C and is kept cold through 
controlled evaporative cooling. This limits the range of distribution; there is 
a use-it-or-lose-it situation. New technology known as mini LNG is in late-
stage development. Mini LNG targets production of the liquid in plants rated 
at a mere 20,000 gallons per day, compared to a typical LNG plant putting out 
5 million gallons per day. Such small plants could be distributed all along the 
transportation network, served by trucks and trains. All they would need is a 
supply of natural gas. Industrial heavyweights such as Shell, GE, and Linde are 
reported to be pursuing this market. Mini LNG would also enable the switch 
away from diesel in other locations such as well site operations.
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Social Science Research
Given the national importance of shale gas, research must be conducted on 
customer perceptions and understanding of the pluses and minuses. Beyond 
this, communication campaigns ought to be devised to close the gaps in 
understanding. This will dampen the confusion caused today by stridency from 
both sides of the debate.
A valid area of research is systematic economic development methodology 
as it relates to shale gas. In many instances shale gas drilling is in areas new 
to such industry. Many of the players are small companies that may need 
guidance in best practices with regard to considering societal benefit in the 
sustainability equation.
Finally, best practices on casing and cementing need to be detailed, as do 
methods to track and ensure these practices. Again, this is not the province of 
research, just something that needs to be done.
CHAPTER 30
Policy Directions
“Come senators, congressmen, please heed the call”
—From “The Times They Are a-Changin’ ” by Bob Dylan
Shale gas has burst into our energy consciousness with such rapidity as not to 
allow for a great deal of preparation in the form of informed policymaking. 
The economic prosperity message has been blunted by the environmental risk 
cacophony. Both aspects are in need of decided action by all concerned parties 
in order for the nation to enjoy the economic windfall while still managing the 
associated risks.
While rulemaking is important, equally critical is voluntary joint industry 
action. When the industry embarked upon challenging deepwater exploitation, 
it formed the consortium DeepStar to jointly address the critical hurdles.
The environmental issues facing the shale gas industry do not even begin 
to approach the difficulty of the deep water tasks. Not to minimize the 
importance, but with a couple of exceptions, the bulk of the actions require the 
broad scale execution of best practices. This task can and must be taken on, 
in part because unconventional resources have, until recently, been the sole 
province of smaller companies with limited resources.
When the Research Partnership to Secure Energy for America (RPSEA) 
was formed in 2006 with congressional line-item funding, the two targets were 
ultra-deepwater and unconventional resources. But even then, when the shale 
gale was a mere breeze, Congress insisted on a “small operator” provision, 
meaning that at least some projects were required to have a clear line of sight 
to benefit the small producer. Today the nation would be well served if RPSEA’s 
focus were to be exclusively tight oil and gas, the latter including shale gas. 
Strictly from a national imperative, all the evidence now points to tight gas on 
land being a more important resource than ultra-deepwater gas. The definition 
of tight gas includes shale gas and gas found in other low-permeability rock 
such as sandstones and carbonates. Also, with very few exceptions, ultra-
deepwater gas is the domain of the big players. They can afford to finance 
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research on their own, or through consortia, such as the recent consortium 
to devise spill containment technology, in response to the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.
The use of public funds in implicit support of any major profit-making 
industry is fraught. Therefore, RPSEA funding of ultra-deepwater efforts is 
questionable. Risk reduction in shale gas is different. It ought to be considered 
a national priority because of the economic gain that would otherwise be 
at risk. Also, the primary beneficiaries, aside from communities in which 
production happens, will be smaller producers. It is true that this landscape 
is continually changing, with bigger players buying into the asset base. But 
the charge that support of shale gas is support of Big Oil has little merit in the 
main. The list of producers in Pennsylvania today is a Who’s Who of companies 
that the public never heard of. Ironically, the entrée of bigger players is likely to 
improve operational diligence. Some may not like the size and profitability of 
ExxonMobil, but for operational discipline they have no equal.
The ideas expressed below are intended to stimulate discussion and 
not be overly prescriptive. The most important areas are those that ensure 
environmentally secure operations. Within each category, though, my ideas are 
addressed in no particular order.
Environmental Issues
Preventing well water contamination: The most important measure is to 
ensure the collection of baseline data on a specified set of chemicals including 
methane in all wells in a predefined proximity to the drilling operations, likely 
2,500 feet. The appropriate authority (federal, state, or county) should specify 
the nature and frequency of the testing and qualify the testing entities. The 
cost ought to be borne directly or indirectly by the producer. The purpose 
is to definitively assess whether fugitive methane or any other species from 
the production operations are entering well water. In the event such a leak is 
detected, regulations ought to be in place for remedial action to fix the leak.
Well operators should be required to place cement sealing over every 
zone of potential gas production, no matter how small in quantity, above the 
reservoir. Failure to do so incurs the risk of a source for leakage. This cement 
job and the normal casing and cementing operations ought to be verifiably 
competent, as determined by appropriately specified testing. Industry 
best practice in this area should be documented and made available to all 
producers. Regulatory oversight for compliance may be needed. This can 
be facilitated by the use of sophisticated sensors and means to transmit via 
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satellite the data to operational supervisors as well as regulators in central 
urban locations, thus minimizing oversight cost. This last is very simply 
accomplished and is commonplace in the industry today. But the driver for 
remote communications has been operational cost reduction, especially for 
deepwater operations. Adapting to measurements required by regulators 
would be simple. The suggestion is that an industry-sponsored organization 
coordinate this effort and ensure that both small operators and regulators 
have remote communication (satellite) capabilities. Every state is writing new 
regulations in this area, which are increasingly prescriptive. We need to throw 
technology at the problem of cost of monitoring and enforcement. Failing to 
do so will overload the state departments of environmental protection and 
siphon away too great a fraction of the severance tax.
Tax matters: Nobody likes new taxes. But severance taxes are fair because they 
are philosophically no different from corporate income taxes. In addition to 
this, all states ought to consider impact fees. These are fees to directly address 
local infrastructure damage such as to roads and bridges from the unusually 
heavy traffic associated with fracturing operations. The proceeds from these 
fees ought to remain with the local community suffering the privation.
Handling flowback water: Regulations must be in place for safe handling of 
flowback water. The most preferred options are to treat and reuse, and disposal 
in UIC Class II wells. Consideration could be given to making mandatory 
only these two options, with variances granted only on a case-by-case basis. 
Disposal in UIC Class II wells is less expensive than treating and reusing 
flowback water when available. However, further diligence on such wells 
relative to procedures to minimize the risk of interaction with active faults 
is needed. Failure to do so can lead to minor earthquakes. Reusing flowback 
water will be facilitated by a practice of using salty water as the base fluid 
for fracturing. Even so, service providers will need to gear up to provide the 
treatment service, so benign alternatives may have to be found for each area in 
the interim.
Minimizing fresh water usage: Industry today can feasibly utilize salty water 
for fracturing. Consideration should be given to regulations requiring this 
as the default, with explainable variances only in cases where salty water of 
convenience is absent or temporarily unavailable.
Disclosure of fracturing chemicals: This issue is more fully discussed in 
chapter 6, “The Chemicals Disclosure Conundrum.” The proprietary product 
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exception must not be permitted to be used as a shield or an artifice. One 
measure to assure that is to require a state body to verify the claim for 
exemption. The nonprofit website FracFocus is now almost a standard of use as 
a simple vehicle for disclosure and public access.
Minimizing fugitive gas emissions: Gas produced prior to the hooking up of a 
pipeline to the production site must be handled in the most environmentally 
secure fashion. In chapter 18, I recommend innovation in small-footprint, 
preferably mobile, means to capture the gas and convert it to a transportable 
liquid. For economics purposes this gas could be considered to be zero cost. 
If the new EPA green completions regulations slated for 2015 go through 
unscathed, methane release and flaring will not be permitted for new 
operations. The associated gas from oil production is not currently covered by 
the legislation, which also has other exemptions. But technologies are needed 
to address legacy and currently exempted operations.
Displacing diesel use: The biggest energy hogs on shale oil or gas operations are 
the high-pressure pumps associated with fracturing. These operate on diesel. 
In close proximity to farms and residences, this constitutes a hazard relative 
to particulate emissions. PM2.5 (particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns 
in size) is a scourge and is responsible for 1.5 million preventable deaths 
worldwide. Diesel can be substituted with natural gas alternatives such as CNG 
or LNG. Pilot operations are under way, with Apache Corporation leading the 
way with the help of equipment manufacturer Caterpillar and service provider 
Halliburton. Other entities have since climbed on board. A key to success is the 
economic supply of CNG or LNG at the rig site. This is discussed in chapter 29, 
“Research Directions.”
Pad drilling: This is a mode of production wherein multiple wells are drilled 
from a single location. This facilitates all of the recommendations made above 
and has a positive environmental footprint with respect to roads and traffic. It 
is a net benefit for the producer as well because a few experienced operators 
can now supervise several wells. Best practices must be shared to nudge pad 
activities to commence as early in the development as possible.
Economic Issues
Ethane monetization: State and local governments should consider 
inducements for local processing of the ethane, be they regional crackers or 
pad-level reactive options (see chapter 14). The compelling economics may 
be sufficient, but the governments should also take full responsibility for 
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local workforce training and the like. Consideration ought also to be given to 
encouraging research and development centers in the Marcellus/Utica region 
targeting research related to wet gas. Proximal production would allow easy 
access to field testing sites.
Export issues: Abetted by a warm winter, abundant shale gas caused the price 
in early 2012 to be the lowest in a decade. Even if this is ignored as aberrant, 
there is little doubt that a lot of cheap gas will become the norm. In fact, a 
colder winter in 2013–2014 caused the prices to revert to the new normal 
of around $4, with minor excursions to $6. This last was entirely due to the 
inadequacy of midstream infrastructure and was short-lived. The temptation to 
export the gas is high, and this is currently being debated. The box below gives 
some views on this matter.
Unconstrained LNG Export Is Not in the National Interest 
We must minimize the export of natural gas in any form in favor of producing 
and exporting a higher-value product. The single most valuable such high-
volume product is ammonia-based fertilizer. (Carbon black would be higher 
value but has a smaller market.) Until recently the US imported half the 
fertilizer consumed. This is because variable and high prices in the early part 
of the century caused many manufacturers to relocate abroad to areas of 
cheap gas such as the Middle East. Now with the prospect of cheap and stable 
shale gas, many of these are returning. No doubt the chemical industry is 
skittish about LNG export concepts because exports could vitiate the business 
assumptions of low cost, were the prices to rise due to massive export of gas. 
At the time of writing, five permits have been issued, totaling about 10.5 bcf 
per day of gas usage. An additional 5 bcf per day could be permitted without 
a material impact on gas prices. Maintaining the price differential between 
North America and Europe (and Asia) is key to the expected manufacturing 
renaissance in the chemicals and fuels sector.
Aside from the pricing issue, another reason to export product rather 
than gas is simple economics. Take the example of anhydrous ammonia, the 
basic building block for nitrogen fertilizer manufacture. About 33.3 mcf gas 
converts to 1 tonne of anhydrous ammonia. The gas value, using $4 per mcf, 
is $134. The value of the anhydrous ammonia is in the vicinity of $800. Also, 
domestic labor was used to get it to that state. The landed price in Europe 
of gas as LNG will be about $8.50 with $4 gas. That near-doubling of value 
added does not contribute much to the domestic economy. Even the ship was 
probably made in Korea.
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The US will be one of the lowest-cost producers of ethane-based ethylene 
and derivative polymer in the world. This raises the high likelihood of the 
US being a net exporter of these chemicals. If gas prices stay low, wet gas will 
be produced almost exclusively. This could cause an ethane glut and lead to 
exports of ethylene derivatives. This ought to be permitted and encouraged.
States proximal to wet gas production but without any of their own, such 
as North Carolina, ought to consider encouraging chemical production. 
Wilmington, North Carolina, already has a chemical industry and being a port 
could be an export site. Prosperity from cheap and abundant gas does not have 
to be restricted to the producing states.
Exporting shale oil: As explained in chapter 12, domestically produced light 
sweet oil from shale reservoirs cannot find a ready market in the US due to 
domestic refineries’ being geared to heavy oil. Consequently it is selling at a 
discount to the world market price of the commodity. In January 2014, the 
discount was $18 less than WTI and $27 less than Brent. One could expect 
the export price to be between the two. From a national standpoint, if limited 
export is permitted and the shortfall made up with extra Canadian crude, there 
ought to be a net positive impact on GDP. This is because Canadian heavy 
oil sells between $15 and $30 less than WTI. Selling high and buying low has 
always been a good strategy!
Oil substitution: Three principal avenues present themselves: electric vehicles, 
natural gas replacement of gasoline and diesel, and conversion of natural gas to 
liquids. The potential policy drivers for this could include the following:
•  A decision by Alaska to kill the gas pipeline to the Lower 48 and to 
encourage the conversion of vast quantities of cheap stranded gas to 
liquids. The owners of the gas, principally major oil companies with a 
thorough understanding of GTL technologies, ought to be motivated to 
do this with no inducement. Absent this, the TAPS, the pipeline bringing 
oil down from the North Slope, is at risk of closure, as discussed in 
chapter 15.
•  Shale gas–producing states should consider requiring operators to 
displace diesel with CNG, LNG, DME, or methanol for the pressure 
pumps used in fracturing and cementing, and natural gas or methanol 
for the vehicles. There will be issues of access to refueling, capital cost of 
retrofits, and the like, but states could address the refueling issues, at least. 
This could be a bit tricky because the fuel of choice for trucks would be 
LNG, not CNG.
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•  All metropolitan areas ought to consider emulating Delhi and a host 
of other Indian cities where all public transport switched to CNG. The 
World Bank evaluated the health benefits as very significant, as noted in 
chapter 17. But from the standpoint of reducing imported oil, replacing 
gasoline has a bigger bang and methanol may be the route, as discussed in 
chapter 19.
•  Dimethyl ether (DME) can substitute for diesel up to at least 20 percent 
with no engine modification, emits zero particulates, and has a very 
high cetane rating. Cheap natural gas equates to cheap DME. States 
should consider DME additive to diesel as an alternative to a wholesale 
switch to natural gas or as an early step toward that goal. New plants 
for DME production will be required. Since DME is a single processing 
step beyond methanol production, methanol and DME strategies can be 
pursued simultaneously.
National Security
The military is a gigantic user of transport fuel. Relative to fuel switching, on 
the one hand mission criticality would demand the most proven and reliable 
fuel. On the other hand, the delivery of such a fuel to the front lines has huge 
elements of cost and potential loss of life. The military ought to conduct an 
analysis of options, some considerations of which are listed below:
• Base operations are amenable to a complete switch to CNG-fueled 
vehicles. In fact it may not be far-fetched for military vehicle design to 
take advantage of methane’s 125+ octane rating with a high-compression 
engine. If the military standardized on such an engine, a civilian version 
down the road could be feasible. Think Hummer.
• Bases, particularly in foreign countries, could operate small-scale 
electricity generators using natural gas with stored backup of CNG or 
even methanol. This could be augmented with solar power in appropriate 
locations. Nonreliance on an outside grid would have security advantages.
• Aside from the physical risks in delivering fuel and water to the front 
lines, the cost of security for the convoy likely raises the cost of these 
commodities to many times the normal. Consequently, the military 
could consider sponsoring research in the small-footprint distributed 
production of transport fuel using the raw material of convenience. The 
baseline cost for such fluid would be the security-inflated cost of convoy 
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delivery. Also, a switch to electricity for vehicles where feasible should be 
strongly considered. Electricity production in forward locations is more 
feasible than liquid fuel production.
Finally, abundant shale gas in North America means that more LNG is 
available for delivery to Europe, thus significantly reducing Russia’s ability 
to use gas supplies as a weapon of political will. One could expect increased 
US influence worldwide as a result. While no specific policy actions spring 
to mind, lawmakers ought to be aware of the consequences in this regard of 
significantly holding back shale gas production in the US.
Conclusions
“There will be an answer, let it be”
—From “Let It Be” by The Beatles (written by John Lennon and Paul McCartney)
Shale gas has the potential to materially improve the economic lot of 
every citizen of the US. There is also the real possibility that, together with 
distributed cleaner energy such as wind and solar, cheap energy in the form 
of shale gas could improve the human condition worldwide. Such lofty 
rewards beg for a concerted effort by all concerned to assess and ameliorate 
the associated environmental risks. In the opinion of this author, that is an 
acceptable risk provided we employ a combination of innovative technology, 
regulatory oversight, and the industry will to do the right thing, nudged along 
by informed local activism in the areas that industry operates.
The public has a right to know the timeframes involved in the rewards 
and the risks. While the intent of the book was to allow the readers to form 
their own opinions, I will attempt a response to the question of timing. The 
reduction in the cost to heat homes was already felt in the winter of 2011; 
one estimate is a $1,000 average reduction per household each year. In 2012 
this number was estimated to be $1,200. Low-cost fertilizer and ethylene 
and derivatives are already making their presence felt from the standpoint of 
reduced imports and will do so increasingly in the short term: two to five years. 
The quicker results will be from resuscitating previously mothballed plants. 
To the extent that there is a world price for these items, export could dampen 
the direct benefit to farmers and other consumers. Policy measures could 
ensure the domestic benefit. In any case the balance of trade would improve 
if for no other reason than through the reduction, or in the limit elimination, 
of imports. In early 2014 the American Chemical Council reported that new 
shale gas–related capital planned totaled $100.2 billion. It appears that nearly 
half of this funding is from foreign sources, underlining the fact that the 
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chemical industries in other countries are non-competitive due to cheap North 
American gas.
Methanol displacement of gasoline and diesel is an exciting consequence of 
shale gas production. The needed legislation to require most cars to accept any 
combination of conventional fuels and alcohol still awaits passage in Congress. 
Meanwhile China is leading the way, although the methanol is entirely being 
sourced from coal, not natural gas. That could change with the anticipated 
supply of gas from Russia, reported to be in the vicinity of 1.4 trillion cubic 
feet per year. The compelling economics could drive change in two to five years 
in the US. The slowest link in that chain will be addition of methanol capacity 
and establishing fueling infrastructure. The high compression engine which 
effectively would more than halve the cost of fuel per mile will take longer: 
up to 10 years. This timeframe could move up if the public is vociferous in 
demanding it.
The positive effects on US national security for dimming the aspirations of 
Russia and Iran would be in the short time frame, two to five years. It would be 
longer for the effect on reduction of imported oil, closer to the 10-year mark 
for a material effect. However, the most recent surge in shale oil production is 
affecting this assessment directly, and the trend is expected to continue. There 
is a realistic possibility that by 2025 all oil will be sourced from North America.
On the environmental risk side, the public will want to know whether 
measures to manage the risk are working and how soon this will be known. 
Regulations requiring that flowback water only be either reused or disposed of 
in UIC Class II wells ought to be in place by 2015, if states choose to impose 
them. North Carolina, the newest state to formulate regulations, expects to 
have these in place by early 2015. But regulations in and of themselves do not 
assure compliance. 
The measures to assure prevention of earthquakes from disposal well 
activity ought to be a short term activity. Proper measures, such as the 
requirement to map the subsurface for proximity to active faults, ought to 
eliminate this phenomenon. The appropriate place for this is in modification 
of the specifications in EPA’s UIC Class II well procedures. Technology for 
reuse of flowback water already exists but more will be needed for broadening 
use and reducing cost. This is the more desirable of the two options. Full-scale 
implementation ought to be possible in two to five years. Since programmed 
releases of flowback water to the surface will not be an option, any accidental 
spills during the two allowable handling methods would be observable events. 
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With the industry trending toward the use of greener constituents in fracturing 
fluid, the only substantive issue with accidental spills should be the saltiness. 
Environmental degradation just from high salt would not be as long lasting 
as it might have been from organic compounds such as diesel, which would 
be forbidden from use in that application in most states. There is no technical 
need to use diesel in fracturing fluid, and disallowing it does not constitute 
restraint of trade.
The use of salty water in place of fresh for fracturing is technically feasible 
today. Material implementation ought also to be in the short term provided 
there is the will to do it. State legislation requiring this would be desirable and 
community activism would be helpful in persuading legislators.
Preventing well water contamination ought to be straightforward if my 
suggestions in this book, and available in greater detail in the North Carolina 
regulations promulgated in early 2015, are followed. A key aspect is that 
industry must make best practices on well construction and monitoring 
available to the smaller producers. Baseline testing of proximal water wells at 
industry expense prior to drilling activity, followed by routine testing after, 
will provide definitive proof of efficacy of well construction. There would no 
room for uncertainty. In the event of an upset condition, response time for 
remediation ought to be weeks not months. From an operational standpoint, 
sound well construction preventing fluid leakage is just a matter of following 
good practice. Consequently, upset conditions ought to carry severe penalties. 
Methane releases during early stages of gas production are believed to occur 
in some instances. In each case the gas is first collected, so the operator knows 
how much there is and precisely where it is stored. This potent greenhouse gas 
must not be directly discharged. If no useful purpose is found, it ought to be 
burned on location (flared). If this gas is either used or flared, the public ought 
not to have concerns on this score. If operators are required to report on these 
occurrences, an even greater measure of comfort could be realized without 
undue burden on the operator. Automatic monitoring with remote reporting 
ought to be straightforward. Provided the so-called green completions mandate 
by the EPA is fully enforced in 2015, all the foregoing is moot. No discharge or 
flaring will be permitted for new production, although there are exemptions 
for exploratory wells, and gas associated with oil production is also not covered 
at this time. The study by the University of Texas (Allen et al., 2013), funded 
largely by the Environmental Defense Fund, is endeavoring to detail precisely 
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the nature and quantity of fugitive emissions. When completed it ought to 
provide direction on how best to ameliorate the problem.
There is little doubt that shale gas is transforming the US energy-based 
economy. An importer of natural gas, with 10 percent imports in 2010, we 
are essentially already in an era of domestic self-sufficiency in 2014. Now the 
argument has shifted to how much export of liquefied natural gas is in the 
national interest. The sheer abundance of gas is keeping the prices low, and 
models from two different sources indicate that the prices should remain low 
to moderate for decades. An important aspect of note is that the prices can be 
expected to remain stable, without the peaks and valleys experienced in the 
past. This stability is almost as much an attraction to industrial users as the low 
pricing.
Even at the upper end of the modeled pricing range, $8 per MM Btu, gas-
based electricity will be cheaper than that from new coal plants, even without 
a price on carbon. But if prices stay in the lower end of the range for long, 
renewable energy sources will be slow to be adopted unless there is policy 
intervention. Another consequence of sustained prices at the low end will 
be emphasis on wet gas production, because the majority of the profit will 
be in the wet component. This will cause a glut in ethane, which, if properly 
anticipated through cracker capacity addition, could make the US the low-cost 
producer of ethylene, allowing for lucrative exports.
The explosion in shale oil production will eventually dampen the ability 
of OPEC to manipulate prices. In the shorter term, the light sweet oil is not 
permitted to be exported, so the effect is felt through the diverting of that type 
of oil away from the US to other markets. The oil export issue will be strongly 
debated in 2015, especially with the Republican majority in Congress. The 
most recent plummeting of oil prices in late 2014 underlines the need to allow 
exports. Absent exports, domestic production will in effect have a price at 
least $6 lower than world prices. This will reduce the breakeven price for US 
production, thus adversely affecting jobs.
Low cost energy is a tide that lifts all boats of economic growth. Shale gas is 
a powerful such tide. It has burst upon us so unexpectedly that we have become 
rattled by the flotsam it carried with it. This author concludes that the flotsam 
is manageable, allowing us to enjoy the benefits of the tide.
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